Narrative:

As I rotated for liftoff for a local pleasure-practice flight; the lower strut tube and wheel assembly fell away from the upper strut assembly and separated from the aircraft. The only indication of this to me was a very brief but pronounced shimmy in the nose wheel followed by an audible thud beneath the fuselage. My immediate suspicion was that the nose gear had retracted with a strong upward motion. I did not retract the landing gear and alerted the tower I was going to stay in the pattern and requested a flyby so they could see if anything looked abnormal on my landing gear. They reported that the nose gear was retracted and the main gear was extended. I stated my intentions to loiter east of the field to consider options and review status. After a brief review of the emergency checklists; I verified the nose gear position indicator displayed the down position. I was able to contact my mechanic via cellphone as I was only slightly higher than pattern altitude to ask him if he thought improper tug handling may have caused this somehow. (During my pre-flight inspection I had noticed that the tow pin ends had been broken off; as they are designed should the tug attempt too sharp a turn. When I inquired about this to the mechanic; I was told that the line personnel had broken them the day before moving the aircraft and a new pin had been ordered. I specifically asked if that made my aircraft non-airworthy and was assured that it was ok to fly even with the pin ends broken. The linkage appeared undamaged and manual compression movement seemed normal.) I then requested a low approach so my mechanic could offer a visual opinion. He and the tower both confirmed that the strut tube was visible just below the gear doors and the mains appeared to be extended fully. After another brief time of loitering east of the field; I advised the tower I was ready to land and inquired if the closed runway was usable; but was told it was barricaded. I then landed on the long runway with a left quartering headwind touching down at the 1;000 foot markers on the upwind half of the runway using no flaps to increase touchdown speed. Once mains were in contact with the surface; I shut off fuel mixture to the engine; feathered the prop; and bumped the starter to move the prop to a horizontal position and held the pitch attitude level as long as possible to coast through the runway intersection and reduce ground speed. The strut contacted the runway surface and slid for approximately 300 feet before stopping with light braking action. The strut did not collapse or retract into the nose gear compartment. Subsequent inspection found the lower strut tube had pierced the fuselage under the right rear passenger seat and the tire had then impacted the rear tail cone. The strut linkage was found on the runway close to the touchdown point where it had sheared off upon landing. The aircraft was released approximately two hours later and was towed to the hangar with a hydraulic nose gear-lift tug. When I asked the mechanic what would cause this; he stated that he believed the line personnel had removed the tow pin in an effort to be helpful and expeditious but then did not replace it when he found out there were no replacement pins in stock; nor was it flagged on the aircraft as being removed. It is believed that the linkage was held in place by grease and dirt as I was able to push the aircraft out of the hangar myself; partially compressing the strut in the process and made five 90 degree turns as I taxied for takeoff. These events were relayed in person to the investigator upon his arrival mid-afternoon; who then interviewed the maintenance personnel. I am not aware of his findings.I believe this is a classic instance where a task involved more than one person; was left half-completed; and not flagged as such. The mechanic was unaware the line person had removed the pin and did not look at the aircraft himself although I thought he had. The line personnel probably did not realize this was a flight-critical item; nor did I realize the pin was the only thing that held the linkage to the lower assembly (I thought there was a tube that was pressed through the linkage hinge points through which the tow pin was inserted.) the tower personnel and the airport emergency crews were stellar in their assistance and professionalism and were a great benefit to me in working this problem. I delegated too much trust to the mechanic and should have been more vigilant in my own inspection to verify airworthiness. Perhaps if I had been more inquisitive; he might have made a visual inspection also. Although the plane was located in the back of a shared hangar; a red tag or other indication could have been added to the strut linkage to indicate work-in-progress. Concerning the closed runway; why are barricades necessary? The surface appears to be fine although it is next to a hangar construction area. Runway NOTAM did not specify specifics of this barricading; only that it is closed. If mid-runway barricades had not been placed on the runway; I could have landed directly into the wind; had a slower touchdown speed; and not forced the closure of one of the two remaining runways. I suggest leaving all usable surface open and available for emergencies.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE-33 pilot reports nose gear separation from the aircraft during rotation. A successful emergency landing is accomplished with the engine feathered; touching down on the remaining strut tube. The tow pin had been damaged and removed by ground personnel; not knowing of it's dual role as a strut retaining bolt.

Narrative: As I rotated for liftoff for a local pleasure-practice flight; the lower strut tube and wheel assembly fell away from the upper strut assembly and separated from the aircraft. The only indication of this to me was a very brief but pronounced shimmy in the nose wheel followed by an audible thud beneath the fuselage. My immediate suspicion was that the nose gear had retracted with a strong upward motion. I did not retract the landing gear and alerted the Tower I was going to stay in the pattern and requested a flyby so they could see if anything looked abnormal on my landing gear. They reported that the nose gear was retracted and the main gear was extended. I stated my intentions to loiter east of the field to consider options and review status. After a brief review of the emergency checklists; I verified the nose gear position indicator displayed the DOWN position. I was able to contact my Mechanic via cellphone as I was only slightly higher than pattern altitude to ask him if he thought improper tug handling may have caused this somehow. (During my pre-flight inspection I had noticed that the tow pin ends had been broken off; as they are designed should the tug attempt too sharp a turn. When I inquired about this to the Mechanic; I was told that the line personnel had broken them the day before moving the aircraft and a new pin had been ordered. I specifically asked if that made my aircraft non-airworthy and was assured that it was OK to fly even with the pin ends broken. The linkage appeared undamaged and manual compression movement seemed normal.) I then requested a low approach so my Mechanic could offer a visual opinion. He and the Tower both confirmed that the strut tube was visible just below the gear doors and the mains appeared to be extended fully. After another brief time of loitering east of the field; I advised the Tower I was ready to land and inquired if the closed runway was usable; but was told it was barricaded. I then landed on the long runway with a left quartering headwind touching down at the 1;000 foot markers on the upwind half of the runway using no flaps to increase touchdown speed. Once mains were in contact with the surface; I shut off fuel mixture to the engine; feathered the prop; and bumped the starter to move the prop to a horizontal position and held the pitch attitude level as long as possible to coast through the runway intersection and reduce ground speed. The strut contacted the runway surface and slid for approximately 300 feet before stopping with light braking action. The strut did not collapse or retract into the nose gear compartment. Subsequent inspection found the lower strut tube had pierced the fuselage under the right rear passenger seat and the tire had then impacted the rear tail cone. The strut linkage was found on the runway close to the touchdown point where it had sheared off upon landing. The aircraft was released approximately two hours later and was towed to the hangar with a hydraulic nose gear-lift tug. When I asked the Mechanic what would cause this; he stated that he believed the line personnel had removed the tow pin in an effort to be helpful and expeditious but then did not replace it when he found out there were no replacement pins in stock; nor was it flagged on the aircraft as being removed. It is believed that the linkage was held in place by grease and dirt as I was able to push the aircraft out of the hangar myself; partially compressing the strut in the process and made five 90 degree turns as I taxied for takeoff. These events were relayed in person to the Investigator upon his arrival mid-afternoon; who then interviewed the maintenance personnel. I am not aware of his findings.I believe this is a classic instance where a task involved more than one person; was left half-completed; and not flagged as such. The Mechanic was unaware the Line Person had removed the pin and did not look at the aircraft himself although I thought he had. The Line Personnel probably did not realize this was a flight-critical item; nor did I realize the pin was the only thing that held the linkage to the lower assembly (I thought there was a tube that was pressed through the linkage hinge points through which the tow pin was inserted.) The Tower personnel and the airport emergency crews were stellar in their assistance and professionalism and were a great benefit to me in working this problem. I delegated too much trust to the Mechanic and should have been more vigilant in my own inspection to verify airworthiness. Perhaps if I had been more inquisitive; he might have made a visual inspection also. Although the plane was located in the back of a shared hangar; a red tag or other indication could have been added to the strut linkage to indicate work-in-progress. Concerning the closed runway; why are barricades necessary? The surface appears to be fine although it is next to a hangar construction area. Runway NOTAM did not specify specifics of this barricading; only that it is closed. If mid-runway barricades had not been placed on the runway; I could have landed directly into the wind; had a slower touchdown speed; and not forced the closure of one of the two remaining runways. I suggest leaving all usable surface open and available for emergencies.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.