Narrative:

Near midnight local time; the crew received an egpws alert to 'pull up' while on a visual approach. The PIC (pilot flying) was performing a line check and was making his first left seat flight in-type in two years. The sic (pilot not flying) had already passed his line check and was very experienced in the aircraft. Additionally; the crew had reached the eleventh hour of what was going to be a second straight 14-hour duty day as the crew was conducting part 135 proving runs to obtain a charter certificate. Descending toward the airport; the crew set up and briefed the ILS runway 4 approach. The aircraft was direct to the airport and vectors for the ILS were requested. Center replied 'unable vectors'. The pilot not flying asked the pilot flying if he wanted the 'arc' or the visual. The pilot not flying thought the geometry was bad for the arc so asked the pilot not flying to request the visual. The pilot not flying requested the visual which was approved; and suggested that the descent be continued to 9;000 ft. The pilot flying agreed and the pilot not flying dialed in the altitude. It went un-noticed by the crew that 8;000 ft was actually dialed in. Twenty miles east of the airport; the pilot not flying suggested a turn to 225 degrees and the pilot flying agreed. The turn was to proceed to the downwind to join a five mile final. When the egpws alert sounded; the pilot flying disconnected the autopilot; applied full power and pitched the aircraft up into a climb. The radar altimeter was blank (exceeded 2;500 ft AGL) and nothing was seen ahead through the windows. The crew was aware of the terrain southeast of the airport but believed they were above the terrain and west of it. The pilot flying and the pilot not flying both believed the aircraft was closer to the airport than the radar track indicated. The crew was being careful with an FAA inspector aboard conducting 135 proving runs and a route check. The PIC/pilot flying should not have 'settled' for the visual approach at night; unfamiliar airport; after the request for vectors was turned down. Visual perceptions should not be trusted at night. Care should be taken when setting and double-checking the altitude bug. This event is another reminder that fatigue affects perceptions; judgment; and human performance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An RA390 crew descending into a high altitude airport on a night VFR approach executed the EGPWS escape maneuver following a 'PULL UP' alert after 8;000 FT was set in the altitude alert instead of 9;000 FT.

Narrative: Near midnight local time; the crew received an EGPWS alert to 'Pull UP' while on a visual approach. The PIC (pilot flying) was performing a line check and was making his first left seat flight in-type in two years. The SIC (pilot not flying) had already passed his line check and was very experienced in the aircraft. Additionally; the crew had reached the eleventh hour of what was going to be a second straight 14-hour duty day as the crew was conducting Part 135 proving runs to obtain a charter certificate. Descending toward the airport; the crew set up and briefed the ILS Runway 4 approach. The aircraft was DIRECT to the airport and vectors for the ILS were requested. Center replied 'unable vectors'. The pilot not flying asked the pilot flying if he wanted the 'ARC' or the visual. The pilot not flying thought the geometry was bad for the arc so asked the pilot not flying to request the visual. The pilot not flying requested the visual which was approved; and suggested that the descent be continued to 9;000 FT. The pilot flying agreed and the pilot not flying dialed in the altitude. It went un-noticed by the crew that 8;000 FT was actually dialed in. Twenty miles east of the airport; the pilot not flying suggested a turn to 225 degrees and the pilot flying agreed. The turn was to proceed to the downwind to join a five mile final. When the EGPWS alert sounded; the pilot flying disconnected the autopilot; applied full power and pitched the aircraft up into a climb. The radar altimeter was blank (exceeded 2;500 FT AGL) and nothing was seen ahead through the windows. The crew was aware of the terrain southeast of the airport but believed they were above the terrain and west of it. The pilot flying and the pilot not flying both believed the aircraft was closer to the airport than the radar track indicated. The crew was being careful with an FAA Inspector aboard conducting 135 proving runs and a route check. The PIC/pilot flying should not have 'settled' for the visual approach at night; unfamiliar airport; after the request for vectors was turned down. Visual perceptions should not be trusted at night. Care should be taken when setting and double-checking the altitude bug. This event is another reminder that fatigue affects perceptions; judgment; and human performance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.