Narrative:

After takeoff we received gear disagree warning showing the nose gear would not retract. We contacted center and leveled off at 4;000 ft to run the checklist. We did some discussion in reviewing the notes with the note intensive procedure for gear disagree. Once the checklist finally was decided upon; we ran the procedure; all the while flying in snowy conditions with full anti-ice. ATC queried if we needed a climb higher to attempt to get out of icing conditions. Around this time; glancing over; I did notice the right/wing anti-ice caution message which was written up the day before. As the flying pilot and PIC; I suggested continuing for (an alternate) which was a VMC airport and is listed as one of the diversion/alternate airports for our departure airport; which is pretty remote. Our departure was snowy and a fairly short runway with less than 7;000 ft. We spent some time trying to stow the manual landing gear release handle; which had to be stowed later by contract maintenance with tools. During our climb out to 17;000 or so; I noticed cabin altitude (alt) climbing which turned into cabin alt caution message and then warning message. I commanded O2 masks on prior to the warning and we ran QRH for cabin alt. We descended back down to 10;000 and eventually lower; still enroute to our alternate. We also completed the right wing anti ice QRH procedure. [We] landed uneventfully at our alternate.the gear malfunction and anti-ice; I believe; were purely malfunctions. However crew lack of attention contributed to the pressurization problem. After deicing with engines running and APU shutdown at the deicing area we restarted the APU but elected to wait two minutes before re-establishing bleeds on APU. We entered the runway at the intersection for back taxi because the main taxiway was closed for snow removal. I believe somewhere between the post deice check and before takeoff check; we forgot to select APU lcv open. During the before takeoff check we had the takeoff config ok because 10th stage bleeds were closed and packs were selected on. This was a bleeds closed condition and no configuration warnings occurred. In retrospect we counted messages on ED2 versus looking for content. Extra messages were the wing/cowl advisory and continuous ignition. We missed the APU lcv. Had one of the pilots looked on the overhead panel I believe we would have noticed the missing APU lcv switch light being illuminated. The pressurization event happened in part by being distracted with the lack of being able to stow the manual landing gear release handle. I believe viewing all switch lights as part of the before takeoff check would have been a good double check of viewing contents on ED2. I should have opened lcv right away during post deicing check. More vigilance when completing deice/post deice check. More vigilance in cross checking ED2 status messages vs. Associated switch lights on the panel.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 Captain reported failure of the nose gear to retract after takeoff in light snow. While attempting to resolve the gear issue at 4;000 FT a R/WING Anti-ice caution message was observed. While climbing and diverting to a VMC airport the cabin would not pressurize.

Narrative: After takeoff we received Gear Disagree Warning showing the nose gear would not retract. We contacted Center and leveled off at 4;000 FT to run the checklist. We did some discussion in reviewing the notes with the note intensive procedure for Gear Disagree. Once the checklist finally was decided upon; we ran the procedure; all the while flying in snowy conditions with full anti-ice. ATC queried if we needed a climb higher to attempt to get out of icing conditions. Around this time; glancing over; I did notice the R/WING Anti-ice caution message which was written up the day before. As the flying pilot and PIC; I suggested continuing for (an alternate) which was a VMC airport and is listed as one of the diversion/alternate airports for our departure airport; which is pretty remote. Our departure was snowy and a fairly short runway with less than 7;000 FT. We spent some time trying to stow the Manual Landing Gear Release handle; which had to be stowed later by contract maintenance with tools. During our climb out to 17;000 or so; I noticed Cabin Altitude (Alt) climbing which turned into Cabin Alt caution message and then warning message. I commanded O2 masks on prior to the warning and we ran QRH for Cabin Alt. We descended back down to 10;000 and eventually lower; still enroute to our alternate. We also completed the Right WING Anti Ice QRH procedure. [We] landed uneventfully at our alternate.The gear malfunction and Anti-Ice; I believe; were purely malfunctions. However crew lack of attention contributed to the pressurization problem. After deicing with engines running and APU shutdown at the deicing area we restarted the APU but elected to wait two minutes before re-establishing bleeds on APU. We entered the runway at the intersection for back taxi because the main taxiway was closed for snow removal. I believe somewhere between the Post Deice check and Before Takeoff check; we forgot to select APU LCV Open. During the Before Takeoff check we had the Takeoff Config OK because 10th stage bleeds were closed and packs were selected ON. This was a bleeds closed condition and no CONFIG warnings occurred. In retrospect we counted messages on ED2 versus looking for content. Extra messages were the wing/cowl advisory and continuous ignition. We missed the APU LCV. Had one of the pilots looked on the overhead panel I believe we would have noticed the missing APU LCV switch light being illuminated. The pressurization event happened in part by being distracted with the lack of being able to stow the manual landing gear release handle. I believe viewing all switch lights as part of the before takeoff check would have been a good double check of viewing contents on ED2. I should have opened LCV right away during post deicing check. More vigilance when completing deice/post deice check. More vigilance in cross checking ED2 status messages vs. associated switch lights on the panel.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.