Narrative:

Flight iai from den to abq. Flight had departed den on runway 35L cleared for a den-9 SID, J013 ALS.... The SID includes 'maintain 10,000'. After takeoff departure control was contacted on 123.85 and a turn to 170 issued. As we rolled out on the 170 heading, the first officer (PNF) announced to departure control 'iai out of 9 for 10.' departure's response was partially garbled but was later deciphered to be 'expect higher 10 south of den.' as we were trying to decipher this transmission and before the first officer had an opportunity to respond, departure returned with 'xxia cleared for FL200'. The first officer responded with 'cleared to 200'. He either did not include a call sign or it was blocked. I questioned the clearance, and the second officer affirmed that it was for us, so I initiated a climb. It was an unusual clearance for that location, but I could see the inbound track south of the airport, and there was an aircraft at 12 O'clock and about 10 mi that was going to pass clear off our left and moving away, so I rationalized that that was the last in the inbound string and the clearance was indeed for us. Shortly later, as we passed approximately 12,000, I sighted an inbound descending at our 2 O'clock that was going to be a conflict, so I increased the rate of climb to pass well above him. As we passed 13, departure questioned our altitude and issued the traffic. We assumed visual separation before a conflict occurred so no violation (?) happened. Our clearance was indeed remain at 10,000, expect higher south. The controller then immediately issued a clearance to an air carrier Y xxia swbnd to climb to 200. The response on the tape was missing a call sign, although the controller later had to reissue the clearance to air carrier Y. A case of VFR WX saving the bacon. Had it been in WX, we would undoubtedly have had a traffic conflict or worse with the inbound. Air carrier Y's not getting the clearance in a timely manner put him in conflict with the high terrain west of the airport. What did I learn, or relearn? First, if it doesn't feel right, start seeking confirmation from outside your immediate circle of friends. Second, be particularly alert for weakness in your fellow crew members, especially ones who you are unfamiliar with. (The first officer was an older, but relatively new crew member. As I found out as the 4-DAY trip progressed, he was very weak, particularly on the radio and in the situational awareness area.)

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT ALT DEVIATION OVERSHOT DURING CLIMB RESULTS IN CLOSE PROX WITH OPPOSITE DIRECTION INBOUND TRAFFIC.

Narrative: FLT IAI FROM DEN TO ABQ. FLT HAD DEPARTED DEN ON RWY 35L CLRED FOR A DEN-9 SID, J013 ALS.... THE SID INCLUDES 'MAINTAIN 10,000'. AFTER TKOF DEP CTL WAS CONTACTED ON 123.85 AND A TURN TO 170 ISSUED. AS WE ROLLED OUT ON THE 170 HDG, THE F/O (PNF) ANNOUNCED TO DEP CTL 'IAI OUT OF 9 FOR 10.' DEP'S RESPONSE WAS PARTIALLY GARBLED BUT WAS LATER DECIPHERED TO BE 'EXPECT HIGHER 10 S OF DEN.' AS WE WERE TRYING TO DECIPHER THIS XMISSION AND BEFORE THE F/O HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND, DEP RETURNED WITH 'XXIA CLRED FOR FL200'. THE F/O RESPONDED WITH 'CLRED TO 200'. HE EITHER DID NOT INCLUDE A CALL SIGN OR IT WAS BLOCKED. I QUESTIONED THE CLRNC, AND THE S/O AFFIRMED THAT IT WAS FOR US, SO I INITIATED A CLIMB. IT WAS AN UNUSUAL CLRNC FOR THAT LOCATION, BUT I COULD SEE THE INBND TRACK S OF THE ARPT, AND THERE WAS AN ACFT AT 12 O'CLOCK AND ABOUT 10 MI THAT WAS GOING TO PASS CLEAR OFF OUR LEFT AND MOVING AWAY, SO I RATIONALIZED THAT THAT WAS THE LAST IN THE INBND STRING AND THE CLRNC WAS INDEED FOR US. SHORTLY LATER, AS WE PASSED APPROX 12,000, I SIGHTED AN INBND DESCENDING AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK THAT WAS GOING TO BE A CONFLICT, SO I INCREASED THE RATE OF CLIMB TO PASS WELL ABOVE HIM. AS WE PASSED 13, DEP QUESTIONED OUR ALT AND ISSUED THE TFC. WE ASSUMED VISUAL SEPARATION BEFORE A CONFLICT OCCURRED SO NO VIOLATION (?) HAPPENED. OUR CLRNC WAS INDEED REMAIN AT 10,000, EXPECT HIGHER SOUTH. THE CTLR THEN IMMEDIATELY ISSUED A CLRNC TO AN ACR Y XXIA SWBND TO CLIMB TO 200. THE RESPONSE ON THE TAPE WAS MISSING A CALL SIGN, ALTHOUGH THE CTLR LATER HAD TO REISSUE THE CLRNC TO ACR Y. A CASE OF VFR WX SAVING THE BACON. HAD IT BEEN IN WX, WE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE HAD A TFC CONFLICT OR WORSE WITH THE INBND. ACR Y'S NOT GETTING THE CLRNC IN A TIMELY MANNER PUT HIM IN CONFLICT WITH THE HIGH TERRAIN W OF THE ARPT. WHAT DID I LEARN, OR RELEARN? FIRST, IF IT DOESN'T FEEL RIGHT, START SEEKING CONFIRMATION FROM OUTSIDE YOUR IMMEDIATE CIRCLE OF FRIENDS. SECOND, BE PARTICULARLY ALERT FOR WEAKNESS IN YOUR FELLOW CREW MEMBERS, ESPECIALLY ONES WHO YOU ARE UNFAMILIAR WITH. (THE F/O WAS AN OLDER, BUT RELATIVELY NEW CREW MEMBER. AS I FOUND OUT AS THE 4-DAY TRIP PROGRESSED, HE WAS VERY WEAK, PARTICULARLY ON THE RADIO AND IN THE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AREA.)

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.