Narrative:

After the flight landed; the crew wrote up the right thrust reverser with maintenance control. When the maintenance controller took the write-up; the controller started to research the events of adding MEL 78-30-01 before the flight departed. It was discovered that during the initial call of the write-up from the captain to maintenance control; the captain had said the right thrust reverser did not work; but the write-up in the logbook stated the left thrust reserver did not work. The initial call for the thrust reverser to maintenance control was from the captain of this previous flight. There was a crew change; and the new crew added the new MEL 78-30-01 to the release. Before the MEL was added to the release; a 3-way call was performed between the maintenance controller; dispatcher and the mechanic to verify the 2 MEL's that were added. The second MEL was 25-70-10. This is my opinion of what I believe may have happened. When maintenance went out to the aircraft; they reviewed the logbook and saw the left thrust reverser was in the write-up. Then; the left thrust reverser was deactivated. During the 3-way call; all the participants verified the MEL numbers. I did check the MEL's in the MEL book when they were added. We did not read the MEL from the MEL book; we just verified the numbers. Maintenance control had made me aware of the MEL's well before the 3-way call took place. The end result was the flight flew with the wrong thrust reverser deactivated. I believe this event was caused by a communication break down at the beginning of the event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 flight crew and maintenance personnel describe the events surrounding the deactivation of the left thrust reverser when the right reverser was the faulty system. The original write up was incorrect and contradictory but was not caught by Maintenance or the flight crew accepting the aircraft. Both thrust reverser's are found to be inoperative upon landing.

Narrative: After the flight landed; the crew wrote up the right thrust reverser with Maintenance Control. When the Maintenance Controller took the write-up; the Controller started to research the events of adding MEL 78-30-01 before the flight departed. It was discovered that during the initial call of the write-up from the Captain to Maintenance Control; the Captain had said the right thrust reverser did not work; but the write-up in the logbook stated the left thrust reserver did not work. The initial call for the thrust reverser to Maintenance Control was from the Captain of this previous flight. There was a crew change; and the new crew added the new MEL 78-30-01 to the release. Before the MEL was added to the release; a 3-way call was performed between the Maintenance Controller; Dispatcher and the mechanic to verify the 2 MEL's that were added. The second MEL was 25-70-10. This is my opinion of what I believe may have happened. When Maintenance went out to the aircraft; they reviewed the logbook and saw the left thrust reverser was in the write-up. Then; the left thrust reverser was deactivated. During the 3-way call; all the participants verified the MEL numbers. I did check the MEL's in the MEL book when they were added. We did not read the MEL from the MEL book; we just verified the numbers. Maintenance Control had made me aware of the MEL's well before the 3-way call took place. The end result was the flight flew with the wrong thrust reverser deactivated. I believe this event was caused by a communication break down at the beginning of the event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.