Narrative:

This report relates specifically to an FAA ramp check in 5/89, and generally to numerous ramp checks performed by the same FAA inspector during the month of 5/89. In 5/89 the FAA inspector at sna boarded flight and upon arrival asked to see the log book, performed a cabin walk-through, then asked me to activate the emergency lights, which I did. He then did another cabin walk-through, checking the emergency lighting system. That was the third time that month that the inspector had performed a similar inspection. He then returned to the cabin to check the break-away tension on the passenger seats. He returned to the cockpit and informed me that seats 30C and 32C 'pushed forward too easily.' he asked me if I planned to enter it in the log book. I was getting the ATIS and reviewing the departure procedure at the time, but interrupted my regular crew duties again to answer his question. I informed him that log book entries were the captain's jurisdiction, and that in any event, cabin items were normally entered in the F/a log book, and that a carbon copy of that entry was then placed in the aircraft log. He was unfamiliar with our procedure. He then asked me if I intended to enter it in the F/a log, and I told him once again that log book entries of any type are not the first officer's responsibility, and suggested that he talk the situation over with the captain when he returned to the aircraft. He left the cockpit. I went back to seats 30C and 32C and checked the break-away tension. There seemed to be no discernable difference between the resistance of those seats, and the other 6 seats I checked in the same manner. I went outside to complete the walk-around. When I returned to the cockpit, captain was there. I informed him of the problem with seats. We assumed our crew stations, I called for our clearance, and we then proceeded to review the complicated noise abatement procedure required at sna. In the middle of our crew briefing, minutes now before departure, the inspector returned to the cockpit and demanded to know what captain intended to do about the seats in question. The captain inquired whether or not the inspector had used any type of tool or meter to establish the tension of those seats, and the inspector replied, 'no, of course not,' then repeated his questions re: crew intentions. Captain queried him re: the potential accuracy of using merely his hand to establish a metric limit, and the inspector became short and again repeated his question. He asked if we intended to enter the items in question in the log book, and also asked what our procedure for write-ups was. I had already outlined that procedure to him earlier. Captain informed him that the items would be entered in the log en route to msp, and that maintenance would be informed that the FAA felt the seats were out of tolerance and that if they were, the situation would be duly handled with the proper tools. The inspector made a notation in his notebook, left the cockpit precisely at departure time, told the lead F/a to block off those seats, and departed the aircraft. The seats were blocked off, log book entry correctly made, and items reported to maintenance in msp. Captain and I were given no indication that our handling of the situation was in any way unsatisfactory to the inspector. Following day, 5/89, same inspector met flight (captain on that occasion also, I believe, filed a report). We were approximately 30 mins late into sna that day; the scheduled turnaround time is 52 mins. We had developed an EICAS computer problem en route from msp, and had called maintenance control who had dispatched a mechanic from lax with appropriate parts to repair our problem (left computer was bad). Upon arrival, mechanic immediately came to cockpit, followed by inspector, who wanted to know where log book was. I indicated it was on observer's seat and returned to my discussion with the mechanic who was in the process of running an EICAS test. Inspector wanted to know what the problem was, and if the individual wearing a computer maintenance uniform stating 'maintenance' over the left pocket was in fact a mechanic. I replied affirmatively, told inspector that when maintenance established what the problem was, inspector would be briefed as to problem and solution, and that I didn't have time to talk to him right then. Mechanic went outside and replaced left computer--took approximately 10 mins. Mechanic returned to cockpit, performed satisfactory EICAS check, signed off log and was about to leave. Inspector wanted to know if we had written up computer problem. I replied of course, and called company as well, which was why we presently had a company mechanic at a nonmaint station. Inspector then informed me that several passenger seats did not display appropriate breakaway tension. Mechanic suggested we defer the items since we were already late, and seats would not be used. Inspector demanded to see the manual listing deferred items and went inside with mechanic, taking log book. Meanwhile, sna station agents had been told that maintenance problem was resolved and had begun to board aircraft. I left cockpit to complete exterior preflight, returned and obtained ATIS. Captain had returned--I informed him of situation. I got clearance, agent shut door and drove away with airstairs and we looked for log book. Tug called for pushback clearance. Told him to standby. Called gate control and informed them we had no log. Agent said 'they' were coming back to aircraft, at which point we observed station manager, the FAA and our mechanic driving across ramp. Stairs were returned, door opened and FAA said breakaway tension on the seats was not listed in the MEL and therefore a no-go item. Mechanic went to the cabin, adjusted the tension on the seats, door was closed again, and captain and I continued to complete pre-departure duties. The confusion perpetrated by the seat incident, opening & closing of the door, absence of flight log, our 'real' maintenance difficulty with EICAS computer and the hectic nature of sna combined with demanding noise abatement procedures combined to create an unnecessarily disrupting situation for the crew. Inspector interruptions disturbed cockpit regimen.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FAA RAMP INSPECTION ON 2 OCCASIONS REGARDING SEAT 'PUSH RESISTANCE.' INSPECTOR QUESTIONED WHETHER MECHANIC IN COMPANY UNIFORM WAS REALLY A MECHANIC AS HE CHECKED EICAS COMPUTER. INSPECTOR REMOVED LOG BOOK FROM ACFT TO CHECK IF BREAKAWAY SEAT TENSION WAS A MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST ITEM. ACFT ALMOST DEPARTED WITHOUT LOG ABOARD.

Narrative: THIS RPT RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO AN FAA RAMP CHK IN 5/89, AND GENERALLY TO NUMEROUS RAMP CHKS PERFORMED BY THE SAME FAA INSPECTOR DURING THE MONTH OF 5/89. IN 5/89 THE FAA INSPECTOR AT SNA BOARDED FLT AND UPON ARR ASKED TO SEE THE LOG BOOK, PERFORMED A CABIN WALK-THROUGH, THEN ASKED ME TO ACTIVATE THE EMER LIGHTS, WHICH I DID. HE THEN DID ANOTHER CABIN WALK-THROUGH, CHKING THE EMER LIGHTING SYS. THAT WAS THE THIRD TIME THAT MONTH THAT THE INSPECTOR HAD PERFORMED A SIMILAR INSPECTION. HE THEN RETURNED TO THE CABIN TO CHK THE BREAK-AWAY TENSION ON THE PAX SEATS. HE RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT AND INFORMED ME THAT SEATS 30C AND 32C 'PUSHED FORWARD TOO EASILY.' HE ASKED ME IF I PLANNED TO ENTER IT IN THE LOG BOOK. I WAS GETTING THE ATIS AND REVIEWING THE DEP PROC AT THE TIME, BUT INTERRUPTED MY REGULAR CREW DUTIES AGAIN TO ANSWER HIS QUESTION. I INFORMED HIM THAT LOG BOOK ENTRIES WERE THE CAPT'S JURISDICTION, AND THAT IN ANY EVENT, CABIN ITEMS WERE NORMALLY ENTERED IN THE F/A LOG BOOK, AND THAT A CARBON COPY OF THAT ENTRY WAS THEN PLACED IN THE ACFT LOG. HE WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH OUR PROC. HE THEN ASKED ME IF I INTENDED TO ENTER IT IN THE F/A LOG, AND I TOLD HIM ONCE AGAIN THAT LOG BOOK ENTRIES OF ANY TYPE ARE NOT THE F/O'S RESPONSIBILITY, AND SUGGESTED THAT HE TALK THE SITUATION OVER WITH THE CAPT WHEN HE RETURNED TO THE ACFT. HE LEFT THE COCKPIT. I WENT BACK TO SEATS 30C AND 32C AND CHKED THE BREAK-AWAY TENSION. THERE SEEMED TO BE NO DISCERNABLE DIFFERENCE BTWN THE RESISTANCE OF THOSE SEATS, AND THE OTHER 6 SEATS I CHKED IN THE SAME MANNER. I WENT OUTSIDE TO COMPLETE THE WALK-AROUND. WHEN I RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT, CAPT WAS THERE. I INFORMED HIM OF THE PROB WITH SEATS. WE ASSUMED OUR CREW STATIONS, I CALLED FOR OUR CLRNC, AND WE THEN PROCEEDED TO REVIEW THE COMPLICATED NOISE ABATEMENT PROC REQUIRED AT SNA. IN THE MIDDLE OF OUR CREW BRIEFING, MINUTES NOW BEFORE DEP, THE INSPECTOR RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT AND DEMANDED TO KNOW WHAT CAPT INTENDED TO DO ABOUT THE SEATS IN QUESTION. THE CAPT INQUIRED WHETHER OR NOT THE INSPECTOR HAD USED ANY TYPE OF TOOL OR METER TO ESTABLISH THE TENSION OF THOSE SEATS, AND THE INSPECTOR REPLIED, 'NO, OF COURSE NOT,' THEN REPEATED HIS QUESTIONS RE: CREW INTENTIONS. CAPT QUERIED HIM RE: THE POTENTIAL ACCURACY OF USING MERELY HIS HAND TO ESTABLISH A METRIC LIMIT, AND THE INSPECTOR BECAME SHORT AND AGAIN REPEATED HIS QUESTION. HE ASKED IF WE INTENDED TO ENTER THE ITEMS IN QUESTION IN THE LOG BOOK, AND ALSO ASKED WHAT OUR PROC FOR WRITE-UPS WAS. I HAD ALREADY OUTLINED THAT PROC TO HIM EARLIER. CAPT INFORMED HIM THAT THE ITEMS WOULD BE ENTERED IN THE LOG ENRTE TO MSP, AND THAT MAINT WOULD BE INFORMED THAT THE FAA FELT THE SEATS WERE OUT OF TOLERANCE AND THAT IF THEY WERE, THE SITUATION WOULD BE DULY HANDLED WITH THE PROPER TOOLS. THE INSPECTOR MADE A NOTATION IN HIS NOTEBOOK, LEFT THE COCKPIT PRECISELY AT DEP TIME, TOLD THE LEAD F/A TO BLOCK OFF THOSE SEATS, AND DEPARTED THE ACFT. THE SEATS WERE BLOCKED OFF, LOG BOOK ENTRY CORRECTLY MADE, AND ITEMS RPTED TO MAINT IN MSP. CAPT AND I WERE GIVEN NO INDICATION THAT OUR HANDLING OF THE SITUATION WAS IN ANY WAY UNSATISFACTORY TO THE INSPECTOR. FOLLOWING DAY, 5/89, SAME INSPECTOR MET FLT (CAPT ON THAT OCCASION ALSO, I BELIEVE, FILED A RPT). WE WERE APPROX 30 MINS LATE INTO SNA THAT DAY; THE SCHEDULED TURNAROUND TIME IS 52 MINS. WE HAD DEVELOPED AN EICAS COMPUTER PROB ENRTE FROM MSP, AND HAD CALLED MAINT CTL WHO HAD DISPATCHED A MECH FROM LAX WITH APPROPRIATE PARTS TO REPAIR OUR PROB (LEFT COMPUTER WAS BAD). UPON ARR, MECH IMMEDIATELY CAME TO COCKPIT, FOLLOWED BY INSPECTOR, WHO WANTED TO KNOW WHERE LOG BOOK WAS. I INDICATED IT WAS ON OBSERVER'S SEAT AND RETURNED TO MY DISCUSSION WITH THE MECH WHO WAS IN THE PROCESS OF RUNNING AN EICAS TEST. INSPECTOR WANTED TO KNOW WHAT THE PROB WAS, AND IF THE INDIVIDUAL WEARING A COMPUTER MAINT UNIFORM STATING 'MAINT' OVER THE LEFT POCKET WAS IN FACT A MECH. I REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY, TOLD INSPECTOR THAT WHEN MAINT ESTABLISHED WHAT THE PROB WAS, INSPECTOR WOULD BE BRIEFED AS TO PROB AND SOLUTION, AND THAT I DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO TALK TO HIM RIGHT THEN. MECH WENT OUTSIDE AND REPLACED LEFT COMPUTER--TOOK APPROX 10 MINS. MECH RETURNED TO COCKPIT, PERFORMED SATISFACTORY EICAS CHK, SIGNED OFF LOG AND WAS ABOUT TO LEAVE. INSPECTOR WANTED TO KNOW IF WE HAD WRITTEN UP COMPUTER PROB. I REPLIED OF COURSE, AND CALLED COMPANY AS WELL, WHICH WAS WHY WE PRESENTLY HAD A COMPANY MECH AT A NONMAINT STATION. INSPECTOR THEN INFORMED ME THAT SEVERAL PAX SEATS DID NOT DISPLAY APPROPRIATE BREAKAWAY TENSION. MECH SUGGESTED WE DEFER THE ITEMS SINCE WE WERE ALREADY LATE, AND SEATS WOULD NOT BE USED. INSPECTOR DEMANDED TO SEE THE MANUAL LISTING DEFERRED ITEMS AND WENT INSIDE WITH MECH, TAKING LOG BOOK. MEANWHILE, SNA STATION AGENTS HAD BEEN TOLD THAT MAINT PROB WAS RESOLVED AND HAD BEGUN TO BOARD ACFT. I LEFT COCKPIT TO COMPLETE EXTERIOR PREFLT, RETURNED AND OBTAINED ATIS. CAPT HAD RETURNED--I INFORMED HIM OF SITUATION. I GOT CLRNC, AGENT SHUT DOOR AND DROVE AWAY WITH AIRSTAIRS AND WE LOOKED FOR LOG BOOK. TUG CALLED FOR PUSHBACK CLRNC. TOLD HIM TO STANDBY. CALLED GATE CTL AND INFORMED THEM WE HAD NO LOG. AGENT SAID 'THEY' WERE COMING BACK TO ACFT, AT WHICH POINT WE OBSERVED STATION MGR, THE FAA AND OUR MECH DRIVING ACROSS RAMP. STAIRS WERE RETURNED, DOOR OPENED AND FAA SAID BREAKAWAY TENSION ON THE SEATS WAS NOT LISTED IN THE MEL AND THEREFORE A NO-GO ITEM. MECH WENT TO THE CABIN, ADJUSTED THE TENSION ON THE SEATS, DOOR WAS CLOSED AGAIN, AND CAPT AND I CONTINUED TO COMPLETE PRE-DEP DUTIES. THE CONFUSION PERPETRATED BY THE SEAT INCIDENT, OPENING & CLOSING OF THE DOOR, ABSENCE OF FLT LOG, OUR 'REAL' MAINT DIFFICULTY WITH EICAS COMPUTER AND THE HECTIC NATURE OF SNA COMBINED WITH DEMANDING NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS COMBINED TO CREATE AN UNNECESSARILY DISRUPTING SITUATION FOR THE CREW. INSPECTOR INTERRUPTIONS DISTURBED COCKPIT REGIMEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.