Narrative:

A situation involving mol VORTAC (114.4) has existed for several months in which ipt VORTAC (114.4) interferes with mol at high altitudes. You will note a change over point on J48 16 mi northeast of mol is present south of the 16 mi changeover point and at times as far as 20 mi southeast of mol at high altitude. Pilots have been complaining for some time but no one seems to care. This has been the case since mol frequency was changed to 114.4 several months ago. Fix: change the frequency of one station. Ps: accurate navigation in the area of mol is required. I was flying back home from air carrier business on an large transport flight from miami to minneapolis. After being airborne about 2 1/2-3 hours a F/a approached me and asked if I was qualified to fly the large transport as a captain (I was) and if I was able to fly to published WX minimums (I was). She asked me to come to the cockpit. I spoke to the schedule captain (an acquaintance) and he said that he was on 'high minimums' (as a new captain) and that the WX in minneapolis was below his limits. He said he had spoken to dispatch and they had agreed that it would be ok for me to make the landing at minneapolis, if needed, because of low visibility (RVR was about 1800). I agreed to get in the captain's seat and proceeded to fly. We were put into a holding pattern at judas intersection and the WX started to clear up. As we waited the captain discussed the new drug testing ruling which had been passed the day before and said: 'maybe they will meet us all at the gate and test us. I sure hope you didn't have a cocktail today.' well, right then I remembered that, in fact, I had ordered and drunk 2 beers right after takeoff (about 2 hours before). As we spoke, the WX cleared to above the new captain's minimums and I immediately put him in the seat. I remained in the jump seat through an uneventful and professionally executed approach and landing. I did not discuss the situation of the alcohol with anyone on the crew. (The F/a who approached me to come to the cockpit was the one who had sold the liquor to me.) the lessons of the situation, to me, are the following: no matter what mental checklist I have that keeps me from mixing alcohol and flying when I do my usual line flying activities, it was not useful in this situation. Since I had no impairment from the beer, and since hours had gone by since I drank it, I just wasn't able to piece the 2 events together. Perhaps a passenger should never be asked to fly in such a situation, or perhaps there should be a checklist or a carried set of question to be asked before a person gets in the seat.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW COMPLAINT ABOUT VOR FREQ OVERLAP.

Narrative: A SITUATION INVOLVING MOL VORTAC (114.4) HAS EXISTED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS IN WHICH IPT VORTAC (114.4) INTERFERES WITH MOL AT HIGH ALTS. YOU WILL NOTE A CHANGE OVER POINT ON J48 16 MI NE OF MOL IS PRESENT S OF THE 16 MI CHANGEOVER POINT AND AT TIMES AS FAR AS 20 MI SE OF MOL AT HIGH ALT. PLTS HAVE BEEN COMPLAINING FOR SOME TIME BUT NO ONE SEEMS TO CARE. THIS HAS BEEN THE CASE SINCE MOL FREQ WAS CHANGED TO 114.4 SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. FIX: CHANGE THE FREQ OF ONE STATION. PS: ACCURATE NAV IN THE AREA OF MOL IS REQUIRED. I WAS FLYING BACK HOME FROM ACR BUSINESS ON AN LGT FLT FROM MIAMI TO MINNEAPOLIS. AFTER BEING AIRBORNE ABOUT 2 1/2-3 HRS A F/A APCHED ME AND ASKED IF I WAS QUALIFIED TO FLY THE LGT AS A CAPT (I WAS) AND IF I WAS ABLE TO FLY TO PUBLISHED WX MINIMUMS (I WAS). SHE ASKED ME TO COME TO THE COCKPIT. I SPOKE TO THE SCHEDULE CAPT (AN ACQUAINTANCE) AND HE SAID THAT HE WAS ON 'HIGH MINIMUMS' (AS A NEW CAPT) AND THAT THE WX IN MINNEAPOLIS WAS BELOW HIS LIMITS. HE SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO DISPATCH AND THEY HAD AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE OK FOR ME TO MAKE THE LNDG AT MINNEAPOLIS, IF NEEDED, BECAUSE OF LOW VISIBILITY (RVR WAS ABOUT 1800). I AGREED TO GET IN THE CAPT'S SEAT AND PROCEEDED TO FLY. WE WERE PUT INTO A HOLDING PATTERN AT JUDAS INTXN AND THE WX STARTED TO CLEAR UP. AS WE WAITED THE CAPT DISCUSSED THE NEW DRUG TESTING RULING WHICH HAD BEEN PASSED THE DAY BEFORE AND SAID: 'MAYBE THEY WILL MEET US ALL AT THE GATE AND TEST US. I SURE HOPE YOU DIDN'T HAVE A COCKTAIL TODAY.' WELL, RIGHT THEN I REMEMBERED THAT, IN FACT, I HAD ORDERED AND DRUNK 2 BEERS RIGHT AFTER TKOF (ABOUT 2 HRS BEFORE). AS WE SPOKE, THE WX CLRED TO ABOVE THE NEW CAPT'S MINIMUMS AND I IMMEDIATELY PUT HIM IN THE SEAT. I REMAINED IN THE JUMP SEAT THROUGH AN UNEVENTFUL AND PROFESSIONALLY EXECUTED APCH AND LNDG. I DID NOT DISCUSS THE SITUATION OF THE ALCOHOL WITH ANYONE ON THE CREW. (THE F/A WHO APCHED ME TO COME TO THE COCKPIT WAS THE ONE WHO HAD SOLD THE LIQUOR TO ME.) THE LESSONS OF THE SITUATION, TO ME, ARE THE FOLLOWING: NO MATTER WHAT MENTAL CHKLIST I HAVE THAT KEEPS ME FROM MIXING ALCOHOL AND FLYING WHEN I DO MY USUAL LINE FLYING ACTIVITIES, IT WAS NOT USEFUL IN THIS SITUATION. SINCE I HAD NO IMPAIRMENT FROM THE BEER, AND SINCE HOURS HAD GONE BY SINCE I DRANK IT, I JUST WASN'T ABLE TO PIECE THE 2 EVENTS TOGETHER. PERHAPS A PAX SHOULD NEVER BE ASKED TO FLY IN SUCH A SITUATION, OR PERHAPS THERE SHOULD BE A CHKLIST OR A CARRIED SET OF QUESTION TO BE ASKED BEFORE A PERSON GETS IN THE SEAT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.