Narrative:

We had no FMS at all and we were on green needles [(no RNAV capability)] the entire flight. The controllers kept giving us the maier 4 RNAV STAR--for which we were not equipped--and that caused confusion for both us and the controllers since we were on the coyot 2 arrival. We were finally given brusr at 13;000 ft and 250 KTS. I misjudged the descent point and so we started down late. We asked ATC to lift the restriction and the controller told us not to worry about the altitude. I misunderstood and thought both restrictions had been lifted and so when we arrived at brusr; we were still going over 250 KTS. I believe we were about 300 KTS or so. The captain made it clear to me that the speed had not been lifted and that it was still a hard speed; so we slowed down; but we were a few miles past brusr before we slowed to 250 KTS. The controller never said anything about it and he continued to give us descent clearances. When we were within 10 NM of the airport; the controller still thought we were on the maier 4 and we told him again that we were not and he then vectored us to final for an ILS approach to [runway] 26.being on green needles and having no information at all on ETA; vertical descent; or position info; except for the DME off the vors; was taking a lot of our attention and I misread the distances on the approach chart. I was using the wrong distances to plan my descent and my mistake was realized late; leading to the confusion of the brusr intersection clearance.it had been some years since I had to fly green needles and my IFR chart reading was a little degraded so I need to keep up a little better on my chart reading. I had tried to tell the captain when I was going to start down; but he was distracted with getting the weather and I had not double checked to see if he heard my plan. So; I should confirm my descent planning with the other pilot.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Dispatched with no FMS and; thus; no moving map; vertical or lateral nav data; the flight crew of a CRJ-700 miscalculated their top of descent point and were unable to comply with ATC restrictions. A contributing factor was the repeated failure of ATC to recognize that they; unlike all the other inbound traffic; were flying a non-RNAV arrival. This resulted in repeated distractions as clearances needing to be rephrased consistent with their cleared arrival procedure.

Narrative: We had no FMS at all and we were on green needles [(no RNAV capability)] the entire flight. The controllers kept giving us the MAIER 4 RNAV STAR--for which we were not equipped--and that caused confusion for both us and the controllers since we were on the COYOT 2 arrival. We were finally given BRUSR at 13;000 FT and 250 KTS. I misjudged the descent point and so we started down late. We asked ATC to lift the restriction and the Controller told us not to worry about the altitude. I misunderstood and thought both restrictions had been lifted and so when we arrived at BRUSR; we were still going over 250 KTS. I believe we were about 300 KTS or so. The Captain made it clear to me that the speed had not been lifted and that it was still a hard speed; so we slowed down; but we were a few miles past BRUSR before we slowed to 250 KTS. The Controller never said anything about it and he continued to give us descent clearances. When we were within 10 NM of the airport; the Controller still thought we were on the MAIER 4 and we told him again that we were not and he then vectored us to final for an ILS approach to [Runway] 26.Being on green needles and having no information at all on ETA; vertical descent; or position info; except for the DME off the VORs; was taking a lot of our attention and I misread the distances on the approach chart. I was using the wrong distances to plan my descent and my mistake was realized late; leading to the confusion of the BRUSR intersection clearance.It had been some years since I had to fly green needles and my IFR chart reading was a little degraded so I need to keep up a little better on my chart reading. I had tried to tell the Captain when I was going to start down; but he was distracted with getting the weather and I had not double checked to see if he heard my plan. So; I should confirm my descent planning with the other pilot.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.