Narrative:

After holding on the arrival into dca for 20 minutes we made the final decent for approach to runway 19. We had briefed and planned a flaps full landing on runway 19 lda/DME. Runway was wet with gusting winds; ceiling was reported at 1;100 ft broken with rain. Approach was stable and done to SOP. Arriving at MDA the aircraft leveled off and the first officer asked to set the missed approach altitude. We set 1;800 ft for the missed per the approach plate. Reaching the vdp; we did not see the runway. Flight conditions were heavy rain and moderate turbulence. About 1.5 miles from the runway we finally had ground contact and I shut the autopilot off and descended a hundred feet or so and was in the clear. We were not in a position to make a stabilized approach so I executed a missed approach. My first officer tried to center the heading bug for the missed; but due to the turbulence he accidentally hit the autothrottle button. I pitched up and made the appropriate call for the missed and manually applied toga. I was not prepared for what followed.everything went ok through the gear up portion of the go-around. The flight director was commanding a pitch up of approximately 20 degrees and we were only climbing initially to 1;800 ft. I did not like the feeling or picture created by the high nose up attitude so (hand flying and controlling throttles) I shallowed out the climb. Within just a few seconds we approached the flap limit speed. I pitched up to reduce the airspeed; but it was too late and I exceeded the flap limit speed while still in the flaps 4 position. The first officer then asked to raise the flaps to 3 and I said yes. We continued to raise the flaps during the go-around; but due to my poor power management I overspeed the flaps at least 2 more times. I did hear the high speed oral warning at least once. Once the aircraft was clean and established on the heading assigned by ATC I re-engaged the automation. We then got vectors for a second approach and briefed our errors to ensure that I didn't make the same mistake a second time. Just before initiating the second approach the visibility at the field dropped to below minimums for runway 19. Winds exceeded the tailwind component for runway 01 so it was back around for a third attempt. After reviewing the weather in dc and seeing no improvement and with our fuel now getting down to bingo I elected to divert to iad. The weather was acceptable and I advised dispatch along with the passengers of my intentions. We received an extended downwind and after 10 minutes of vectors I declared minimum fuel. We were given a 23 mile final and made a successful landing in iad with reserve fuel on board. Once at the gate I called maintenance to advise them of the flap overspeed event and was told the aircraft would need an inspection. Passengers were re-accommodated and after approximately 3 hours we got the sign off to move the airplane back to dc. Total flight time for the day was over 9 hours and duty was about 15 hours plus.I was not aware that the turbulence was going to be that bad throughout the decent portion and landing. It was difficult to see the instruments at times because of the ride. During the approach the 2 aircraft ahead of us landed so I assumed we were going to have no problems. Weather reported 1;100 ft broken and the MDA was 800 ft. The heavy rain at the MDA is what I believe prevented us from seeing the airport environment. Having not done a go-around in quite a few months; and not having done one manually since my last check-ride; caught me off guard. I was disappointed that I didn't manage the power better during the climb. I had it in my mind that the procedure required toga so I hit the buttons and added full power; but having not followed the flight director I got myself into a poor situation. After slowing due to the first overspeed and correcting the issue I re-applied full power since were still climbing and created the second flap overspeed event. I understand my mistakes and hope that with this experience I will not make the same mistakes in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: After holding for 20 minutes; Air Carrier Captain reports going around from minimums after the Runway 19 LDA/DME approach does not result in sighting the runway due to heavy rain. The First Officer accidentally disengages the autothrottles due to turbulence and the manual go-around does not go well; resulting in several flap overspeeds. The Captain elects to divert to IAD when the the visibility goes bellow minimums for the LDA approach and tailwinds prevent landing to the north. Minimum fuel is declared while being vectored for approach to IAD.

Narrative: After holding on the arrival into DCA for 20 minutes we made the final decent for approach to Runway 19. We had briefed and planned a flaps full landing on Runway 19 LDA/DME. Runway was wet with gusting winds; ceiling was reported at 1;100 FT broken with rain. Approach was stable and done to SOP. Arriving at MDA the aircraft leveled off and the First Officer asked to set the missed approach altitude. We set 1;800 FT for the missed per the approach plate. Reaching the VDP; we did not see the runway. Flight conditions were heavy rain and moderate turbulence. About 1.5 miles from the runway we finally had ground contact and I shut the autopilot off and descended a hundred feet or so and was in the clear. We were not in a position to make a stabilized approach so I executed a missed approach. My First Officer tried to center the heading bug for the missed; but due to the turbulence he accidentally hit the autothrottle button. I pitched up and made the appropriate call for the missed and manually applied TOGA. I was not prepared for what followed.Everything went ok through the gear up portion of the go-around. The flight director was commanding a pitch up of approximately 20 degrees and we were only climbing initially to 1;800 FT. I did not like the feeling or picture created by the high nose up attitude so (hand flying and controlling throttles) I shallowed out the climb. Within just a few seconds we approached the flap limit speed. I pitched up to reduce the airspeed; but it was too late and I exceeded the flap limit speed while still in the flaps 4 position. The First Officer then asked to raise the flaps to 3 and I said yes. We continued to raise the flaps during the go-around; but due to my poor power management I overspeed the flaps at least 2 more times. I did hear the high speed oral warning at least once. Once the aircraft was clean and established on the heading assigned by ATC I re-engaged the automation. We then got vectors for a second approach and briefed our errors to ensure that I didn't make the same mistake a second time. Just before initiating the second approach the visibility at the field dropped to below minimums for Runway 19. Winds exceeded the tailwind component for Runway 01 so it was back around for a third attempt. After reviewing the weather in DC and seeing no improvement and with our fuel now getting down to bingo I elected to divert to IAD. The weather was acceptable and I advised Dispatch along with the passengers of my intentions. We received an extended downwind and after 10 minutes of vectors I declared minimum fuel. We were given a 23 mile final and made a successful landing in IAD with reserve fuel on board. Once at the gate I called Maintenance to advise them of the flap overspeed event and was told the aircraft would need an inspection. Passengers were re-accommodated and after approximately 3 hours we got the sign off to move the airplane back to DC. Total flight time for the day was over 9 hours and duty was about 15 hours plus.I was not aware that the turbulence was going to be that bad throughout the decent portion and landing. It was difficult to see the instruments at times because of the ride. During the approach the 2 aircraft ahead of us landed so I assumed we were going to have no problems. Weather reported 1;100 FT broken and the MDA was 800 FT. The heavy rain at the MDA is what I believe prevented us from seeing the airport environment. Having not done a go-around in quite a few months; and not having done one manually since my last check-ride; caught me off guard. I was disappointed that I didn't manage the power better during the climb. I had it in my mind that the procedure required TOGA so I hit the buttons and added full power; but having not followed the flight director I got myself into a poor situation. After slowing due to the first overspeed and correcting the issue I re-applied full power since were still climbing and created the second flap overspeed event. I understand my mistakes and hope that with this experience I will not make the same mistakes in the future.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.