Narrative:

Upon preflighting the airplane I discovered the cvr would not test. Maintenance deferred the cvr. We started engines and received the level 1 alert hydraulic pump test fail. We checked the QRH which referred us to the aom manual procedure. The aom manual procedure indicated there was a problem with the #3 system edp. We coordinated with the mechanic on the headset; ramp control; flight control; and maintenance. Ramp control needed us to move to get out of the way of another outbound. Maintenance replaced the offending part; and while on the ground we discovered the captain's hand mic was inoperable. Maintenance deferred the hand mic. Shortly after clean up on climbout I noticed that in order to maintain wings level as confirmed by the flight director; a significant angle to the left was required on my control yoke. In other words; my control yoke and the ailerons were out of rig. Also; along the way we got a level 1 no autoland; for no reason we could discern. We pulled up the config page and confirmed that at this considerable control yoke deflection there was no aileron movement displayed on the config page. I used aileron trim to trim the pressure off my control yoke. This did not change the angle the yoke sat at to maintain wings level. (I mention this because the maintenance supervisor who met the airplane seemed confused on this point.) the captain looked down and noticed I had used more than 2 units of aileron trim in order to trim the pressure off my yoke. Knowing the weather around our destination was significantly convective and the destination field had gusty winds I asked if we wanted to call back to operations and get some more people in the loop on our flight control issue of the control yoke being out of rig with the ailerons. I flew and talked to ATC while the captain coordinated with operations. I only heard parts of the conversation due to managing ATC; but at one point I heard maintenance tell my captain that the limit was 2 units of aileron trim; so we were over the limit and it was up to us whether we wanted to continue or bring the plane back. Hearing that we were over the limit on a flight control rigging issue we did not feel it was safe to bring the plane into an area of convective activity or land with wind gusts. We elected to return. On the STAR the autopilot 'south' turned across the course and I went back to hand flying to better control the airplane. On approach and landing we had an approximately 13 knot direct crosswind. Normally such a crosswind is not an issue; heck we use a 10 knot direct crosswind in the sim all the time. This time; however; with the control rigging issue the crosswind control was particularly difficult to maintain. Upon parking we were met by numerous maintenance people; one of whom was some sort of supervisor. Before we had completed the logbook or our secure checklist he was in the cockpit demanding to know what happened. With an attempt at humor I asked if he wanted to hear about the small stuff or the reason for the air turn back. He replied; 'if it is what I think we are signing it off and sending you back out!' I was stunned by his belligerent tone and his expectation bias. As the captain explained the situation to him he was very argumentative in general and insisted that this airplane would continue to fly with the rigging issue with a 'trim sheet' for crews to document how much aileron trim was required and then after data gathering maintenance would address the flight control problem. The maintenance supervisor dismissed my concerns about the difficulty with the crosswind landing saying I shouldn't have used aileron trim. I am concerned that there is actually a worn bearing or pulley causing the control yoke to be out of rig with the ailerons and that could lead to a really big aileron problem for a flight crew sent out to gather data for this 'trim sheet'.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD-11 flight crew reports mis-rigged ailerons that required the First Officer yoke to be deflected about 25 degrees left to maintain wings level. Aileron trim is set to 2.3 units to maintain wings level. Crew elects to return to the departure airport.

Narrative: Upon preflighting the airplane I discovered the CVR would not test. Maintenance deferred the CVR. We started engines and received the Level 1 alert HYD PUMP TEST FAIL. We checked the QRH which referred us to the AOM manual procedure. The AOM manual procedure indicated there was a problem with the #3 system EDP. We coordinated with the Mechanic on the headset; Ramp Control; Flight Control; and Maintenance. Ramp Control needed us to move to get out of the way of another outbound. Maintenance replaced the offending part; and while on the ground we discovered the Captain's hand mic was inoperable. Maintenance deferred the hand mic. Shortly after clean up on climbout I noticed that in order to maintain wings level as confirmed by the flight director; a significant angle to the left was required on my control yoke. In other words; my control yoke and the ailerons were out of rig. Also; along the way we got a level 1 NO AUTOLAND; for no reason we could discern. We pulled up the Config Page and confirmed that at this considerable control yoke deflection there was no aileron movement displayed on the Config Page. I used aileron trim to trim the pressure off my control yoke. This did not change the angle the yoke sat at to maintain wings level. (I mention this because the Maintenance Supervisor who met the airplane seemed confused on this point.) The Captain looked down and noticed I had used more than 2 units of aileron trim in order to trim the pressure off my yoke. Knowing the weather around our destination was significantly convective and the destination field had gusty winds I asked if we wanted to call back to Operations and get some more people in the loop on our flight control issue of the control yoke being out of rig with the ailerons. I flew and talked to ATC while the Captain coordinated with Operations. I only heard parts of the conversation due to managing ATC; but at one point I heard Maintenance tell my Captain that the limit was 2 units of aileron trim; so we were over the limit and it was up to us whether we wanted to continue or bring the plane back. Hearing that we were over the limit on a flight control rigging issue we did not feel it was safe to bring the plane into an area of convective activity or land with wind gusts. We elected to return. On the STAR the autopilot 'S' turned across the course and I went back to hand flying to better control the airplane. On approach and landing we had an approximately 13 knot direct crosswind. Normally such a crosswind is not an issue; heck we use a 10 knot direct crosswind in the sim all the time. This time; however; with the control rigging issue the crosswind control was particularly difficult to maintain. Upon parking we were met by numerous Maintenance people; one of whom was some sort of Supervisor. Before we had completed the logbook or our Secure checklist he was in the cockpit demanding to know what happened. With an attempt at humor I asked if he wanted to hear about the small stuff or the reason for the air turn back. He replied; 'If it is what I think we are signing it off and sending you back out!' I was stunned by his belligerent tone and his expectation bias. As the Captain explained the situation to him he was very argumentative in general and insisted that this airplane would continue to fly with the rigging issue with a 'trim sheet' for crews to document how much aileron trim was required and then after data gathering Maintenance would address the flight control problem. The Maintenance Supervisor dismissed my concerns about the difficulty with the crosswind landing saying I shouldn't have used aileron trim. I am concerned that there is actually a worn bearing or pulley causing the control yoke to be out of rig with the ailerons and that could lead to a really big aileron problem for a flight crew sent out to gather data for this 'trim sheet'.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.