Narrative:

I departed syracuse, ny (syr) on an IFR flight to newport state, ri (2b4). On board was my employer (a private pilot with an instrument rating) and 2 of his friends. My employer wanted to occupy the left seat position and share the flying. My WX briefing with utica FSS indicated that the WX on arrival would be VFR. Based on this information I allowed my employer to fly from the left seat as he wanted to impress his friends. On entering the westfield, ma area the WX began to look worse than forecast. Airspeed was at the top of the green arc. About this time we started to receive mod rain and turbulence. I reduced power to bring our airspeed back to 160 mph. We broke out 800-1000' AGL approximately 3 1/2 mi from runway 22's end. The autoplt was still coupled and we leveled at the MDA of 680'. Power had been further reduced and airspeed was not 140 mph is level flight. I extended approach flaps and gear as my employer disengaged the autoplt. We were now about 2 1/2-3 mi from the runway end. The runway was not yet visible. I estimate flight visibility as 1 1/2-2 mi. My waiting until MDA to deploy gear and flaps was based on my bosses lack of experience in the aircraft. I wanted to see if we had ground contact at the MDA before extending gear or flaps. This was to reduce his workload should a missed approach be necessary. About 1 1/2-2 mi out the runway lights came into view, we were actually below the VASI at 680 MSL. A descent was begun. When the runway was assured I applied full flaps and brought the power to idle. We crossed the threshold at 70-80 mph and the wheels touched approximately 1/4 of the way down the runway. This is where in my opinion the main error occurred. My employer had never braked a heavy aircraft on a wet runway before and had no concept of hydroplaning. There was standing water on the runway and it was pouring. He applied the brakes too hard and when he felt us slide he compounded the problem by applying them harder. I realized I could not explain to him what to do in time and also discounted a go around due to my position in the aircraft and the time needed to reach throttles, flaps, and gear. I did not have brakes on the right side so I could not take over this function. I elected to let him keep holding the brakes as this was better than having his come off them and I told him we probably would not stop by the end. I pulled the yoke back as far as possible to help us slow. Through the 1/2-1/4 point of runway remaining, the brakes began to slowly take effect. As we reached the last pair of runway side lights, I elected to leave the runway to the left as it was too close to call whether the aircraft would be fully stopped when we reached the runway end lights. We rolled to a stop in wet grass 100-150' off the left end of runway 22, the aircraft was undamaged. On reaching the terminal we could see the winds gave us a tailwind component. This in itself was not enough to cause the overrun nor was the wet runway. But the 2 together combined with improper braking technique caused the incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT PERMITS BOSS, UNFAMILIAR WITH ACFT, TO FLY FROM LEFT SEAT.

Narrative: I DEPARTED SYRACUSE, NY (SYR) ON AN IFR FLT TO NEWPORT STATE, RI (2B4). ON BOARD WAS MY EMPLOYER (A PRIVATE PLT WITH AN INSTRUMENT RATING) AND 2 OF HIS FRIENDS. MY EMPLOYER WANTED TO OCCUPY THE LEFT SEAT POSITION AND SHARE THE FLYING. MY WX BRIEFING WITH UTICA FSS INDICATED THAT THE WX ON ARR WOULD BE VFR. BASED ON THIS INFO I ALLOWED MY EMPLOYER TO FLY FROM THE LEFT SEAT AS HE WANTED TO IMPRESS HIS FRIENDS. ON ENTERING THE WESTFIELD, MA AREA THE WX BEGAN TO LOOK WORSE THAN FORECAST. AIRSPEED WAS AT THE TOP OF THE GREEN ARC. ABOUT THIS TIME WE STARTED TO RECEIVE MOD RAIN AND TURBULENCE. I REDUCED POWER TO BRING OUR AIRSPEED BACK TO 160 MPH. WE BROKE OUT 800-1000' AGL APPROX 3 1/2 MI FROM RWY 22'S END. THE AUTOPLT WAS STILL COUPLED AND WE LEVELED AT THE MDA OF 680'. POWER HAD BEEN FURTHER REDUCED AND AIRSPEED WAS NOT 140 MPH IS LEVEL FLT. I EXTENDED APCH FLAPS AND GEAR AS MY EMPLOYER DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT. WE WERE NOW ABOUT 2 1/2-3 MI FROM THE RWY END. THE RWY WAS NOT YET VISIBLE. I ESTIMATE FLT VISIBILITY AS 1 1/2-2 MI. MY WAITING UNTIL MDA TO DEPLOY GEAR AND FLAPS WAS BASED ON MY BOSSES LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THE ACFT. I WANTED TO SEE IF WE HAD GND CONTACT AT THE MDA BEFORE EXTENDING GEAR OR FLAPS. THIS WAS TO REDUCE HIS WORKLOAD SHOULD A MISSED APCH BE NECESSARY. ABOUT 1 1/2-2 MI OUT THE RWY LIGHTS CAME INTO VIEW, WE WERE ACTUALLY BELOW THE VASI AT 680 MSL. A DSCNT WAS BEGUN. WHEN THE RWY WAS ASSURED I APPLIED FULL FLAPS AND BROUGHT THE POWER TO IDLE. WE CROSSED THE THRESHOLD AT 70-80 MPH AND THE WHEELS TOUCHED APPROX 1/4 OF THE WAY DOWN THE RWY. THIS IS WHERE IN MY OPINION THE MAIN ERROR OCCURRED. MY EMPLOYER HAD NEVER BRAKED A HEAVY ACFT ON A WET RWY BEFORE AND HAD NO CONCEPT OF HYDROPLANING. THERE WAS STANDING WATER ON THE RWY AND IT WAS POURING. HE APPLIED THE BRAKES TOO HARD AND WHEN HE FELT US SLIDE HE COMPOUNDED THE PROBLEM BY APPLYING THEM HARDER. I REALIZED I COULD NOT EXPLAIN TO HIM WHAT TO DO IN TIME AND ALSO DISCOUNTED A GO AROUND DUE TO MY POSITION IN THE ACFT AND THE TIME NEEDED TO REACH THROTTLES, FLAPS, AND GEAR. I DID NOT HAVE BRAKES ON THE RIGHT SIDE SO I COULD NOT TAKE OVER THIS FUNCTION. I ELECTED TO LET HIM KEEP HOLDING THE BRAKES AS THIS WAS BETTER THAN HAVING HIS COME OFF THEM AND I TOLD HIM WE PROBABLY WOULD NOT STOP BY THE END. I PULLED THE YOKE BACK AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TO HELP US SLOW. THROUGH THE 1/2-1/4 POINT OF RWY REMAINING, THE BRAKES BEGAN TO SLOWLY TAKE EFFECT. AS WE REACHED THE LAST PAIR OF RWY SIDE LIGHTS, I ELECTED TO LEAVE THE RWY TO THE LEFT AS IT WAS TOO CLOSE TO CALL WHETHER THE ACFT WOULD BE FULLY STOPPED WHEN WE REACHED THE RWY END LIGHTS. WE ROLLED TO A STOP IN WET GRASS 100-150' OFF THE LEFT END OF RWY 22, THE ACFT WAS UNDAMAGED. ON REACHING THE TERMINAL WE COULD SEE THE WINDS GAVE US A TAILWIND COMPONENT. THIS IN ITSELF WAS NOT ENOUGH TO CAUSE THE OVERRUN NOR WAS THE WET RWY. BUT THE 2 TOGETHER COMBINED WITH IMPROPER BRAKING TECHNIQUE CAUSED THE INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.