Narrative:

While descending we entered IMC and icing conditions. I estimate we were 50 miles from the airport. Upon entering these conditions we turned on our cowl and wing anti-ice. Shortly thereafter the EICAS indicated a master warning immediately followed by a master caution anti-ice duct fail message. We then received master caution left and right wing anti-ice fail messages. The first officer (first officer) and I complied with the appropriate QRH items and informed approach that we were having issues with our icing system and requested an expedited ILS into ZZZ and a lower altitude. Shortly thereafter we began leaving icing conditions and mutually decided an emergency did not need to be declared. At this point we were out of icing conditions and would have full use of flaps 45; normal approach speeds; and no increase in runway landing distance. We landed; taxied to the gate and contacted dispatch to initiate a write-up with maintenance. The first officer and I taxied out to a run-up area with contract maintenance to do several tests on the system. We then did a subsequent test at the gate with new textual information from our maintenance to contract maintenance that was more precise/correct for testing the system. Although the system checked out on the ground the first officer and I agreed that while it was legal to depart it still might not be safe. The reasons were several. The icing conditions from ZZZ all the way down to a large area were calling for icing 3;000 feet -23;000 feet. Since we were limited to FL250 due to single pack operations; this was a serious consideration. It was also night time and a considerable portion of the flight would be over mountainous/remote terrain. While on the ground the aircraft experienced an ice detect 2 fail status message. Simply resetting the system and having the messages disappear from the EICAS did not inspire confidence to return to destination under these conditions. During a conference call with the company we explained our rationale. We fully understood this would inconvenience holiday passengers and that certain entities with non-aviation backgrounds might not understand why we did not depart in a plane that was legally signed off. Ultimately we were told that it was solely our decision. We offered to do it the next day during daylight and vastly better weather. The following day we did depart the airport to destination. During flight we had a master warning immediately followed by a master caution anti-ice duct fail. Thankfully better conditions allowed us to quickly exit icing conditions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 flight crew experienced a 'left and right wing anti-ice fail' EICAS message on approach in icing conditions; descended below icing and landed without incident. After system checked OK on the ground by Contract Maintenance; despite company pressure to continue; flight crew elected to delay departure until the following day due to forecast icing conditions enroute to final destination.

Narrative: While descending we entered IMC and icing conditions. I estimate we were 50 miles from the airport. Upon entering these conditions we turned on our cowl and wing anti-ice. Shortly thereafter the EICAS indicated a master warning immediately followed by a master caution anti-ice duct fail message. We then received master caution left and right wing anti-ice fail messages. The First Officer (FO) and I complied with the appropriate QRH items and informed Approach that we were having issues with our icing system and requested an expedited ILS into ZZZ and a lower altitude. Shortly thereafter we began leaving icing conditions and mutually decided an emergency did not need to be declared. At this point we were out of icing conditions and would have full use of flaps 45; normal approach speeds; and no increase in runway landing distance. We landed; taxied to the gate and contacted dispatch to initiate a write-up with maintenance. The FO and I taxied out to a run-up area with contract maintenance to do several tests on the system. We then did a subsequent test at the gate with new textual information from our maintenance to contract maintenance that was more precise/correct for testing the system. Although the system checked out on the ground the FO and I agreed that while it was legal to depart it still might not be safe. The reasons were several. The icing conditions from ZZZ all the way down to a large area were calling for icing 3;000 feet -23;000 feet. Since we were limited to FL250 due to single pack operations; this was a serious consideration. It was also night time and a considerable portion of the flight would be over mountainous/remote terrain. While on the ground the aircraft experienced an Ice Detect 2 Fail status message. Simply resetting the system and having the messages disappear from the EICAS did not inspire confidence to return to destination under these conditions. During a conference call with the company we explained our rationale. We fully understood this would inconvenience holiday passengers and that certain entities with non-aviation backgrounds might not understand why we did not depart in a plane that was legally signed off. Ultimately we were told that it was solely our decision. We offered to do it the next day during daylight and vastly better weather. The following day we did depart the airport to destination. During flight we had a Master Warning immediately followed by a Master Caution Anti-Ice Duct Fail. Thankfully better conditions allowed us to quickly exit icing conditions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.