Narrative:

We arrived slightly late into washington nat'l. In order to expedite things and hopefully depart on time, I walked into operations to get new WX and our manifest while my copilot picked up our departure clearance. When I returned to the lane the passenger had been boarded and the copilot was ready. As I climbed into the cockpit I unknowingly placed the papers I had brought out north top of our departure clearance. After engine start the copilot picked up a taxi clearance and since this was only my second time to this airport I was watching the airport diagram closely while taxiing and the copilot did the taxi checks. Before we reached the end of the runway the ground controller asked if we could accept an intersection takeoff, informing us how much runway was remaining. I said yes we could and he told us to contact the tower. The copilot called the tower and the tower controller asked if we could accept an immediate takeoff. Again I said yes and he cleared us for an immediate takeoff with a right turn to 050. Shortly after takeoff tower told us to contact departure and the copilot did so. Shortly after this the copilot informed me that he was going to call company with our times. About this time I realized, for the first time, that I did not know how high we were supposed to climb, so I turned and asked the copilot. He assumed I had read the clearance he had written down (who would think an ATP would take off IFR not having any idea what he was doing after takeoff) and since he was not positive of the altitude, he started to look for the clearance which I had accidentally buried. Climbing through 3000' I had a feeling we were very close to if not already through our assigned altitude, so I called approach and asked him to verify our assigned altitude. The controller came back and cleared us to 4000 but then stated that our departure clearance was to climb and maintain 2000'. In my opinion some of the contributing factors in this incident include the fact that everything was hurried from arrival through takeoff. Since this was the last leg of the day for this crew there was both fatigue and the simple desire to be through for the day. There was also the desire to try to keep to scheduled times when we were close to departure time on arrival. The major factor was probably lack of crew coordination, with one person getting the clearance and the other flying and neither making sure the flying pilot knew what he was doing. A couple things that could help prevent this from happening again would be the installation of some sort of altitude reminder, a better place to put departure clrncs, adding a review of the takeoff clearance to the before takeoff checklist, and probably most helpful of all would be the removal of the door-spike that went through the captain's brain when he closed the cockpit door.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW SOARS INTO THE BLUE WITHOUT ANY IDEA OF WHAT THEY'RE CLEARED TO.

Narrative: WE ARRIVED SLIGHTLY LATE INTO WASHINGTON NAT'L. IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE THINGS AND HOPEFULLY DEPART ON TIME, I WALKED INTO OPERATIONS TO GET NEW WX AND OUR MANIFEST WHILE MY COPLT PICKED UP OUR DEP CLRNC. WHEN I RETURNED TO THE LANE THE PAX HAD BEEN BOARDED AND THE COPLT WAS READY. AS I CLIMBED INTO THE COCKPIT I UNKNOWINGLY PLACED THE PAPERS I HAD BROUGHT OUT N TOP OF OUR DEP CLRNC. AFTER ENGINE START THE COPLT PICKED UP A TAXI CLRNC AND SINCE THIS WAS ONLY MY SECOND TIME TO THIS ARPT I WAS WATCHING THE ARPT DIAGRAM CLOSELY WHILE TAXIING AND THE COPLT DID THE TAXI CHECKS. BEFORE WE REACHED THE END OF THE RWY THE GND CTLR ASKED IF WE COULD ACCEPT AN INTXN TKOF, INFORMING US HOW MUCH RWY WAS REMAINING. I SAID YES WE COULD AND HE TOLD US TO CONTACT THE TWR. THE COPLT CALLED THE TWR AND THE TWR CTLR ASKED IF WE COULD ACCEPT AN IMMEDIATE TKOF. AGAIN I SAID YES AND HE CLRED US FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF WITH A RIGHT TURN TO 050. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF TWR TOLD US TO CONTACT DEP AND THE COPLT DID SO. SHORTLY AFTER THIS THE COPLT INFORMED ME THAT HE WAS GOING TO CALL COMPANY WITH OUR TIMES. ABOUT THIS TIME I REALIZED, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THAT I DID NOT KNOW HOW HIGH WE WERE SUPPOSED TO CLIMB, SO I TURNED AND ASKED THE COPLT. HE ASSUMED I HAD READ THE CLRNC HE HAD WRITTEN DOWN (WHO WOULD THINK AN ATP WOULD TAKE OFF IFR NOT HAVING ANY IDEA WHAT HE WAS DOING AFTER TKOF) AND SINCE HE WAS NOT POSITIVE OF THE ALT, HE STARTED TO LOOK FOR THE CLRNC WHICH I HAD ACCIDENTALLY BURIED. CLIMBING THROUGH 3000' I HAD A FEELING WE WERE VERY CLOSE TO IF NOT ALREADY THROUGH OUR ASSIGNED ALT, SO I CALLED APCH AND ASKED HIM TO VERIFY OUR ASSIGNED ALT. THE CTLR CAME BACK AND CLRED US TO 4000 BUT THEN STATED THAT OUR DEP CLRNC WAS TO CLIMB AND MAINTAIN 2000'. IN MY OPINION SOME OF THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN THIS INCIDENT INCLUDE THE FACT THAT EVERYTHING WAS HURRIED FROM ARR THROUGH TKOF. SINCE THIS WAS THE LAST LEG OF THE DAY FOR THIS CREW THERE WAS BOTH FATIGUE AND THE SIMPLE DESIRE TO BE THROUGH FOR THE DAY. THERE WAS ALSO THE DESIRE TO TRY TO KEEP TO SCHEDULED TIMES WHEN WE WERE CLOSE TO DEP TIME ON ARR. THE MAJOR FACTOR WAS PROBABLY LACK OF CREW COORD, WITH ONE PERSON GETTING THE CLRNC AND THE OTHER FLYING AND NEITHER MAKING SURE THE FLYING PLT KNEW WHAT HE WAS DOING. A COUPLE THINGS THAT COULD HELP PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN WOULD BE THE INSTALLATION OF SOME SORT OF ALT REMINDER, A BETTER PLACE TO PUT DEP CLRNCS, ADDING A REVIEW OF THE TKOF CLRNC TO THE BEFORE TKOF CHECKLIST, AND PROBABLY MOST HELPFUL OF ALL WOULD BE THE REMOVAL OF THE DOOR-SPIKE THAT WENT THROUGH THE CAPT'S BRAIN WHEN HE CLOSED THE COCKPIT DOOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.