Narrative:

This report is in regard to standardization between flight crews of recently merged companies. While realizing this is really a problem for our flight standards department, I think it should be debriefed because of a possible industry wide problem. As a copilot on the medium large transport my company is standardized as to the flight and seasonal operations of this aircraft. Having merged with a regional west coast carrier my company has integrated its procedures into their operations and training. The desired outcome is obvious in that in order for different crews to work together effectively they need common ground standardization. I recently flew a trip with a captain from the merged company that had changed from the medium large transport Y to medium large transport X and had a total of 50 hours in type. The point of this report is the captain's lack of familiarity with company procedures, aircraft operating procedures and winter flying. West/O going into every procedural difference the episode described was what prompted me to write. We were operating out of stl after heavy snowfall with runway conditions changing constantly. During the 3 hours we were waiting for departure it became apparent that the captain was unaware of company requirements for operating in snow/slush/ice. He was unsure of weight reductions for slush corrections and thought we could takeoff with a tailwind 10 KT limit. This is not allowed on a snow/slush covered runway. While we departed stl uneventfully I am still uncomfortable with the captain's decision and judgement on taking off from a wet slippery runway with a direct crosswind and his lack of experience in these conditions. While attempting to be as tactful as possible, I queried the captain prior to taxi and departure west/O an adequate reply. The captain's lack of familiarity with company procedures the airport environment and WX conditions along with my perceived feeling that he had get homeitis led to a decision that was I feel to hasty. I also think the company has a greater responsibility in ensuring these west coast capts are trained thoroughly in winter operations other than west coast. In doing my job as outlined by the company procedures I feel that I alienated and irritated the captain by having to point these requirements out and also that the captain felt he didn't need to follow the procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG TKOF DOWNWIND WITH SNOW AND SLUSH IN VIOLATION OF FAA CERTIFICATION CRITERIA.

Narrative: THIS RPT IS IN REGARD TO STANDARDIZATION BTWN FLT CREWS OF RECENTLY MERGED COMPANIES. WHILE REALIZING THIS IS REALLY A PROB FOR OUR FLT STANDARDS DEPT, I THINK IT SHOULD BE DEBRIEFED BECAUSE OF A POSSIBLE INDUSTRY WIDE PROB. AS A COPLT ON THE MLG MY COMPANY IS STANDARDIZED AS TO THE FLT AND SEASONAL OPS OF THIS ACFT. HAVING MERGED WITH A REGIONAL W COAST CARRIER MY COMPANY HAS INTEGRATED ITS PROCS INTO THEIR OPS AND TRNING. THE DESIRED OUTCOME IS OBVIOUS IN THAT IN ORDER FOR DIFFERENT CREWS TO WORK TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY THEY NEED COMMON GND STANDARDIZATION. I RECENTLY FLEW A TRIP WITH A CAPT FROM THE MERGED COMPANY THAT HAD CHANGED FROM THE MLG Y TO MLG X AND HAD A TOTAL OF 50 HRS IN TYPE. THE POINT OF THIS RPT IS THE CAPT'S LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH COMPANY PROCS, ACFT OPERATING PROCS AND WINTER FLYING. W/O GOING INTO EVERY PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCE THE EPISODE DESCRIBED WAS WHAT PROMPTED ME TO WRITE. WE WERE OPERATING OUT OF STL AFTER HVY SNOWFALL WITH RWY CONDITIONS CHANGING CONSTANTLY. DURING THE 3 HRS WE WERE WAITING FOR DEP IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE CAPT WAS UNAWARE OF COMPANY REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATING IN SNOW/SLUSH/ICE. HE WAS UNSURE OF WT REDUCTIONS FOR SLUSH CORRECTIONS AND THOUGHT WE COULD TKOF WITH A TAILWIND 10 KT LIMIT. THIS IS NOT ALLOWED ON A SNOW/SLUSH COVERED RWY. WHILE WE DEPARTED STL UNEVENTFULLY I AM STILL UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE CAPT'S DECISION AND JUDGEMENT ON TAKING OFF FROM A WET SLIPPERY RWY WITH A DIRECT XWIND AND HIS LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THESE CONDITIONS. WHILE ATTEMPTING TO BE AS TACTFUL AS POSSIBLE, I QUERIED THE CAPT PRIOR TO TAXI AND DEP W/O AN ADEQUATE REPLY. THE CAPT'S LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH COMPANY PROCS THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT AND WX CONDITIONS ALONG WITH MY PERCEIVED FEELING THAT HE HAD GET HOMEITIS LED TO A DECISION THAT WAS I FEEL TO HASTY. I ALSO THINK THE COMPANY HAS A GREATER RESPONSIBILITY IN ENSURING THESE WEST COAST CAPTS ARE TRAINED THOROUGHLY IN WINTER OPS OTHER THAN WEST COAST. IN DOING MY JOB AS OUTLINED BY THE COMPANY PROCS I FEEL THAT I ALIENATED AND IRRITATED THE CAPT BY HAVING TO POINT THESE REQUIREMENTS OUT AND ALSO THAT THE CAPT FELT HE DIDN'T NEED TO FOLLOW THE PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.