Narrative:

I took one of our pilots, who needed a checkride in the light transport to upgrade to captain, to portland, me, from east hampton via barnes, ma. We needed to go to portland since this is the only area where the FAA in our region has a qualified light transport examiner. The instructor pilot who trained this particular captain informed me that he was not able to do no flap lndgs. We left east hampton in the morning on august xx and headed toward barnes airport where we needed to make a stop. Before landing in barnes, I pulled out the flap selector circuit breaker to simulate a flap failure. We landed in barnes and I pushed in the circuit breaker. We then headed from barnes to portland, me, for the checkride. Outside of portland, I again pulled the same circuit breaker to simulate the same situation, again, once we landed, I pushed the circuit breaker back to the normal position. During the checkride with this captain, I was performing the duties of check airman and examiner and was sitting in the right seat. Normally, as check airman, I could do this checkride without an examiner observing, however, since a type rating was needed for this pilot, we needed the examiner to issue the new certificate. During the actual flight portion of the checkride, I pulled the circuit breaker for flap selector, as I did earlier. During this approach, the pilot was high and fast but we landed uneventfully. During the post-flight briefing, the FAA examiner pointed out that the pilot was high and fast on this approach, but said he was still within limits and the pilot passed the flight check. We left portland, me, and proceeded to la guardia airport, ny, where we were going to do a flight out of. On the way in, I again pulled this same circuit breaker to give the pilot more practice on a no flap landing. However, as we got closer in to the airport, it was very busy, so I pushed the circuit breaker back in, the flaps worked normally and we landed. On august xx + 7, 1989, our local FAA office came in for a routine inspection. After inspecting flight logs, they noticed that on the above date the hobbs meter was 2 hours less from what the hand written wheels up to wheels down flight time was. Since the airplane was due for an inspection the following day, they suggested that we did something to slow down the hobbs meter so that we could continue to fly the airplane beyond its scheduled inspection time. We denied this since it wasn't true and they said before they make any accusations, they would allow our company management to come in and try to explain the situation. I only found out yesterday, august xx + 12, 1989, that by pulling the flap selector circuit breaker this also disables the hobbs meter in the aircraft. I feel that when this is explained to the FAA they will determine that the aircraft was inadvertently flown beyond an inspection and a violation exists. I feel the whole cause to this situation is the fact that this information is not made clear in the aircraft pilots operating handbook. As a matter of fact, it is not even mentioned. I found out about it through our director of maintenance who knew about this through some obscure diagram in a maintenance manual. If the hobbs meter had its own circuit breaker or if this fact was mentioned in the pilots operating handbook, this whole situation would have been avoided.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT TRAINING FOR NO FLAP LNDGS BY PULLING CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAA CLAIMS DELIBERATELY ADJUSTED HOBBS METER TO CONTINUE FLT BEYOND INSPECTION TIME FRAME.

Narrative: I TOOK ONE OF OUR PLTS, WHO NEEDED A CHECKRIDE IN THE LTT TO UPGRADE TO CAPT, TO PORTLAND, ME, FROM EAST HAMPTON VIA BARNES, MA. WE NEEDED TO GO TO PORTLAND SINCE THIS IS THE ONLY AREA WHERE THE FAA IN OUR REGION HAS A QUALIFIED LTT EXAMINER. THE INSTRUCTOR PLT WHO TRAINED THIS PARTICULAR CAPT INFORMED ME THAT HE WAS NOT ABLE TO DO NO FLAP LNDGS. WE LEFT EAST HAMPTON IN THE MORNING ON AUGUST XX AND HEADED TOWARD BARNES ARPT WHERE WE NEEDED TO MAKE A STOP. BEFORE LNDG IN BARNES, I PULLED OUT THE FLAP SELECTOR CIRCUIT BREAKER TO SIMULATE A FLAP FAILURE. WE LANDED IN BARNES AND I PUSHED IN THE CIRCUIT BREAKER. WE THEN HEADED FROM BARNES TO PORTLAND, ME, FOR THE CHECKRIDE. OUTSIDE OF PORTLAND, I AGAIN PULLED THE SAME CIRCUIT BREAKER TO SIMULATE THE SAME SITUATION, AGAIN, ONCE WE LANDED, I PUSHED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER BACK TO THE NORMAL POSITION. DURING THE CHECKRIDE WITH THIS CAPT, I WAS PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF CHECK AIRMAN AND EXAMINER AND WAS SITTING IN THE RIGHT SEAT. NORMALLY, AS CHECK AIRMAN, I COULD DO THIS CHECKRIDE WITHOUT AN EXAMINER OBSERVING, HOWEVER, SINCE A TYPE RATING WAS NEEDED FOR THIS PLT, WE NEEDED THE EXAMINER TO ISSUE THE NEW CERTIFICATE. DURING THE ACTUAL FLT PORTION OF THE CHECKRIDE, I PULLED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR FLAP SELECTOR, AS I DID EARLIER. DURING THIS APCH, THE PLT WAS HIGH AND FAST BUT WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. DURING THE POST-FLT BRIEFING, THE FAA EXAMINER POINTED OUT THAT THE PLT WAS HIGH AND FAST ON THIS APCH, BUT SAID HE WAS STILL WITHIN LIMITS AND THE PLT PASSED THE FLT CHECK. WE LEFT PORTLAND, ME, AND PROCEEDED TO LA GUARDIA ARPT, NY, WHERE WE WERE GOING TO DO A FLT OUT OF. ON THE WAY IN, I AGAIN PULLED THIS SAME CIRCUIT BREAKER TO GIVE THE PLT MORE PRACTICE ON A NO FLAP LNDG. HOWEVER, AS WE GOT CLOSER IN TO THE ARPT, IT WAS VERY BUSY, SO I PUSHED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER BACK IN, THE FLAPS WORKED NORMALLY AND WE LANDED. ON AUGUST XX + 7, 1989, OUR LOCAL FAA OFFICE CAME IN FOR A ROUTINE INSPECTION. AFTER INSPECTING FLT LOGS, THEY NOTICED THAT ON THE ABOVE DATE THE HOBBS METER WAS 2 HRS LESS FROM WHAT THE HAND WRITTEN WHEELS UP TO WHEELS DOWN FLT TIME WAS. SINCE THE AIRPLANE WAS DUE FOR AN INSPECTION THE FOLLOWING DAY, THEY SUGGESTED THAT WE DID SOMETHING TO SLOW DOWN THE HOBBS METER SO THAT WE COULD CONTINUE TO FLY THE AIRPLANE BEYOND ITS SCHEDULED INSPECTION TIME. WE DENIED THIS SINCE IT WASN'T TRUE AND THEY SAID BEFORE THEY MAKE ANY ACCUSATIONS, THEY WOULD ALLOW OUR COMPANY MGMNT TO COME IN AND TRY TO EXPLAIN THE SITUATION. I ONLY FOUND OUT YESTERDAY, AUGUST XX + 12, 1989, THAT BY PULLING THE FLAP SELECTOR CIRCUIT BREAKER THIS ALSO DISABLES THE HOBBS METER IN THE ACFT. I FEEL THAT WHEN THIS IS EXPLAINED TO THE FAA THEY WILL DETERMINE THAT THE ACFT WAS INADVERTENTLY FLOWN BEYOND AN INSPECTION AND A VIOLATION EXISTS. I FEEL THE WHOLE CAUSE TO THIS SITUATION IS THE FACT THAT THIS INFORMATION IS NOT MADE CLEAR IN THE ACFT PLTS OPERATING HANDBOOK. AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT IS NOT EVEN MENTIONED. I FOUND OUT ABOUT IT THROUGH OUR DIRECTOR OF MAINT WHO KNEW ABOUT THIS THROUGH SOME OBSCURE DIAGRAM IN A MAINT MANUAL. IF THE HOBBS METER HAD ITS OWN CIRCUIT BREAKER OR IF THIS FACT WAS MENTIONED IN THE PLTS OPERATING HANDBOOK, THIS WHOLE SITUATION WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.