Narrative:

I drove in to the parking lot and noticed the deice crew had started deicing the plane. I saw deice fluid on the ground around most of the plane. The crew was near the truck but I did not see if they were in the cherry picker since I was driving in at the time. When I went out to the plane with the maintenance technician; we noticed that they were still out at the plane and did not seem to be deicing it any longer. A few snowflakes were coming down; but they were intermittent. The maintenance technician walked around the plane while I went inside to begin my preflight checks. I joined the maintenance technician outside and asked him if the deicers were going to return to do the windshield because I could see 3-4 inches on the wiper blades. The maintenance technician informed me that he saw snow on the wings and talked to the deicers to redo the windshield. As I walked around the aircraft; I noticed a lot of fluid dripping from all parts of the plane; expecting it to be clear. As I looked over the back of the wings; I saw there were still chunks of snow and packed slush on the trailing edges of the right wing. I called the maintenance technician over to have them redo the wings and also the gap in the horizontal stabilizer. He directed them to where he and I saw the snow. The maintenance technician then returned to the office to bring the captain out to the plane. While they were deicing; I asked to climb up on top of the truck to visually inspect the wings and directed them to a section over the flaps that we could not see from the ground. After both wings and the gap in the tail had been cleared; I resumed my internal preflight inspection. The snow had stopped falling by this time. The captain arrived at the plane and visually inspected it. We discussed using icing speeds for takeoff because of the fluid on the wings. We proceeded with our normal checklist items and procedures. ATC advised us of an icing report at 4;000 MSL and we took note to turn on the anti icing level 2 in flight. While I was checking the flight controls before takeoff; the yoke felt heavier than normal but it could have been from the fluid on the elevator. On takeoff; the plane flew normally with the cold air; with really good performance. As we climbed through 2;000 MSL; ATC advised us of the icing PIREP again and we put on level 2 anti icing. As we climbed through 9;000 MSL; the captain remarked that the controls did not feel normal. As we continued to climb through 10;000 MSL we noticed the trim was all the way to the nose down stop. Passing through 11;000 MSL; the captain was using more than normal forward pressure on the controls and seemed to have to push the nose over for level off at 12;000 MSL. He remarked that the plane seemed to pitch for 18 degrees of nose up attitude on its own. He then had me take the controls to confirm that the plane was trying to nose up on itself. I took the controls and immediately noticed they did not feel right and a lot of forward pressure was required for level flight. I returned the controls to the captain and he stated he wanted to return. He tried reducing the power to reduce the amount of forward pressure he had to continue to increase as the aircraft accelerated in level flight. We discussed declaring an emergency but since the aircraft was not in a distressed manner; we opted to return under normal flight rules. We requested center to take us back and that we wanted the longest runway. They asked if we needed any assistance and why we were returning. We stated we had a flight control issue with the trim and that no assistance was required. They began vectoring back at this time. The captain asked for the QRH checklist and if there was something for increased flight control pressures or abnormal elevator/trim pressures. I searched both procedures following failures (yellow tab) and emergency (red tab) checklists and found nothing that met our problem. ATC vectored us to the southeast and began to descend us from 12;000 ft to 11;000 MSL. I began setting up the approach for the ILS while the captain flew the airplane without the autopilot because he wanted to keep control of the plane at all times. We did the descent and approach checklists as we descended and set the flaps for 15 degrees. After the flaps were deployed; the captain said that the increase in pressure to stop the ballooning effect was unnecessary and opted for a flaps 0 setting. He then called for the flaps 0 landing speeds and we reset our airspeed indicators. He called for the gear down and then we did the before landing checklist. We did not do the reduced flap landing checklist because we did not want to delay in the air being vectored around in the ice to accomplish it and a possible unsafe condition to ensue. We approached at about 155 KTS; crossed the approach end of the runway at 150 KTS; and landed without any problems. We returned to the ramp and did our after landing checklist and shut the plane down after talking to company maintenance; flight operations; and I called the maintenance technician out to the plane. After shutdown; we had the maintenance technician inspect the tail for possible jamming of the elevator or trim. The maintenance technician had us move the elevator and trim surfaces full forward and full aft to verify the surfaces were working and were not jammed. Upon his inspection with the cherry picker; he found ice that was on the right side of the elevator only. We suspect that it might have been ice that was on top of the horizontal stabilizer that may have slid back onto the elevator during flight and was not detected during preflight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATR72 flight crew reports finding snow and ice on the aircraft after being deiced. The deice crew is called back requiring two more attempts before the crew is satisfied. After takeoff; abnormal elevator feel is noted and the crew elects to return to the departure airport. Post flight reveals ice restricting elevator movement.

Narrative: I drove in to the parking lot and noticed the deice crew had started deicing the plane. I saw deice fluid on the ground around most of the plane. The crew was near the truck but I did not see if they were in the cherry picker since I was driving in at the time. When I went out to the plane with the Maintenance Technician; we noticed that they were still out at the plane and did not seem to be deicing it any longer. A few snowflakes were coming down; but they were intermittent. The Maintenance Technician walked around the plane while I went inside to begin my preflight checks. I joined the Maintenance Technician outside and asked him if the deicers were going to return to do the windshield because I could see 3-4 inches on the wiper blades. The Maintenance Technician informed me that he saw snow on the wings and talked to the deicers to redo the windshield. As I walked around the aircraft; I noticed a lot of fluid dripping from all parts of the plane; expecting it to be clear. As I looked over the back of the wings; I saw there were still chunks of snow and packed slush on the trailing edges of the right wing. I called the Maintenance Technician over to have them redo the wings and also the gap in the horizontal stabilizer. He directed them to where he and I saw the snow. The Maintenance Technician then returned to the office to bring the Captain out to the plane. While they were deicing; I asked to climb up on top of the truck to visually inspect the wings and directed them to a section over the flaps that we could not see from the ground. After both wings and the gap in the tail had been cleared; I resumed my internal preflight inspection. The snow had stopped falling by this time. The Captain arrived at the plane and visually inspected it. We discussed using icing speeds for takeoff because of the fluid on the wings. We proceeded with our normal checklist items and procedures. ATC advised us of an icing report at 4;000 MSL and we took note to turn on the anti icing level 2 in flight. While I was checking the flight controls before takeoff; the yoke felt heavier than normal but it could have been from the fluid on the elevator. On takeoff; the plane flew normally with the cold air; with really good performance. As we climbed through 2;000 MSL; ATC advised us of the icing PIREP again and we put on level 2 anti icing. As we climbed through 9;000 MSL; the Captain remarked that the controls did not feel normal. As we continued to climb through 10;000 MSL we noticed the trim was all the way to the nose down stop. Passing through 11;000 MSL; the Captain was using more than normal forward pressure on the controls and seemed to have to push the nose over for level off at 12;000 MSL. He remarked that the plane seemed to pitch for 18 degrees of nose up attitude on its own. He then had me take the controls to confirm that the plane was trying to nose up on itself. I took the controls and immediately noticed they did not feel right and a lot of forward pressure was required for level flight. I returned the controls to the Captain and he stated he wanted to return. He tried reducing the power to reduce the amount of forward pressure he had to continue to increase as the aircraft accelerated in level flight. We discussed declaring an emergency but since the aircraft was not in a distressed manner; we opted to return under normal flight rules. We requested Center to take us back and that we wanted the longest runway. They asked if we needed any assistance and why we were returning. We stated we had a flight control issue with the trim and that no assistance was required. They began vectoring back at this time. The Captain asked for the QRH checklist and if there was something for increased flight control pressures or abnormal elevator/trim pressures. I searched both Procedures Following Failures (yellow tab) and Emergency (red tab) checklists and found nothing that met our problem. ATC vectored us to the southeast and began to descend us from 12;000 FT to 11;000 MSL. I began setting up the approach for the ILS while the Captain flew the airplane without the autopilot because he wanted to keep control of the plane at all times. We did the Descent and Approach checklists as we descended and set the flaps for 15 degrees. After the flaps were deployed; the Captain said that the increase in pressure to stop the ballooning effect was unnecessary and opted for a flaps 0 setting. He then called for the flaps 0 landing speeds and we reset our airspeed indicators. He called for the gear down and then we did the Before Landing Checklist. We did not do the Reduced Flap Landing Checklist because we did not want to delay in the air being vectored around in the ice to accomplish it and a possible unsafe condition to ensue. We approached at about 155 KTS; crossed the approach end of the runway at 150 KTS; and landed without any problems. We returned to the Ramp and did our After Landing Checklist and shut the plane down after talking to company Maintenance; Flight Operations; and I called the Maintenance Technician out to the plane. After shutdown; we had the Maintenance Technician inspect the tail for possible jamming of the elevator or trim. The Maintenance Technician had us move the elevator and trim surfaces full forward and full aft to verify the surfaces were working and were not jammed. Upon his inspection with the cherry picker; he found ice that was on the right side of the elevator only. We suspect that it might have been ice that was on top of the horizontal stabilizer that may have slid back onto the elevator during flight and was not detected during preflight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.