Narrative:

Possible over speed of slats. Atl had severe thunderstorms and low ceilings. Approaching rmg; we were instructed to slow to minimum practicable and prepare for holding at the VOR. I slowed to 12-15 KTS above footer. We received holding instructions at rmg and entered holding. While in holding we were given several descents. I kept adjusting the bug to 12-15 KTS above footer as we descended. On our second turn in holding; upon turning to the downwind leg; I noticed the airspeed slowing to within 5 KTS above footer. We were at approximately FL230. Winds at altitude were 100 KTS out of the west. We had just met the southeast bug on the airspeed tape and with the airspeed decreasing; I ordered slats extend and placed the hydraulic auxiliary and transfer switches on. After the airspeed footer lowered; I set the bug about 15 KTS below the southeast bug. The aircraft stabilized and we were given a heading out of holding; further descent; and subsequent speed increase to 300 KTS. We cleaned up the aircraft and the remainder of the flight was uneventful. I was concerned with the possibility of misinterpreting the speed of the slat extension at altitude. When arriving at the gate I notified maintenance control of a possible slat over speed. Maintenance arrived at the aircraft and interviewed me. Maintenance stated if I did not get the clacker or other warning then there was no overspeed. However; maintenance checked the maintenance side of the mcdu for any events and found none. No logbook entry was made and we continued with the remainder of the pairing.I believe the airspeed bleed off was due to the turn into a 100 KTS tailwind. Automation was too slow to compensate for the airspeed bleed off. The FAA was aboard giving us a line 'check' and had no comment about the event and said we had excellent crew coordination.looking back at the situation; I would have set a higher speed above the footer; at least 20 KTS. This would provide a safe pad for the automation to catch-up.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: After slowing at the direction of ATC in a holding pattern at altitude; the flight crew of a B-717 noted the airspeed dropping rapidly and extended the slats as a precaution. The Captain requested Maintenance to inspect the aircraft due to a possible slat overspeed.

Narrative: Possible over speed of slats. ATL had severe thunderstorms and low ceilings. Approaching RMG; we were instructed to slow to minimum practicable and prepare for holding at the VOR. I slowed to 12-15 KTS above footer. We received holding instructions at RMG and entered holding. While in holding we were given several descents. I kept adjusting the bug to 12-15 KTS above footer as we descended. On our second turn in holding; upon turning to the downwind leg; I noticed the airspeed slowing to within 5 KTS above footer. We were at approximately FL230. Winds at altitude were 100 KTS out of the west. We had just met the southeast bug on the airspeed tape and with the airspeed decreasing; I ordered slats extend and placed the Hydraulic Auxiliary and Transfer switches on. After the airspeed footer lowered; I set the bug about 15 KTS below the southeast bug. The aircraft stabilized and we were given a heading out of holding; further descent; and subsequent speed increase to 300 KTS. We cleaned up the aircraft and the remainder of the flight was uneventful. I was concerned with the possibility of misinterpreting the speed of the slat extension at altitude. When arriving at the gate I notified Maintenance Control of a possible slat over speed. Maintenance arrived at the aircraft and interviewed me. Maintenance stated if I did not get the clacker or other warning then there was no overspeed. However; Maintenance checked the maintenance side of the MCDU for any events and found none. No logbook entry was made and we continued with the remainder of the pairing.I believe the airspeed bleed off was due to the turn into a 100 KTS tailwind. Automation was too slow to compensate for the airspeed bleed off. The FAA was aboard giving us a line 'check' and had no comment about the event and said we had excellent crew coordination.Looking back at the situation; I would have set a higher speed above the footer; at least 20 KTS. This would provide a safe pad for the automation to catch-up.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.