Narrative:

This crew had good rapport all month. This comfortable working environment may have contributed to us not monitoring everything at the same time and appropriate time. The captain was trying to sell his home, move across the country, and get ready for training. Company sopa tells us that the PNF will set a newly assigned altitude into the altitude warning indicator (awi). He then points to the new setting and repeats it to the PF. The PF will then, repeat the altitude. Quite frequency during the month of flying, when I was PNF and the captain PF would set th awi, while I was still communicating with ATC. In this case I had set the assigned altitude of 14,000' into the awi. Sopa tells us to then call 2 to go and 1 to go as we are within 2000' and 1000' of the assigned altitude. The PF is to acknowledge these callouts. Occasionally these callouts cannot be made at the proper time due to additional ATC communications. The 1000' to go warning also comes from the awi, with a chime and a light. At 15,000' ATC called us to have us verify our altitude. We all looked at our altimeters, 15,000', then at the awi, 14,000'. We told ATC 15,000' to which they replied 'cleared to climb and maintain 16,000'.' we all were at fault. The crew was tired, the captain was selling his house, moving, and training. Both the captain and first officer wanted to catch that last commuting flight home. The awi does not always go off at 1000' to go and the chime can't always be heard. The crew was comfortable working with each other to the point where sopa was a little lax. I sometimes feel that the cockpit is more professional when working with a crew that doesn't get along well. Extraneous conversation is at a minimum. With fewer distractions, more time is spent with the task at hand.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT ALT DEVIATION OVERSHOT DURING CLIMB.

Narrative: THIS CREW HAD GOOD RAPPORT ALL MONTH. THIS COMFORTABLE WORKING ENVIRONMENT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO US NOT MONITORING EVERYTHING AT THE SAME TIME AND APPROPRIATE TIME. THE CAPT WAS TRYING TO SELL HIS HOME, MOVE ACROSS THE COUNTRY, AND GET READY FOR TRAINING. COMPANY SOPA TELLS US THAT THE PNF WILL SET A NEWLY ASSIGNED ALT INTO THE ALT WARNING INDICATOR (AWI). HE THEN POINTS TO THE NEW SETTING AND REPEATS IT TO THE PF. THE PF WILL THEN, REPEAT THE ALT. QUITE FREQ DURING THE MONTH OF FLYING, WHEN I WAS PNF AND THE CAPT PF WOULD SET TH AWI, WHILE I WAS STILL COMMUNICATING WITH ATC. IN THIS CASE I HAD SET THE ASSIGNED ALT OF 14,000' INTO THE AWI. SOPA TELLS US TO THEN CALL 2 TO GO AND 1 TO GO AS WE ARE WITHIN 2000' AND 1000' OF THE ASSIGNED ALT. THE PF IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THESE CALLOUTS. OCCASIONALLY THESE CALLOUTS CANNOT BE MADE AT THE PROPER TIME DUE TO ADDITIONAL ATC COMS. THE 1000' TO GO WARNING ALSO COMES FROM THE AWI, WITH A CHIME AND A LIGHT. AT 15,000' ATC CALLED US TO HAVE US VERIFY OUR ALT. WE ALL LOOKED AT OUR ALTIMETERS, 15,000', THEN AT THE AWI, 14,000'. WE TOLD ATC 15,000' TO WHICH THEY REPLIED 'CLRED TO CLIMB AND MAINTAIN 16,000'.' WE ALL WERE AT FAULT. THE CREW WAS TIRED, THE CAPT WAS SELLING HIS HOUSE, MOVING, AND TRAINING. BOTH THE CAPT AND F/O WANTED TO CATCH THAT LAST COMMUTING FLT HOME. THE AWI DOES NOT ALWAYS GO OFF AT 1000' TO GO AND THE CHIME CAN'T ALWAYS BE HEARD. THE CREW WAS COMFORTABLE WORKING WITH EACH OTHER TO THE POINT WHERE SOPA WAS A LITTLE LAX. I SOMETIMES FEEL THAT THE COCKPIT IS MORE PROFESSIONAL WHEN WORKING WITH A CREW THAT DOESN'T GET ALONG WELL. EXTRANEOUS CONVERSATION IS AT A MINIMUM. WITH FEWER DISTRACTIONS, MORE TIME IS SPENT WITH THE TASK AT HAND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.