Narrative:

At approximately the time and date specified above, I was instructing a student doing touch and go lndgs in preparation for his first solo flight. The student had just completed several satisfactory lndgs and I decided to land and let him fly his first solo flight. Upon requesting permission, we were cleared to land on runway 34. After we landed we rolled straight ahead on runway to a full stop. Meanwhile, the pattern had become very busy, with several more aircraft calling in to land. One aircraft, an small aircraft, was cleared to land on runway 21. The aircraft was instructed to hold short of runway 34-16 and after the small aircraft landed, it in fact turned off on taxiway (delta), well short of runway 34-16. (See airport diagram included.) a short time after the small aircraft had turned off runway 21, I rolled to a stop at the intersection of runways 34-16 and 21-03 and anticipating being cleared to taxi to the ramp via runway 03, then via taxiway C as is the standard practice at ogd, I turned to taxi as described above. Even though there were several more aircraft in the traffic pattern and one on short final for runway 34, neither tower nor ground issued taxi instructions. Tower frequency was extremely busy and it was very difficult to make contact with the tower. I knew no other aircraft had been cleared for runway 03-21, and I was very aware of the several aircraft landing on runway 16-34. I felt it might be necessary to at least clear runway 34-16. As I was in the process of clearing runway 34-16 the lady on tower frequency started talking to me. I heard only part of what she said because her transmission was stepped on. The part I heard was to the effect that in the future not to taxi on a runway unless previously cleared. Not being sure of the first of her transmission, and being in the middle of 2 runways, and momentarily unable to raise the tower, I understood I had been instructed to taxi to the ramp. In my estimation, contributing factors were: 1) reluctance of the tower to issue timely taxi instructions to allow me to know the taxi route intended. 2) excessive unnecessary talking and chatter on tower frequency. 3) # of aircraft in the pattern at the time exceeded the controller's ability to see and control everything that was going on. 4) normal practice of turning aircraft off runway 34-16 onto runway 21-03 at pilot's discretion. 5) poor communications aggravated by even poorer radio technique. This type of occurrence could be precluded by clearer and more timely taxi instructions. High traffic vol training might be helpful for some controllers. Controllers should try to remain as standard as possible so that pilots know what to expect. Don't allow taxi on runways.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR WITH STUDENT PLT TAXIED ONTO INTERSECTING RWY TO CLEAR ACTIVE WHEN DID NOT RECEIVE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. THIS IS OFTEN NORMAL PROC. CTLR ADMONISHED INSTRUCTOR NOT TO TAXI ON A RWY UNLESS CLEARED.

Narrative: AT APPROX THE TIME AND DATE SPECIFIED ABOVE, I WAS INSTRUCTING A STUDENT DOING TOUCH AND GO LNDGS IN PREPARATION FOR HIS FIRST SOLO FLT. THE STUDENT HAD JUST COMPLETED SEVERAL SATISFACTORY LNDGS AND I DECIDED TO LAND AND LET HIM FLY HIS FIRST SOLO FLT. UPON REQUESTING PERMISSION, WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 34. AFTER WE LANDED WE ROLLED STRAIGHT AHEAD ON RWY TO A FULL STOP. MEANWHILE, THE PATTERN HAD BECOME VERY BUSY, WITH SEVERAL MORE ACFT CALLING IN TO LAND. ONE ACFT, AN SMA, WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 21. THE ACFT WAS INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 34-16 AND AFTER THE SMA LANDED, IT IN FACT TURNED OFF ON TXWY (DELTA), WELL SHORT OF RWY 34-16. (SEE ARPT DIAGRAM INCLUDED.) A SHORT TIME AFTER THE SMA HAD TURNED OFF RWY 21, I ROLLED TO A STOP AT THE INTXN OF RWYS 34-16 AND 21-03 AND ANTICIPATING BEING CLRED TO TAXI TO THE RAMP VIA RWY 03, THEN VIA TXWY C AS IS THE STANDARD PRACTICE AT OGD, I TURNED TO TAXI AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE SEVERAL MORE ACFT IN THE TFC PATTERN AND ONE ON SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 34, NEITHER TWR NOR GND ISSUED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. TWR FREQ WAS EXTREMELY BUSY AND IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE TWR. I KNEW NO OTHER ACFT HAD BEEN CLRED FOR RWY 03-21, AND I WAS VERY AWARE OF THE SEVERAL ACFT LNDG ON RWY 16-34. I FELT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO AT LEAST CLEAR RWY 34-16. AS I WAS IN THE PROCESS OF CLRING RWY 34-16 THE LADY ON TWR FREQ STARTED TALKING TO ME. I HEARD ONLY PART OF WHAT SHE SAID BECAUSE HER XMISSION WAS STEPPED ON. THE PART I HEARD WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT IN THE FUTURE NOT TO TAXI ON A RWY UNLESS PREVIOUSLY CLRED. NOT BEING SURE OF THE FIRST OF HER XMISSION, AND BEING IN THE MIDDLE OF 2 RWYS, AND MOMENTARILY UNABLE TO RAISE THE TWR, I UNDERSTOOD I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TAXI TO THE RAMP. IN MY ESTIMATION, CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: 1) RELUCTANCE OF THE TWR TO ISSUE TIMELY TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO ALLOW ME TO KNOW THE TAXI ROUTE INTENDED. 2) EXCESSIVE UNNECESSARY TALKING AND CHATTER ON TWR FREQ. 3) # OF ACFT IN THE PATTERN AT THE TIME EXCEEDED THE CTLR'S ABILITY TO SEE AND CTL EVERYTHING THAT WAS GOING ON. 4) NORMAL PRACTICE OF TURNING ACFT OFF RWY 34-16 ONTO RWY 21-03 AT PLT'S DISCRETION. 5) POOR COMS AGGRAVATED BY EVEN POORER RADIO TECHNIQUE. THIS TYPE OF OCCURRENCE COULD BE PRECLUDED BY CLEARER AND MORE TIMELY TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. HIGH TFC VOL TRNING MIGHT BE HELPFUL FOR SOME CTLRS. CTLRS SHOULD TRY TO REMAIN AS STANDARD AS POSSIBLE SO THAT PLTS KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT. DON'T ALLOW TAXI ON RWYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.