Narrative:

On approach [eight mile final for the ILS]...at approximately 2;500 ft we selected tai for the engines as we began to enter icing conditions (a cloud deck from approximately 2;500 ft to 800 ft). This was the first time during the flight that we used the tai. The number two engine tai showed a disagreement indication: bright light on the overhead panel and a yellow indication on the engine instruments. We cycled the tai several times to no avail. Although the 'correct' response would have been to go around; climb to a non-icing altitude; run the QRH; and continue the flight; given the lack of fuel available (approximately 6;900 pounds); and at least a 200-300 mile flight to find non-icing conditions (if not much more) and the knowledge of the system and the QRH procedures combined with a very thin cloud deck; we chose to continue the approach rather than waste fuel on what would have been a futile attempt to 'fix' the issue. In short; we knew we were going to have to descend through the deck with the tai inoperative no matter what. The tai valve circuit breaker was in.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Upon entering icing conditions on final approach; B737 flight crew received Engine Thermal Anti-Ice inoperative indication for the Number Two Engine and continued the approach to an uneventful landing.

Narrative: On approach [eight mile final for the ILS]...at approximately 2;500 FT we selected TAI for the engines as we began to enter icing conditions (a cloud deck from approximately 2;500 FT to 800 FT). This was the first time during the flight that we used the TAI. The Number Two Engine TAI showed a disagreement indication: bright light on the overhead panel and a yellow indication on the engine instruments. We cycled the TAI several times to no avail. Although the 'correct' response would have been to go around; climb to a non-icing altitude; run the QRH; and continue the flight; given the lack of fuel available (approximately 6;900 LBS); and at least a 200-300 mile flight to find non-icing conditions (if not much more) and the knowledge of the system and the QRH procedures combined with a very thin cloud deck; we chose to continue the approach rather than waste fuel on what would have been a futile attempt to 'fix' the issue. In short; we knew we were going to have to descend through the deck with the TAI inoperative no matter what. The TAI valve circuit breaker was in.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.