Narrative:

While under ZLA control, passing 10500' for 9000 at fillmore VORTAC, we were alerted to traffic reported at 11 O'clock, 1 1/2 mi (note: altitude information not given). While looking at 11 O'clock, both captain and first officer simultaneously perceived an small aircraft at 12 O'clock, reciprocal heading, pass approximately 100' below. The perception occurred too late to permit evasive action. Following the near hit, query of controller elicited the following information: altitude information on the small aircraft was available (reported as 10600'), controller contended that the target had been idented earlier. Neither captain nor first officer had heard or acknowledged. This contention raises the following point: good controller technique would be to suggest a level off in descent when 2 targets are so clearly in conflict, particularly with altitude information available. Contributing factors caused by ARTCC: a) incorrect clock code given. B) failure to state altitude of conflicting traffic. C) failure to correctly prioritize work duties: i) eg, immediately preceding the call for conflicting traffic, controller was reading a route clearance to another aircraft, followed by 'stand by on your readback' and then our 1 1/2 mi alert. Ii) controller seemed to be over-controling, particularly flight behind us. Too many xmissions, too little control. While I realize that responsibility for see and avoid still rests with flight crews, it still is incumbent upon ATC to transmit available traffic information in an accurate and timely fashion. Upon arrival at bur, I immediately contacted ZLA area manager and conveyed the above information.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG NMAC WITH AN SMA.

Narrative: WHILE UNDER ZLA CTL, PASSING 10500' FOR 9000 AT FILLMORE VORTAC, WE WERE ALERTED TO TFC RPTED AT 11 O'CLOCK, 1 1/2 MI (NOTE: ALT INFO NOT GIVEN). WHILE LOOKING AT 11 O'CLOCK, BOTH CAPT AND F/O SIMULTANEOUSLY PERCEIVED AN SMA AT 12 O'CLOCK, RECIPROCAL HDG, PASS APPROX 100' BELOW. THE PERCEPTION OCCURRED TOO LATE TO PERMIT EVASIVE ACTION. FOLLOWING THE NEAR HIT, QUERY OF CTLR ELICITED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ALT INFO ON THE SMA WAS AVAILABLE (RPTED AS 10600'), CTLR CONTENDED THAT THE TARGET HAD BEEN IDENTED EARLIER. NEITHER CAPT NOR F/O HAD HEARD OR ACKNOWLEDGED. THIS CONTENTION RAISES THE FOLLOWING POINT: GOOD CTLR TECHNIQUE WOULD BE TO SUGGEST A LEVEL OFF IN DSCNT WHEN 2 TARGETS ARE SO CLEARLY IN CONFLICT, PARTICULARLY WITH ALT INFO AVAILABLE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS CAUSED BY ARTCC: A) INCORRECT CLOCK CODE GIVEN. B) FAILURE TO STATE ALT OF CONFLICTING TFC. C) FAILURE TO CORRECTLY PRIORITIZE WORK DUTIES: i) EG, IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE CALL FOR CONFLICTING TFC, CTLR WAS READING A ROUTE CLRNC TO ANOTHER ACFT, FOLLOWED BY 'STAND BY ON YOUR READBACK' AND THEN OUR 1 1/2 MI ALERT. ii) CTLR SEEMED TO BE OVER-CTLING, PARTICULARLY FLT BEHIND US. TOO MANY XMISSIONS, TOO LITTLE CTL. WHILE I REALIZE THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEE AND AVOID STILL RESTS WITH FLT CREWS, IT STILL IS INCUMBENT UPON ATC TO XMIT AVAILABLE TFC INFO IN AN ACCURATE AND TIMELY FASHION. UPON ARR AT BUR, I IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED ZLA AREA MGR AND CONVEYED THE ABOVE INFO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.