Narrative:

Approaching front range over den; encountered instantaneous airspeed increase to barber pole; then overspeed warning. I pulled the power to near idle then increased climb rate to no effect. Got second overspeed warning. I was worried about stalling on backside. Pushed power back up a little. I transferred control to first officer to make the PA to take seats immediately. Then severe turbulence hit; first officer stopped climb and started descent. First officer made turn to right to avoid area. First officer had momentary loss of control. He was worried about maintaining control of aircraft. I made calls to get descent clearance. One call was consonants only due to the turbulence knocking out my breath. Turbulence was in all 3 directions of rotation; especially in roll and yaw. I had difficulty reading gages; especially the smaller figures. I remember seeing FL370 (I assume that was highest altitude) and FL355 for a while; [and] then turbulence decreased at FL330 and only light chop at FL310. Although I exercised my emergency authority in reversing climb; I didn't declare an emergency. Didn't have time; didn't think of it; [and] was concerned for aircraft control. I did immediately report severe mountain wave and repeatedly tell ATC 'we are descending'.no injuries. Flight attendants in seats; two passengers in lavs who rode it out bracing themselves. After the event I consulted FM; and determined that the event met all 6 of the parameters listed in the definition of severe turbulence. I reported severe turbulence to ATC and verbally to the dispatcher. I then received a barrage of second guessing by maintenance through the dispatcher. Eventually I stopped responding to the messages. I would like to see the foqa data to see how what I remembered compares to what the data says. I am a trained human factors researcher/educator and I know how severe stress affects memory. Right afterward; first officer and I agreed that this would be a good human factors scenario. I believe we coordinated very well; acting as a team. We did encounter a minor tertiary (or more) wave maybe 100 miles downwind. Afterward discovered yellow book; which was in the book cubbyhole with the strap by the observers seat; on the console to the right of the first officer forward of his kit bag. That much thrown about. Upon landing I discovered minor bleeding from my elbow; cause unknown. We need an immediate PA button. I gave up control to punch buttons on the comm. Panel. Flight attendants had turbulence inbound and thus were in their seats but didn't mention the turbulence to me. Inbound pilots didn't brief me as they were concerned about their mistake of extending flaps above FL200. Dispatcher described 'cry wolf syndrome' because they had daily wave warnings for over 60 days with no reports. Afterward he said got 3 different warnings from different sources that day so maybe he should have emphasized it. I didn't keep my paperwork so I can't say if it was in the flight plan. I wasn't thinking wave in particular; maybe due to the excessive flying I was doing. I have flown gliders to above FL300 on the front range and sagre decristo ranges in colorado; so am experienced. The angle to the cloud formation didn't catch my attention; not that it is always that obvious. I don't remember the winds catching my attention as being strong enough for strong wave but I could be wrong.I am very concerned by the actions of maintenance to try and talk crews out of reports that cause them to inspect the aircraft. This was the second time they've done it to me. I have copies of the 6 messages sent to me putting pressure on me about the severe turbulence report. The dispatcher; as well; was pretty tired of the requests he was forwarding. Pressure doesn't work on me but I'm sure it does with some. I hope the FAA representative will take this comment very seriously. I didn't call it severe without some thought and reference to FM. Corporate culture is very much thatwith flight planning; the fuel planning; etc someone on the ground can do it better than the captain and usually the captain is even left in the dark. I can't tell you how many flight plans I get with non optimum routes and altitudes with no explanation of why or what's out there to cause a change- when I call to ask; the response is 'the computer did that.' and yet the FAA will hold me responsible. Responsibility and authority must go hand in hand; leadership 101. I think its time the FAA steps in and corrects this financially driven industry back to match far's.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 Captain described a severe turbulence and loss of control event over the Front Range near DEN which the incoming crew and flight attendants experienced but did not pass on.

Narrative: Approaching Front Range over DEN; encountered instantaneous airspeed increase to barber pole; then overspeed warning. I pulled the power to near idle then increased climb rate to no effect. Got second overspeed warning. I was worried about stalling on backside. Pushed power back up a little. I transferred control to First Officer to make the PA to take seats immediately. Then severe turbulence hit; First Officer stopped climb and started descent. First Officer made turn to right to avoid area. First Officer had momentary loss of control. He was worried about maintaining control of Aircraft. I made calls to get descent clearance. One call was consonants only due to the turbulence knocking out my breath. Turbulence was in all 3 directions of rotation; especially in roll and yaw. I had difficulty reading gages; especially the smaller figures. I remember seeing FL370 (I assume that was highest altitude) and FL355 for a while; [and] then turbulence decreased at FL330 and only light chop at FL310. Although I exercised my emergency authority in reversing climb; I didn't declare an emergency. Didn't have time; didn't think of it; [and] was concerned for aircraft control. I did immediately report severe mountain wave and repeatedly tell ATC 'we ARE descending'.No injuries. Flight attendants in seats; two passengers in lavs who rode it out bracing themselves. After the event I consulted FM; and determined that the event met all 6 of the parameters listed in the definition of severe turbulence. I reported severe turbulence to ATC and verbally to the Dispatcher. I then received a barrage of second guessing by Maintenance through the Dispatcher. Eventually I stopped responding to the messages. I would like to see the FOQA data to see how what I remembered compares to what the data says. I am a trained human factors researcher/educator and I know how severe stress affects memory. Right afterward; First Officer and I agreed that this would be a good human factors scenario. I believe we coordinated very well; acting as a team. We did encounter a minor tertiary (or more) wave maybe 100 miles downwind. Afterward discovered yellow book; which was in the book cubbyhole with the strap by the observers seat; on the console to the right of the First Officer forward of his kit bag. That much thrown about. Upon landing I discovered minor bleeding from my elbow; cause unknown. We need an immediate PA button. I gave up control to punch buttons on the comm. panel. Flight attendants had turbulence inbound and thus were in their seats but didn't mention the turbulence to me. Inbound pilots didn't brief me as they were concerned about their mistake of extending flaps above FL200. Dispatcher described 'cry wolf syndrome' because they had daily wave warnings for over 60 days with no reports. Afterward he said got 3 different warnings from different sources that day so maybe he should have emphasized it. I didn't keep my paperwork so I can't say if it was in the flight plan. I wasn't thinking wave in particular; maybe due to the excessive flying I was doing. I have flown gliders to above FL300 on the Front Range and Sagre deCristo ranges in Colorado; so am experienced. The angle to the cloud formation didn't catch my attention; not that it is always that obvious. I don't remember the winds catching my attention as being strong enough for strong wave but I could be wrong.I am very concerned by the actions of Maintenance to try and talk crews out of reports that cause them to inspect the aircraft. This was the second time they've done it to me. I have copies of the 6 messages sent to me putting pressure on me about the severe turbulence report. The Dispatcher; as well; was pretty tired of the requests he was forwarding. Pressure doesn't work on me but I'm sure it does with some. I hope the FAA representative will take this comment very seriously. I didn't call it severe without some thought and reference to FM. Corporate culture is very much thatwith flight planning; the fuel planning; etc someone on the ground can do it better than the Captain and usually the Captain is even left in the dark. I can't tell you how many flight plans I get with non optimum routes and altitudes with NO explanation of why or what's out there to cause a change- when I call to ask; the response is 'the computer did that.' And yet the FAA will hold me responsible. Responsibility and Authority must go hand in hand; Leadership 101. I think its time the FAA steps in and corrects this financially driven industry back to match FAR's.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.