Narrative:

En route to evv from stl center gave us a crossing restriction to descend to 9000' at 25 DME west of pxv on V4. This clearance was accepted at 56 DME west of pxv while still climbing to our cruise altitude of 17000'. Strong west winds gave us a ground speed of 380 KTS. Due to the high ground speed we initiated our descent immediately. I later realized that at this ground speed we had about 4 mins to lose 8000'. Both crew members were new in the aircraft (a much faster type than we are accustomed to) with less than 100 hours of combined experience in the cockpit. We were therefore slow to realize that a much higher rate of descent than normal would be necessary. At 30 DME west I realized we would not make our restriction, so I advised my first officer to notify ATC. He was finally able to break onto the frequency at 26.5 DME. The controller was upset although no traffic conflict existed. The main contributing factors to this incident were: crew inexperience in a much faster aircraft than either are accustomed to. Scheduling 2 newly trained pilots together is asking for trouble. Filing an unrealistically high cruise altitude resulting in a very short cruise segment. High cockpit and controller workload making notification difficult in time critical situation. Supplemental information from acn 104797: we advised the controller we would be unable to meet the altitude at the DME fix whereupon he made a comment about the short distance to the DME fix and asked us for suggestions as to what he should do with other traffic. I feel that in a situation such as this in a radar environment with mode C transponder, the controller should have been aware of our altitude and rate of descent and if necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic given us a turn or even a 360 degree turn to loose the required altitude rather than make comments about the distance and suggestions on how he should deal with the other traffic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER LTT ALT DEVIATION CROSSING RESTRICTION NOT MET.

Narrative: ENRTE TO EVV FROM STL CENTER GAVE US A XING RESTRICTION TO DSND TO 9000' AT 25 DME W OF PXV ON V4. THIS CLRNC WAS ACCEPTED AT 56 DME W OF PXV WHILE STILL CLBING TO OUR CRUISE ALT OF 17000'. STRONG W WINDS GAVE US A GND SPD OF 380 KTS. DUE TO THE HIGH GND SPD WE INITIATED OUR DSCNT IMMEDIATELY. I LATER REALIZED THAT AT THIS GND SPD WE HAD ABOUT 4 MINS TO LOSE 8000'. BOTH CREW MEMBERS WERE NEW IN THE ACFT (A MUCH FASTER TYPE THAN WE ARE ACCUSTOMED TO) WITH LESS THAN 100 HRS OF COMBINED EXPERIENCE IN THE COCKPIT. WE WERE THEREFORE SLOW TO REALIZE THAT A MUCH HIGHER RATE OF DSCNT THAN NORMAL WOULD BE NECESSARY. AT 30 DME W I REALIZED WE WOULD NOT MAKE OUR RESTRICTION, SO I ADVISED MY F/O TO NOTIFY ATC. HE WAS FINALLY ABLE TO BREAK ONTO THE FREQ AT 26.5 DME. THE CTLR WAS UPSET ALTHOUGH NO TFC CONFLICT EXISTED. THE MAIN CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT WERE: CREW INEXPERIENCE IN A MUCH FASTER ACFT THAN EITHER ARE ACCUSTOMED TO. SCHEDULING 2 NEWLY TRAINED PLTS TOGETHER IS ASKING FOR TROUBLE. FILING AN UNREALISTICALLY HIGH CRUISE ALT RESULTING IN A VERY SHORT CRUISE SEGMENT. HIGH COCKPIT AND CTLR WORKLOAD MAKING NOTIFICATION DIFFICULT IN TIME CRITICAL SITUATION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 104797: WE ADVISED THE CTLR WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO MEET THE ALT AT THE DME FIX WHEREUPON HE MADE A COMMENT ABOUT THE SHORT DISTANCE TO THE DME FIX AND ASKED US FOR SUGGESTIONS AS TO WHAT HE SHOULD DO WITH OTHER TFC. I FEEL THAT IN A SITUATION SUCH AS THIS IN A RADAR ENVIRONMENT WITH MODE C XPONDER, THE CTLR SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF OUR ALT AND RATE OF DSCNT AND IF NECESSARY TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH OTHER TFC GIVEN US A TURN OR EVEN A 360 DEG TURN TO LOOSE THE REQUIRED ALT RATHER THAN MAKE COMMENTS ABOUT THE DISTANCE AND SUGGESTIONS ON HOW HE SHOULD DEAL WITH THE OTHER TFC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.