Light transport climbed through the altitude of an MTR.

Attributes
ACN	120865
Time
Date	198908
Day	Fri
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	atc facility : ape
State Reference	OH
Altitude	msl bound lower : 10000 msl bound upper : 11000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	artcc : zid
Operator	other
Make Model Name	Military Trainer
Flight Phase	cruise other
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Operator	common carrier : air taxi
Make Model Name	Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng
Flight Phase	climbout : intermediate altitude
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	controller : non radar
Qualification	controller : developmental
Experience	controller non radar : 2
ASRS Report	120865
Person 2
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	controller : radar
Qualification	controller : radar
Experience	controller radar : 5
ASRS Report	120957
Events
Anomaly	conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : published procedure non adherence : required legal separation
Independent Detector	atc equipment other atc equipment : unspecified other controllera
Resolutory Action	other
Consequence	Other
Miss Distance	horizontal : 12000 vertical : 300
Supplementary
Primary Problem	ATC Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Operational Error

Narrative:

MTR X was level wbound at 110. Light transport Y coming off of cmh checked on frequency climbing to 100. Radar controller cleared light transport Y 'maintain 100 fly heading 360 vectors for traffic'. Light transport Y read back 'roger 160 heading 360'. Both radar and manual controller did not catch wrong readback. When light transport Y was detected through 100 separation had already been lost. I feel both the improper readback by a pilot and the inability of 2 different controllers detecting this bad readback were contributing factors in this situation. As controllers we bear responsibilities of detecting these bad readbacks, many of which are (just plain a mistake) inadvertent. At the same time, many bad readbacks are the simple result of pilots not listening! I feel more emphasis should be placed on pilots listening up. They should also be made aware that their bad readback (whether listening up or not was a factor) caused a controller to lose separation. As controllers, we need to give our utmost attention to listening, but we also need the utmost attention from the pilots to listen to us also.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LTT CLIMBED THROUGH THE ALT OF AN MTR.

Narrative: MTR X WAS LEVEL WBOUND AT 110. LTT Y COMING OFF OF CMH CHECKED ON FREQ CLIMBING TO 100. RADAR CTLR CLRED LTT Y 'MAINTAIN 100 FLY HDG 360 VECTORS FOR TFC'. LTT Y READ BACK 'ROGER 160 HDG 360'. BOTH RADAR AND MANUAL CTLR DID NOT CATCH WRONG READBACK. WHEN LTT Y WAS DETECTED THROUGH 100 SEPARATION HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST. I FEEL BOTH THE IMPROPER READBACK BY A PLT AND THE INABILITY OF 2 DIFFERENT CTLRS DETECTING THIS BAD READBACK WERE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN THIS SITUATION. AS CTLRS WE BEAR RESPONSIBILITIES OF DETECTING THESE BAD READBACKS, MANY OF WHICH ARE (JUST PLAIN A MISTAKE) INADVERTENT. AT THE SAME TIME, MANY BAD READBACKS ARE THE SIMPLE RESULT OF PLTS NOT LISTENING! I FEEL MORE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON PLTS LISTENING UP. THEY SHOULD ALSO BE MADE AWARE THAT THEIR BAD READBACK (WHETHER LISTENING UP OR NOT WAS A FACTOR) CAUSED A CTLR TO LOSE SEPARATION. AS CTLRS, WE NEED TO GIVE OUR UTMOST ATTN TO LISTENING, BUT WE ALSO NEED THE UTMOST ATTN FROM THE PLTS TO LISTEN TO US ALSO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.