Narrative:

We had 4;200 pounds of fuel with an alternate of jfk. Enough fuel for two approaches but not enough fuel for holding considering anticipated traffic congestion on diversion. At the outer marker to runway 24 tower called winds 310/24g37 and suggested we circle to 6. (I think she probably said 31 but I heard 6 saw a dry runway and decided to continue to 24.) I did not have time to get ACARS data for 31 at this point. At four miles we received an increasing performance windshear warning. The first officer/pilot flying made an excellent decision to go around. He hit the toga button and rotated to 10 degrees nose high and shut down at that point. Speed was vref-10; N1 was 60%; pitch was two degrees above the ami; the autopilot disconnect aural was blaring and I looked at my five year battle hardened first officer and thought why doesn't he see anything wrong with this picture? I waited for what seemed like an eternity hoping he would recognize the situation and make the appropriate callout and pitch change. I then advanced power; silenced the warning and went into instructor mode. As you would expect; there were two brief stick shaker activations while power was spooling up. Once again tower offered us 31. Left downwind was busy because we had to reconfigure; run checklists and program the FMS/ACARS. Several wind checks were made on final and the landing was uneventful other than the fact that I took the controls during the flare because the first officer lengthened his aim point; made a late power reduction and floated. Another thing that happened was we set our normal 1;500 AGL traffic pattern altitude which had us visibly close to terrain on downwind so we climbed another 600 ft. It would be good if the briefing pages had official traffic pattern altitude listed if it is higher than 1;500 ft. I'll bet it is in abe but since I don't have an AFD I have no way of knowing that. Also; it would be helpful if training emphasized proper procedures during go around and the importance of setting power prior to rotation and silencing the aural so that the pilot not flying can hear you. The FAA airplane flying handbook lists several stall indications that were all present in this scenario (inappropriate pitch; power; airspeed; stall warning) but my first officer failed to recognize most of them because they are not all emphasized in training and publications. These fundamentals need to be well documented in our publications and drilled into our heads because they are vital to preventing aircraft upsets. Another bad habit that you see on the line is people ignoring the pitch command bar while accelerating during climbs. Could this be why my first officer ignored the ami [alpha margin indicator aka pitch limit indicator]?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ200 First Officer poorly executed a go around due to windshear four miles from the field. The Captain assumed control of the aircraft for the go around and a visual pattern was entered for landing.

Narrative: We had 4;200 LBS of fuel with an alternate of JFK. Enough fuel for two approaches but not enough fuel for holding considering anticipated traffic congestion on diversion. At the outer marker to Runway 24 Tower called winds 310/24G37 and suggested we circle to 6. (I think she probably said 31 but I heard 6 saw a dry runway and decided to continue to 24.) I did not have time to get ACARS data for 31 at this point. At four miles we received an increasing performance windshear warning. The First Officer/pilot flying made an excellent decision to go around. He hit the TOGA button and rotated to 10 degrees nose high and shut down at that point. Speed was Vref-10; N1 was 60%; pitch was two degrees above the AMI; the autopilot disconnect aural was blaring and I looked at my five year battle hardened First Officer and thought why doesn't he see anything wrong with this picture? I waited for what seemed like an eternity hoping he would recognize the situation and make the appropriate callout and pitch change. I then advanced power; silenced the warning and went into instructor mode. As you would expect; there were two brief stick shaker activations while power was spooling up. Once again Tower offered us 31. Left downwind was busy because we had to reconfigure; run checklists and program the FMS/ACARS. Several wind checks were made on final and the landing was uneventful other than the fact that I took the controls during the flare because the First Officer lengthened his aim point; made a late power reduction and floated. Another thing that happened was we set our normal 1;500 AGL traffic pattern altitude which had us visibly close to terrain on downwind so we climbed another 600 FT. It would be good if the briefing pages had official traffic pattern altitude listed if it is higher than 1;500 FT. I'll bet it is in ABE but since I don't have an AFD I have no way of knowing that. Also; it would be helpful if training emphasized proper procedures during go around and the importance of setting power prior to rotation and silencing the aural so that the pilot not flying can hear you. The FAA airplane flying handbook lists several stall indications that were all present in this scenario (inappropriate pitch; power; airspeed; stall warning) but my First Officer failed to recognize most of them because they are not all emphasized in training and publications. These fundamentals need to be well documented in our publications and drilled into our heads because they are vital to preventing aircraft upsets. Another bad habit that you see on the line is people ignoring the pitch command bar while accelerating during climbs. Could this be why my First Officer ignored the AMI [Alpha Margin Indicator AKA Pitch Limit Indicator]?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.