Narrative:

The start of this incident began with the phone call to FSS, when I neglected to request NOTAMS and none were offered during the briefing. As it was, I found out from approach control the uncontrolled field selected as our destination had a temporary control tower. We were cleared to land on the short runway. I responded we wanted the longer one and were told the main runway was being repaired and 'men and equipment' were blocking part of its use. That was why the temporary tower was there. We then were cleared to land on the longer runway. Considering we would be landing toward the location of the men and equipment, we reselected the shorter runway and landed. It was not until after landing that I noticed the shorter runway was cut into a forest of 60' pine trees making for uneasy thoughts about using it for takeoff. A quick recalculation of our light twin's accelerate-stop distance, at near maximum gross weight, showed we would use nearly every bit of the shorter runway to stop if we lost an engine on takeoff. Our accelerate-go distance was even more critical considering the 60' pine trees. An engine failure after rotation and before climbing above 300' meant hitting the trees. While we were clearing customs, 2 commuter aircraft landed and one took off on the main runway toward the men and equipment. Although the equipment was on the runway, the main runway offered 25% more length than the shorter runway, plus there was wide open ground on the left side and departure ends. If we needed to abort the takeoff, I felt much better about avoiding the men and equipment and rolling out on grass rather than rolling out into trees. However, on taxi out for takeoff, we were directed to the short runway and definitely told the main runway was unavailable due to the men and equipment. No explanation why the commuter aircraft could use it and we couldn't, just unavailable. The smaller runway intersected the main runway, making a shape like a leaning 'T,' with the run-up area at the top, center of the 'T.' as we approached the run-up area, ground told us to cross the main runway and contact tower for takeoff. Still not happy with their attempts to run my aircraft, I told them we were going to do our run-up checks first. 'Fine, contact tower when ready for takeoff.' it was then I decided to get a little better safety margin by fast taxiing onto the runway and making a running takeoff. We contacted the tower and received, 'cleared for takeoff,' swung around, aimed for the runway and pushed up the power to fast-taxi across the main runway and hit the approach end of the smaller runway running--and that's exactly what we almost did. The main runway has a slight crest at its centerline, running the length, probably for better water drainage, but it also blocks the sight of runway end lights set on low stanchions for the short runway. Nearly across the main runway centerline these light stanchions came in view, but we had accelerated too fast to stop. I swerved to the right to avoid them, went off the runway onto a small, paved shoulder, then dodged left between the runway edge lights and onto the short runway, went to full power and took off. Luckily, nothing was hit. Reflecting on how this accident almost happened, I positively should have advised the tower of my intentions and should certainly have gotten a closer look at the area before diving in. Also, as I mentioned in the beginning, getting the NOTAMS on the airport would have also helped, although west/O knowing about the high pine trees proximity to the short runway, I probably would have still used this airport. Receiving the tower's takeoff clearance, west/O a 'taxi across...' at that location on the airport also contributed to my actions. There can be no doubt this incident, although initiated by safety concerns, was brought on by a momentary lapse in my judgement. A re-reminder to always be alert and think. It's ironic, my front seat passenger remarked to me just afterward, that that was some pretty sharp flying. I had to correct him by telling him the definition of a superior pilot: 'one who uses superior judgement so he doesn't have to use his superior skill.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF LIGHT TWIN ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVISE WHEN DEPARTING THE SHORT RWY AT PORT ANGELES. A TEMPORARY CTL TWR HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BECAUSE OF CONSTRUCTION ON THE LONGER RWY. IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXECUTE A RUNNING TKOF, THE REPORTER NARROWLY MISSES RWY 31 END LIGHTS. THE TXWY APPEARS TO LINE UP WITH THE RWY.

Narrative: THE START OF THIS INCIDENT BEGAN WITH THE PHONE CALL TO FSS, WHEN I NEGLECTED TO REQUEST NOTAMS AND NONE WERE OFFERED DURING THE BRIEFING. AS IT WAS, I FOUND OUT FROM APCH CTL THE UNCONTROLLED FIELD SELECTED AS OUR DEST HAD A TEMPORARY CTL TWR. WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON THE SHORT RWY. I RESPONDED WE WANTED THE LONGER ONE AND WERE TOLD THE MAIN RWY WAS BEING REPAIRED AND 'MEN AND EQUIPMENT' WERE BLOCKING PART OF ITS USE. THAT WAS WHY THE TEMPORARY TWR WAS THERE. WE THEN WERE CLRED TO LAND ON THE LONGER RWY. CONSIDERING WE WOULD BE LNDG TOWARD THE LOCATION OF THE MEN AND EQUIP, WE RESELECTED THE SHORTER RWY AND LANDED. IT WAS NOT UNTIL AFTER LNDG THAT I NOTICED THE SHORTER RWY WAS CUT INTO A FOREST OF 60' PINE TREES MAKING FOR UNEASY THOUGHTS ABOUT USING IT FOR TKOF. A QUICK RECALCULATION OF OUR LIGHT TWIN'S ACCELERATE-STOP DISTANCE, AT NEAR MAX GROSS WT, SHOWED WE WOULD USE NEARLY EVERY BIT OF THE SHORTER RWY TO STOP IF WE LOST AN ENG ON TKOF. OUR ACCELERATE-GO DISTANCE WAS EVEN MORE CRITICAL CONSIDERING THE 60' PINE TREES. AN ENG FAILURE AFTER ROTATION AND BEFORE CLBING ABOVE 300' MEANT HITTING THE TREES. WHILE WE WERE CLRING CUSTOMS, 2 COMMUTER ACFT LANDED AND ONE TOOK OFF ON THE MAIN RWY TOWARD THE MEN AND EQUIP. ALTHOUGH THE EQUIP WAS ON THE RWY, THE MAIN RWY OFFERED 25% MORE LENGTH THAN THE SHORTER RWY, PLUS THERE WAS WIDE OPEN GND ON THE LEFT SIDE AND DEP ENDS. IF WE NEEDED TO ABORT THE TKOF, I FELT MUCH BETTER ABOUT AVOIDING THE MEN AND EQUIP AND ROLLING OUT ON GRASS RATHER THAN ROLLING OUT INTO TREES. HOWEVER, ON TAXI OUT FOR TKOF, WE WERE DIRECTED TO THE SHORT RWY AND DEFINITELY TOLD THE MAIN RWY WAS UNAVAILABLE DUE TO THE MEN AND EQUIP. NO EXPLANATION WHY THE COMMUTER ACFT COULD USE IT AND WE COULDN'T, JUST UNAVAILABLE. THE SMALLER RWY INTERSECTED THE MAIN RWY, MAKING A SHAPE LIKE A LEANING 'T,' WITH THE RUN-UP AREA AT THE TOP, CENTER OF THE 'T.' AS WE APCHED THE RUN-UP AREA, GND TOLD US TO CROSS THE MAIN RWY AND CONTACT TWR FOR TKOF. STILL NOT HAPPY WITH THEIR ATTEMPTS TO RUN MY ACFT, I TOLD THEM WE WERE GOING TO DO OUR RUN-UP CHKS FIRST. 'FINE, CONTACT TWR WHEN READY FOR TKOF.' IT WAS THEN I DECIDED TO GET A LITTLE BETTER SAFETY MARGIN BY FAST TAXIING ONTO THE RWY AND MAKING A RUNNING TKOF. WE CONTACTED THE TWR AND RECEIVED, 'CLRED FOR TKOF,' SWUNG AROUND, AIMED FOR THE RWY AND PUSHED UP THE PWR TO FAST-TAXI ACROSS THE MAIN RWY AND HIT THE APCH END OF THE SMALLER RWY RUNNING--AND THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT WE ALMOST DID. THE MAIN RWY HAS A SLIGHT CREST AT ITS CENTERLINE, RUNNING THE LENGTH, PROBABLY FOR BETTER WATER DRAINAGE, BUT IT ALSO BLOCKS THE SIGHT OF RWY END LIGHTS SET ON LOW STANCHIONS FOR THE SHORT RWY. NEARLY ACROSS THE MAIN RWY CENTERLINE THESE LIGHT STANCHIONS CAME IN VIEW, BUT WE HAD ACCELERATED TOO FAST TO STOP. I SWERVED TO THE RIGHT TO AVOID THEM, WENT OFF THE RWY ONTO A SMALL, PAVED SHOULDER, THEN DODGED LEFT BTWN THE RWY EDGE LIGHTS AND ONTO THE SHORT RWY, WENT TO FULL PWR AND TOOK OFF. LUCKILY, NOTHING WAS HIT. REFLECTING ON HOW THIS ACCIDENT ALMOST HAPPENED, I POSITIVELY SHOULD HAVE ADVISED THE TWR OF MY INTENTIONS AND SHOULD CERTAINLY HAVE GOTTEN A CLOSER LOOK AT THE AREA BEFORE DIVING IN. ALSO, AS I MENTIONED IN THE BEGINNING, GETTING THE NOTAMS ON THE ARPT WOULD HAVE ALSO HELPED, ALTHOUGH W/O KNOWING ABOUT THE HIGH PINE TREES PROX TO THE SHORT RWY, I PROBABLY WOULD HAVE STILL USED THIS ARPT. RECEIVING THE TWR'S TKOF CLRNC, W/O A 'TAXI ACROSS...' AT THAT LOCATION ON THE ARPT ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO MY ACTIONS. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THIS INCIDENT, ALTHOUGH INITIATED BY SAFETY CONCERNS, WAS BROUGHT ON BY A MOMENTARY LAPSE IN MY JUDGEMENT. A RE-REMINDER TO ALWAYS BE ALERT AND THINK. IT'S IRONIC, MY FRONT SEAT PAX REMARKED TO ME JUST AFTERWARD, THAT THAT WAS SOME PRETTY SHARP FLYING. I HAD TO CORRECT HIM BY TELLING HIM THE DEFINITION OF A SUPERIOR PLT: 'ONE WHO USES SUPERIOR JUDGEMENT SO HE DOESN'T HAVE TO USE HIS SUPERIOR SKILL.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.