Narrative:

The weather was reported as VFR although the tower reported a low cloud layer moving across airport. Captain elected to attempt a visual approach to runway 4R. I stated that I disagreed with the decision as I we couldn't see the airport at all. Captain stated that we would take vectors to final and then try to see the runway. On final approach; the airport was not visible; though the captain declared that we would continue. We received weather report which was clearly below visual approach criteria. Captain began descent (still in VMC and above cloud layer) at FAF. Because I was focused on his decision to attempt this approach; captain and I were not of a shared mental model. Therefore; the approach was never properly set-up on the autopilot mode control panel. MDA was not set when in the altitude window when we began the descent from FAF. At approximately 1;500 AGL; I finally convinced captain to go around. Again; the altitude window wasn't set. Furthermore; go around altitude was never discussed or briefed. After the go around was initiated; I attempted to notify the tower; but as I reached for the yoke mounted push to talk switch; I inadvertently hit the autopilot disconnect switch. This was very distracting and confusing to both of us. Though the captain continued to fly the airplane; the go around call was never issued. When the tower realized that we had gone around; they called us and issued an altitude which we had already exceeded. We reported that we would return to the altitude which I believe was 2;000 ft. After discussion between captain and me; vectors and several missed communications with tower and approach control; we executed a localizer approach to the opposite runway.fatigue was a contributing factor. It was the end of a long duty night which had begun on the west coast the evening before. At the start of the duty period; the captain and I both noted that we hadn't slept well that day. Another contributing factor was the first officer's windshield began arcing while en-route and the heat had to be turned off. This resulted in a fogged windshield that I had to keep wiping off. A third factor was that the airport had no ILS available. The only approach to the long runway available to us was a non-precision to a runway that had a displaced threshold. This was an undesirable condition for a large jet to have no vertical guidance. I believe this was why the captain was so focused on attempting a visual approach to the runway where there was a normal threshold.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Unanticipated IMC; no available ILS and fatigue combined to cause a breakdown in CRM on the flight deck; an eventual poorly managed go around for a B757-200 flight crew.

Narrative: The weather was reported as VFR although the Tower reported a low cloud layer moving across airport. Captain elected to attempt a visual approach to Runway 4R. I stated that I disagreed with the decision as I we couldn't see the airport at all. Captain stated that we would take vectors to final and then try to see the runway. On final approach; the airport was not visible; though The Captain declared that we would continue. We received weather report which was clearly below visual approach criteria. Captain began descent (still in VMC and above cloud layer) at FAF. Because I was focused on his decision to attempt this approach; Captain and I were not of a shared mental model. Therefore; the approach was never properly set-up on the autopilot mode control panel. MDA was not set when in the altitude window when we began the descent from FAF. At approximately 1;500 AGL; I finally convinced Captain to go around. Again; the altitude window wasn't set. Furthermore; go around altitude was never discussed or briefed. After the go around was initiated; I attempted to notify the Tower; but as I reached for the yoke mounted push to talk switch; I inadvertently hit the autopilot disconnect switch. This was very distracting and confusing to both of us. Though the Captain continued to fly the airplane; the go around call was never issued. When the Tower realized that we had gone around; they called us and issued an altitude which we had already exceeded. We reported that we would return to the altitude which I believe was 2;000 FT. After discussion between Captain and me; vectors and several missed communications with Tower and Approach Control; we executed a localizer approach to the opposite runway.Fatigue was a contributing factor. It was the end of a long duty night which had begun on the West Coast the evening before. At the start of the duty period; The Captain and I both noted that we hadn't slept well that day. Another contributing factor was the First Officer's windshield began arcing while en-route and the heat had to be turned off. This resulted in a fogged windshield that I had to keep wiping off. A third factor was that the airport had no ILS available. The only approach to the long runway available to us was a non-precision to a runway that had a displaced threshold. This was an undesirable condition for a large jet to have no vertical guidance. I believe this was why the Captain was so focused on attempting a visual approach to the runway where there was a normal threshold.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.