Narrative:

During cruise; had apparent number 2 generator failure; saw source off light followed by drive light. While running the checklists; we noticed an odor like burning rubber or plastic; and the flight attendants reported the same throughout the cabin. We donned the masks/goggles and continued checklists to include smoke/fumes on the aircraft. We declared the emergency and diverted to a nearby airport. The fumes/odor remained but did not increase; and no smoke was seen at any time. Decent and landing were normal; and after fire crews checked us out externally; we taxied to the gate.I don't believe we made any significant errors in handling this event; but the major issue was with the O2 mask/goggles (single combined unit in this aircraft) and communications and coordination. I don't believe the fumes warranted goggles; but it was not an option in this case. Glare and reduced visibility with the goggles hindered us a bit in checklist switchology. And of course communication inside and outside the cockpit was cumbersome and slow. I would have liked to make a reassuring PA informing the passengers of our situation; but I felt maxed out; so I had the flight attendant do it. As far as the divert; I accepted clearance to a point on the arrival which had to be programmed; but I should have requested vectors. Post-flight; we were replaced with pilots; a good choice even though we felt we could continue. Then we agreed to deadhead. A better choice would have been to go to the hotel and deadhead the next day. This would have avoided a number of hassles and a very long; late duty day; and given us better crew rest. A couple of suggestions: continue to have us practice with the masks in training; that limited exposure was helpful. [One should] request vectors to simplify the situation. After a stressful event like this; hang it up and go to the hotel.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-700 Number 2 Generator alerted SOURCE OFF; then DRIVE followed by a burning rubber or plastic odor. Smoke masks with integrated goggles were donned; an emergency declared and the flight diverted to a nearby airport. All communications were difficult.

Narrative: During cruise; had apparent Number 2 Generator failure; saw SOURCE OFF light followed by DRIVE light. While running the checklists; we noticed an odor like burning rubber or plastic; and the flight attendants reported the same throughout the cabin. We donned the masks/goggles and continued checklists to include smoke/fumes on the aircraft. We declared the emergency and diverted to a nearby airport. The fumes/odor remained but did not increase; and no smoke was seen at any time. Decent and landing were normal; and after fire crews checked us out externally; we taxied to the gate.I don't believe we made any significant errors in handling this event; but the major issue was with the O2 mask/goggles (single combined unit in this aircraft) and communications and coordination. I don't believe the fumes warranted goggles; but it was not an option in this case. Glare and reduced visibility with the goggles hindered us a bit in checklist switchology. And of course communication inside and outside the cockpit was cumbersome and slow. I would have liked to make a reassuring PA informing the passengers of our situation; but I felt maxed out; so I had the flight attendant do it. As far as the divert; I accepted clearance to a point on the arrival which had to be programmed; but I should have requested vectors. Post-flight; we were replaced with pilots; a good choice even though we felt we could continue. Then we agreed to deadhead. A better choice would have been to go to the hotel and deadhead the next day. This would have avoided a number of hassles and a very long; late duty day; and given us better crew rest. A couple of suggestions: Continue to have us practice with the masks in training; that limited exposure was helpful. [One should] request vectors to simplify the situation. After a stressful event like this; hang it up and go to the hotel.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.