Narrative:

After two vectors off arrival; center cleared us direct to a fix. At FL240; 270 KTS assigned; approximately 30 miles southeast of the fix; center cleared us to descend via the arrival. I knew we were already very high on the profile and told first officer that we needed to get down. First officer went to level change and fully extended speedbrakes. This was not correcting our profile error of 3;000 ft high quickly enough and I told center twice that we were going to have a problem making the 10;000 ft restriction. There was no response from center on both occasions and I assumed that I was either stepped on or they were ignoring me. At approximately 15;000 ft; 270 KTS and approximately 2;000 ft high on profile I told first officer that we needed to extend the slats in order to get down. First officer started to reach to extend them and then realized that it was the pilot not flying's job and I extended them. Soon after we heard a loud bang and received a slat disagree warning; with no associated roll. I looked at the QRH and put the slats back up. The alert went away. We did make the 10;000 ft restriction. We extended the flaps early because I thought the problem might return and it did. We complied with the QRH; stowed slats; declared an emergency and made an uneventful landing; cleared runway; had emergency personnel look over the aircraft for damage and taxied to the ramp. Late descent by ATC and lack of ATC response led to perceived problems making altitude restrictions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD11 flight crew reports a loud bang and a Slat Disagree warning while extending slats at 270 KTS during descent to make a crossing restriction. The Slat Disagree warning disappears when the slats are retracted; but reappears when extended during approach; resulting in a no slat flap 28 landing.

Narrative: After two vectors off arrival; Center cleared us direct to a fix. At FL240; 270 KTS assigned; approximately 30 miles southeast of the fix; Center cleared us to descend via the arrival. I knew we were already very high on the profile and told First Officer that we needed to get down. First Officer went to level change and fully extended speedbrakes. This was not correcting our profile error of 3;000 FT high quickly enough and I told Center twice that we were going to have a problem making the 10;000 FT restriction. There was no response from Center on both occasions and I assumed that I was either stepped on or they were ignoring me. At approximately 15;000 FT; 270 KTS and approximately 2;000 FT high on profile I told First Officer that we needed to extend the slats in order to get down. First Officer started to reach to extend them and then realized that it was the pilot not flying's job and I extended them. Soon after we heard a loud bang and received a Slat Disagree warning; with no associated roll. I looked at the QRH and put the slats back up. The alert went away. We did make the 10;000 FT restriction. We extended the flaps early because I thought the problem might return and it did. We complied with the QRH; stowed slats; declared an emergency and made an uneventful landing; cleared runway; had emergency personnel look over the aircraft for damage and taxied to the ramp. Late descent by ATC and lack of ATC response led to perceived problems making altitude restrictions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.