Narrative:

The flight was conducted in the approved training area with no other aircraft in the area. The lesson content was to teach a private pilot to maneuver to a predetermined landing area from a normal (straight-in autorotation). This is normally accomplished by making s-turns while descending. My choice to teach a private applicant this maneuver was the first of many judgement errors. The student made the first turns of the maneuver successfully with no difficulties. Success of any autorotation is dependent on maintaining minimum descent speed. The student was apparently not aware that the attitude of the helicopter was changing as he entered the third turn. At this point I took control of the helicopter. Not recognizing the student had lost the picture, and not taking over the controllers sooner was the second error in judgement. When I took over control of the helicopter we were approximately 150' AGL. Here I made an attempt to gain airspeed by lowering the nose toward the ground. This only complicated matters. Had I attempted to join the needles and recover with power and used the small amount of airspeed available, I believe I could have prevented the resulting hard landing. Instead I proceeded to attempt the completion of the maneuver believing at the time that this was the only course of action which would prevent an uncontrolled descent. I had not considered this turn of events prior to beginning the maneuver and therefore was unprepared for it. The corrective action I did take was ineffective in preventing a hard landing. Immediately following the incident I made the worst error in judgement. I was able to control the helicopter in a hover with no abnormal vibrations and made a landing. I then exited the helicopter and inspected the right side of the helicopter. The visible damage was limited to the landing gear. The engine, airframe, rotor systems and flight controls appeared undamaged. In my shocked condition I neglected to stop and consider any of the repercussions of a hard landing and the effect that it had on the true airworthiness of that aircraft. It was not my intention to fly an unairworthy helicopter. However, that is exactly what my decision was. This decision was not arrived at logically. I chose to fly the helicopter back to the airport where a detailed inspection could be made. My thoughts were focused on the personal repercussions of this incident, not the immediate responsibilities of the PIC of an aircraft. The inspection that I made was incomplete to say the least. I instructed the student to remain in the helicopter with the rotors still turning. In this condition it is not possible to make an informed decision about the condition of an aircraft. However, for reasons of shock and duress, I decided to fly back. On the return flight there was no indication of further problems developing, and the flight was conducted west/O further violation of far's. Had I taken the time to shut down the aircraft, gather myself and make a proper inspection and make an informed decision I would not have made any further flts in that helicopter. In the future I will only instructed my student's those maneuver specific to the rating sought. The value of learning a maneuver is lost when it's practical use is unlikely. I also have learned that when a pilot believes that he is able to recover from almost anything that is when his is most likely to encounter a situation from which he cannot recover. Most importantly, I've learned that when I doubt or under stress, stop and think before acting!!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE GIVING INSTRUCTION TO STUDENT HELICOPTER PLT, INSTRUCTOR ATTEMPTED TO RECOVER ACFT AT LOW ALT. HARD LNDG ENSUED. CASUAL INSPECTION WAS MADE AND ACFT FLOWN BACK TO BASE.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS CONDUCTED IN THE APPROVED TRNING AREA WITH NO OTHER ACFT IN THE AREA. THE LESSON CONTENT WAS TO TEACH A PVT PLT TO MANEUVER TO A PREDETERMINED LNDG AREA FROM A NORMAL (STRAIGHT-IN AUTOROTATION). THIS IS NORMALLY ACCOMPLISHED BY MAKING S-TURNS WHILE DSNDING. MY CHOICE TO TEACH A PVT APPLICANT THIS MANEUVER WAS THE FIRST OF MANY JUDGEMENT ERRORS. THE STUDENT MADE THE FIRST TURNS OF THE MANEUVER SUCCESSFULLY WITH NO DIFFICULTIES. SUCCESS OF ANY AUTOROTATION IS DEPENDENT ON MAINTAINING MINIMUM DSCNT SPD. THE STUDENT WAS APPARENTLY NOT AWARE THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE HELI WAS CHANGING AS HE ENTERED THE THIRD TURN. AT THIS POINT I TOOK CTL OF THE HELI. NOT RECOGNIZING THE STUDENT HAD LOST THE PICTURE, AND NOT TAKING OVER THE CTLRS SOONER WAS THE SECOND ERROR IN JUDGEMENT. WHEN I TOOK OVER CTL OF THE HELI WE WERE APPROX 150' AGL. HERE I MADE AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN AIRSPD BY LOWERING THE NOSE TOWARD THE GND. THIS ONLY COMPLICATED MATTERS. HAD I ATTEMPTED TO JOIN THE NEEDLES AND RECOVER WITH PWR AND USED THE SMALL AMOUNT OF AIRSPD AVAILABLE, I BELIEVE I COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE RESULTING HARD LNDG. INSTEAD I PROCEEDED TO ATTEMPT THE COMPLETION OF THE MANEUVER BELIEVING AT THE TIME THAT THIS WAS THE ONLY COURSE OF ACTION WHICH WOULD PREVENT AN UNCONTROLLED DSCNT. I HAD NOT CONSIDERED THIS TURN OF EVENTS PRIOR TO BEGINNING THE MANEUVER AND THEREFORE WAS UNPREPARED FOR IT. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION I DID TAKE WAS INEFFECTIVE IN PREVENTING A HARD LNDG. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT I MADE THE WORST ERROR IN JUDGEMENT. I WAS ABLE TO CTL THE HELI IN A HOVER WITH NO ABNORMAL VIBRATIONS AND MADE A LNDG. I THEN EXITED THE HELI AND INSPECTED THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE HELI. THE VISIBLE DAMAGE WAS LIMITED TO THE LNDG GEAR. THE ENG, AIRFRAME, ROTOR SYSTEMS AND FLT CTLS APPEARED UNDAMAGED. IN MY SHOCKED CONDITION I NEGLECTED TO STOP AND CONSIDER ANY OF THE REPERCUSSIONS OF A HARD LNDG AND THE EFFECT THAT IT HAD ON THE TRUE AIRWORTHINESS OF THAT ACFT. IT WAS NOT MY INTENTION TO FLY AN UNAIRWORTHY HELI. HOWEVER, THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT MY DECISION WAS. THIS DECISION WAS NOT ARRIVED AT LOGICALLY. I CHOSE TO FLY THE HELI BACK TO THE ARPT WHERE A DETAILED INSPECTION COULD BE MADE. MY THOUGHTS WERE FOCUSED ON THE PERSONAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THIS INCIDENT, NOT THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PIC OF AN ACFT. THE INSPECTION THAT I MADE WAS INCOMPLETE TO SAY THE LEAST. I INSTRUCTED THE STUDENT TO REMAIN IN THE HELI WITH THE ROTORS STILL TURNING. IN THIS CONDITION IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO MAKE AN INFORMED DECISION ABOUT THE CONDITION OF AN ACFT. HOWEVER, FOR REASONS OF SHOCK AND DURESS, I DECIDED TO FLY BACK. ON THE RETURN FLT THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF FURTHER PROBS DEVELOPING, AND THE FLT WAS CONDUCTED W/O FURTHER VIOLATION OF FAR'S. HAD I TAKEN THE TIME TO SHUT DOWN THE ACFT, GATHER MYSELF AND MAKE A PROPER INSPECTION AND MAKE AN INFORMED DECISION I WOULD NOT HAVE MADE ANY FURTHER FLTS IN THAT HELI. IN THE FUTURE I WILL ONLY INSTRUCTED MY STUDENT'S THOSE MANEUVER SPECIFIC TO THE RATING SOUGHT. THE VALUE OF LEARNING A MANEUVER IS LOST WHEN IT'S PRACTICAL USE IS UNLIKELY. I ALSO HAVE LEARNED THAT WHEN A PLT BELIEVES THAT HE IS ABLE TO RECOVER FROM ALMOST ANYTHING THAT IS WHEN HIS IS MOST LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER A SITUATION FROM WHICH HE CANNOT RECOVER. MOST IMPORTANTLY, I'VE LEARNED THAT WHEN I DOUBT OR UNDER STRESS, STOP AND THINK BEFORE ACTING!!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.