Narrative:

Our area was operating in midnight configurations (one low sector scope; one high sector scope) due to low traffic from weather. Johnstown approach control called our supervisor to initiate the take over of their airspace due to ATC zero (they lost their land line communications and were using a personal cell phone to call). The supervisor asked the low side controller (who had take over the sector just moments before) if they could assume the airspace and they replied that they could. The supervisor said something to the effect of 'you've got no traffic at all; okay we've got it' and was about to assume the airspace but myself and another controller (the controller who was just relieved from the low sides) interjected and brought up that we needed more information from jst in order to assume the airspace. Specifically:-if they were staying open as a VFR tower-how we would contact them? If they were going to continue the ATIS? How we would be notified of changes to the ATIS? The supervisor then tried to get the relieved low side controller to take the phone to assume the supervisor's duty; but the controller was not comfortable with taking over the supervisor's duty. Then the supervisor asked if they were going to stay open as a VFR tower; but neglected to find answers to our other questions. (He never opened any of the contingency binders and did not attempt to use our opening/closing approach control briefing checklist.) after he hung up the phone and the low side controller assumed the airspace; myself and the relieved low side controller pressed the supervisor about finding out the current ATIS code. He replied that we didn't need the information and that since they were calling from a personal cell phone; he didn't want to bother them to call with the information. He also implied that we could 'assume' the ATIS code changes because they change about once an hour. He also said that we were only required to read the weather and didn't even need the codes at all. First; we found that the contingency binder lacked a checklist for what information we would need when assuming airspace. Second; this particular supervisor has demonstrated; time and time again; lack of operational knowledge and the inability to make sound managerial decisions. At some point; someone is going to have to look into his ability to perform his duties at an acceptable level. Thus far; all of our complaints have fallen on deaf ears.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZOB Controller described some confusion encountered when 'contingency' plans were not reviewed and/or followed during an ATC ZERO event by an adjacent facility. Reporter also questioned the Supervisor's operational knowledge base.

Narrative: Our area was operating in midnight configurations (one low sector scope; one high sector scope) due to low traffic from weather. Johnstown Approach Control called our Supervisor to initiate the take over of their airspace due to ATC ZERO (they lost their land line communications and were using a personal cell phone to call). The Supervisor asked the Low Side Controller (who had take over the sector just moments before) if they could assume the airspace and they replied that they could. The Supervisor said something to the effect of 'you've got no traffic at all; okay we've got it' and was about to assume the airspace but myself and another Controller (the Controller who was just relieved from the low sides) interjected and brought up that we needed more information from JST in order to assume the airspace. Specifically:-If they were staying open as a VFR Tower-How we would contact them? If they were going to continue the ATIS? How we would be notified of changes to the ATIS? The Supervisor then tried to get the relieved Low Side Controller to take the phone to assume the Supervisor's duty; but the Controller was not comfortable with taking over the Supervisor's duty. Then the Supervisor asked if they were going to stay open as a VFR tower; but neglected to find answers to our other questions. (He never opened any of the contingency binders and did not attempt to use our opening/closing approach control briefing checklist.) After he hung up the phone and the Low Side Controller assumed the airspace; myself and the relieved Low Side Controller pressed the Supervisor about finding out the current ATIS code. He replied that we didn't need the information and that since they were calling from a personal cell phone; he didn't want to bother them to call with the information. He also implied that we could 'assume' the ATIS code changes because they change about once an hour. He also said that we were only required to read the weather and didn't even need the codes at all. First; we found that the contingency binder lacked a checklist for what information we would need when assuming airspace. Second; this particular Supervisor has demonstrated; time and time again; lack of operational knowledge and the inability to make sound managerial decisions. At some point; someone is going to have to look into his ability to perform his duties at an acceptable level. Thus far; all of our complaints have fallen on deaf ears.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.