Narrative:

The captain was the PF and I; the first officer was the pm. Just as we started to configure the aircraft; we got an ECAM message stating that the flaps were locked due to the actuation of the wingtip brakes; with a note not to exceed 200 knots. We were at approximately 2;500 feet at the time and executed a missed approach and notified ATC. We were given vectors and an altitude. The captain kept control of the aircraft staying well below 200 knots and took over ATC communications. I pulled out the manual and searched for the appropriate procedure. Per the slat/flap indicator on the upper ECAM; our flaps appeared to be 0; while the slats were working just fine. Since we had recently switched over to the 'new' manual; we both were determined to ensure that we were accomplishing the right procedure; along with the right landing distance calculations and corrections to our landing/approach speed. Not only did we maintain a continued dialogue throughout the whole event; but I went thru the procedure several times; and we even handed over controls so that he (the captain) could review the manual procedures and make sure that we got it right. We notified company and had a message relayed to maintenance; hoping to get some helpful guidance. The message back was just to follow the manual. In the meantime; we were vectored around for another visual. There was very little traffic in the area so we were not really concerned with sequencing behind other aircraft. We discussed our landing distance calculation (5;000 feet or so from what I can recall) and we discussed our landing speed; which would be flown 25 knots faster per the procedure; and decided as a precaution; to have emergency equipment standing by. We briefed the flight attendants; got new weather (VFR still) and completed appropriate checklists. We just treated it as a slightly faster than normal landing using max reverse; low brakes; with everything else being fairly normal (other than the flaps.) it was an uneventful approach to an uneventful landing. The emergency vehicles followed us to the gate and we were met there by our maintenance personnel. One issue concerning this event was that while trying to involve maintenance in the process; we received word from them that we should just follow the procedure. Fair enough; that is just what we did; but we would have liked to get them more involved in the process; as we value their opinion on all matters mechanical. They may not have had anything to tell us that would have made any difference in the actions we took; but it's always nice to have them in the loop during these kinds of situations and to receive some kind of helpful feedback. Secondly; I do not want to speak for the captain; but for me; trying to follow an unfamiliar 'new' manual procedure for a no-flap landing with partial slats was a bit unnerving. The procedure itself is really fairly simple now that we have seen it and ran through it in real time; but it is different than the old procedure that I ran in sim training. We spent a lot of time during this event running and re- running the procedure; when it could and should have 'flowed' better. I think we knocked out all the appropriate checklists; but I just can't be sure. Overall; I think we did a good job; but I personally would have felt more confident about it with a recurrent sim (with the new manual) under my belt.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 First Officer reports a flap fault with wing tip brakes locked during approach. A go-around was initiated in order to comply with new procedures. Eventually a zero flap with slats 3 approach and landing ensues; flown at Vref+25 to an uneventful landing.

Narrative: The Captain was the PF and I; the First Officer was the PM. Just as we started to configure the aircraft; we got an ECAM message stating that the flaps were locked due to the actuation of the wingtip brakes; with a note not to exceed 200 knots. We were at approximately 2;500 feet at the time and executed a missed approach and notified ATC. We were given vectors and an altitude. The Captain kept control of the aircraft staying well below 200 knots and took over ATC communications. I pulled out the Manual and searched for the appropriate procedure. Per the slat/flap indicator on the upper ECAM; our flaps appeared to be 0; while the slats were working just fine. Since we had recently switched over to the 'new' Manual; we both were determined to ensure that we were accomplishing the right procedure; along with the right landing distance calculations and corrections to our landing/approach speed. Not only did we maintain a continued dialogue throughout the whole event; but I went thru the procedure several times; and we even handed over controls so that he (the Captain) could review the Manual procedures and make sure that we got it right. We notified company and had a message relayed to Maintenance; hoping to get some helpful guidance. The message back was just to follow the Manual. In the meantime; we were vectored around for another visual. There was very little traffic in the area so we were not really concerned with sequencing behind other aircraft. We discussed our landing distance calculation (5;000 feet or so from what I can recall) and we discussed our landing speed; which would be flown 25 knots faster per the procedure; and decided as a precaution; to have emergency equipment standing by. We briefed the flight attendants; got new weather (VFR still) and completed appropriate checklists. We just treated it as a slightly faster than normal landing using max reverse; low brakes; with everything else being fairly normal (other than the flaps.) It was an uneventful approach to an uneventful landing. The emergency vehicles followed us to the gate and we were met there by our Maintenance personnel. One issue concerning this event was that while trying to involve Maintenance in the process; we received word from them that we should just follow the procedure. Fair enough; that is just what we did; but we would have liked to get them more involved in the process; as we value their opinion on all matters mechanical. They may not have had anything to tell us that would have made any difference in the actions we took; but it's always nice to have them in the loop during these kinds of situations and to receive some kind of helpful feedback. Secondly; I do not want to speak for the Captain; but for me; trying to follow an unfamiliar 'new' Manual procedure for a no-flap landing with partial slats was a bit unnerving. The procedure itself is really fairly simple now that we have seen it and ran through it in real time; but it IS different than the old procedure that I ran in SIM training. We spent a lot of time during this event running and re- running the procedure; when it could and should have 'flowed' better. I think we knocked out all the appropriate checklists; but I just can't be sure. Overall; I think we did a good job; but I personally would have felt more confident about it with a recurrent SIM (with the new Manual) under my belt.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.