Narrative:

I was at the controls at FL310 in smooth air with the seat belt sign off when notified by ATC that our destination airport was closed due to fog formation and not expected to improve for 1- 1 1/2 hours. Surprising since it was forecast to be clear. Entered holding at FL310 and turned aircraft over to the first officer while I talked with dispatch and informed passenger of the situation. While discussing a change of alternates and passenger handling with dispatch, ATC informed us the WX had suddenly improved and the field was open, but was not certain how long it would hold. I instructed the first officer to proceed toward destination and handle communication with ATC--we would shoot the approach if the WX held. While informing dispatch of our plans ATC cleared us to begin descent. Evidently the descent checklist was not called for (seat belt-on) and when I took over flying the aircraft (approximately 20000') concern was focused on maneuvering for the approach and monitoring the rapidly changing WX conditions. It did not occur to me to double check the seat belt sign. No one noticed the sign was not on, even though the F/a's made the appropriate announcement to fasten seat belts and checked the passenger for compliance just prior to landing. While taxiing to the gate and adjusting the exterior lights I happened to glance up at the switch and noticed it was off. I turned it on at that time--a little late. The air was smooth during descent and the passenger were checked for seat belts secure before landing--but the potential was there for injury. The cabin crew was nearly hired and may have noticed the sign not on had they been more experienced. A double check on completion of a checklist after transferring control of aircraft was overridden by a concern with the approach conditions.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LANDED WITHOUT SEAT BELT SIGN ON.

Narrative: I WAS AT THE CONTROLS AT FL310 IN SMOOTH AIR WITH THE SEAT BELT SIGN OFF WHEN NOTIFIED BY ATC THAT OUR DEST ARPT WAS CLOSED DUE TO FOG FORMATION AND NOT EXPECTED TO IMPROVE FOR 1- 1 1/2 HRS. SURPRISING SINCE IT WAS FORECAST TO BE CLEAR. ENTERED HOLDING AT FL310 AND TURNED ACFT OVER TO THE F/O WHILE I TALKED WITH DISPATCH AND INFORMED PAX OF THE SITUATION. WHILE DISCUSSING A CHANGE OF ALTERNATES AND PAX HANDLING WITH DISPATCH, ATC INFORMED US THE WX HAD SUDDENLY IMPROVED AND THE FIELD WAS OPEN, BUT WAS NOT CERTAIN HOW LONG IT WOULD HOLD. I INSTRUCTED THE F/O TO PROCEED TOWARD DEST AND HANDLE COM WITH ATC--WE WOULD SHOOT THE APCH IF THE WX HELD. WHILE INFORMING DISPATCH OF OUR PLANS ATC CLRED US TO BEGIN DSCNT. EVIDENTLY THE DSCNT CHKLIST WAS NOT CALLED FOR (SEAT BELT-ON) AND WHEN I TOOK OVER FLYING THE ACFT (APPROX 20000') CONCERN WAS FOCUSED ON MANEUVERING FOR THE APCH AND MONITORING THE RAPIDLY CHANGING WX CONDITIONS. IT DID NOT OCCUR TO ME TO DOUBLE CHK THE SEAT BELT SIGN. NO ONE NOTICED THE SIGN WAS NOT ON, EVEN THOUGH THE F/A'S MADE THE APPROPRIATE ANNOUNCEMENT TO FASTEN SEAT BELTS AND CHKED THE PAX FOR COMPLIANCE JUST PRIOR TO LNDG. WHILE TAXIING TO THE GATE AND ADJUSTING THE EXTERIOR LIGHTS I HAPPENED TO GLANCE UP AT THE SWITCH AND NOTICED IT WAS OFF. I TURNED IT ON AT THAT TIME--A LITTLE LATE. THE AIR WAS SMOOTH DURING DSCNT AND THE PAX WERE CHKED FOR SEAT BELTS SECURE BEFORE LNDG--BUT THE POTENTIAL WAS THERE FOR INJURY. THE CABIN CREW WAS NEARLY HIRED AND MAY HAVE NOTICED THE SIGN NOT ON HAD THEY BEEN MORE EXPERIENCED. A DOUBLE CHK ON COMPLETION OF A CHKLIST AFTER TRANSFERRING CONTROL OF ACFT WAS OVERRIDDEN BY A CONCERN WITH THE APCH CONDITIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.