Narrative:

Rejected takeoff due to a 'bleeds not off' level 1 alert. We experienced over 2 hours of delay for numerous air system malfunctions involving one block turn back and engine shutdown and another engine start and subsequent shutdown while leaving #2 running for maintenance in the gate. Maintenance resulted in 3 different MEL attempts to remedy the problem including: APU inop; APU load bleed valve inop; and finally deferral of the entire air system auto controller. Additionally; we had to deal with APU inop engine starts (multiple due to weak ground air cart) and cross bleed start procedures. We were concurrently working ACARS re-init issues and paperwork due to the delay including weight and balance/ fuel load/clearance; etc. The cockpit became very hot and crew physical stress was a definite factor. Final deferral of the air system controller was accomplished in the gate with an engine running which increased the time pressure to push back. All performance numbers and mcdu programming had already been accomplished prior to this last deferral. On our final push back we agreed that with the air system in manual we would be operating the aircraft 'like an md-10.' we performed after start and before takeoff checks as per md-10 air manual procedures. After getting the level 1 alert and rejecting the takeoff we reconfigured and accomplished a normal takeoff. As a result of our concurrence to operate the air system like an md-10 and with performance numbers already being done we did not check the mcdu settings for packs on/off. It did not occur to us to rerun the performance numbers or reset the mcdu. We had missed the MEL operations section notations which would have directed us to make a pack on/off selection. Could have been prevented by always rechecking and briefing MEL operations sections completely. Contributing factor was exposure to hot aircraft cockpit (we asked why no a/C to cockpit and were told a/C was used to cool avionics compartment not cockpit). Contributing factor was task saturation from paperwork issues/mels/fuel load leading us to miss the mcdu re-programming step as per the notations in final MEL. Contributing factor is md-11 with air manual is a rare occurrence. Contributing factor was excessive delay time and running engine during final MEL work. Best prevention would be to insure complete reading and understanding of any and all parts of an MEL prior to doing performance numbers and briefing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MD-11 APU air was MEL'ed after several attempts to repair the system on a hot humid day. Finally; the crew rejected a takeoff after being incorrectly configured for a BLEEDS OFF takeoff.

Narrative: Rejected takeoff due to a 'BLEEDS NOT OFF' level 1 alert. We experienced over 2 hours of delay for numerous air system malfunctions involving one block turn back and engine shutdown and another engine start and subsequent shutdown while leaving #2 running for maintenance in the gate. Maintenance resulted in 3 different MEL attempts to remedy the problem including: APU inop; APU load bleed valve inop; and finally deferral of the entire air system auto controller. Additionally; we had to deal with APU inop engine starts (multiple due to weak ground air cart) and cross bleed start procedures. We were concurrently working ACARS re-INIT issues and paperwork due to the delay including weight and balance/ fuel load/clearance; etc. The cockpit became very hot and crew physical stress was a definite factor. Final deferral of the air system controller was accomplished in the gate with an engine running which increased the time pressure to push back. All performance numbers and MCDU programming had already been accomplished prior to this last deferral. On our final push back we agreed that with the air system in manual we would be operating the aircraft 'like an MD-10.' We performed after start and before takeoff checks as per MD-10 air manual procedures. After getting the level 1 alert and rejecting the takeoff we reconfigured and accomplished a normal takeoff. As a result of our concurrence to operate the air system like an MD-10 and with performance numbers already being done we did not check the MCDU settings for packs on/off. It did not occur to us to rerun the performance numbers or reset the MCDU. We had missed the MEL operations section notations which would have directed us to make a pack on/off selection. Could have been prevented by always rechecking and briefing MEL operations sections completely. Contributing factor was exposure to hot aircraft cockpit (we asked why no A/C to cockpit and were told A/C was used to cool avionics compartment not cockpit). Contributing factor was task saturation from paperwork issues/MELs/fuel load leading us to miss the MCDU re-programming step as per the notations in final MEL. Contributing factor is MD-11 with air manual is a rare occurrence. Contributing factor was excessive delay time and running engine during final MEL work. Best prevention would be to insure complete reading and understanding of any and all parts of an MEL prior to doing performance numbers and briefing.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.