Narrative:

Push back out of the gate in the dark. Incorrect marshalling procedures which could of resulted in damage to equipment or injury to pushback crew. The marshaller knew the new signals; just did not understand when to give these signals. I was in communication with the tug driver the entire time; so I was not confused about the status of the pushback. However; the marshaller was giving me signals that would of involved injury or damage to equipment. The marshaller never gave me a 'stop and hold position' wands crossed at night signal. When we stopped and set our brakes; the marshaller gave me the 'hold position; standing by' arms down at 45 degree angle to side; while tug still hooked up. I was communicating this to the driver; he stated; the marshaller said these are the correct signals; so; the driver was not in charge of the pushback on the ground. So; who is in charge of the ground crew when pushing back if they do not understand the communication they are giving each other and the flight deck? Also; I was discussing this with the driver; the marshaller then gave me the ''all clear' signal; wands high in the air; while tug still connected to aircraft. We waited until everyone was clear; and reported this to operations. Once again; apparently too many changes and not enough time for everyone to be on the same page and absorb these changes. I have never had a botched pushback this bad before. If I and the first officer had not been paying close attention; we could have been cleared to taxi into the tug and driver.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Airbus pilot reported his pushback Marshaller utilized inappropriate night time wand signals apparently because of poor training following many air carrier procedural changes with insufficient training time.

Narrative: Push back out of the Gate in the dark. Incorrect marshalling procedures which could of resulted in damage to equipment or injury to pushback crew. The Marshaller knew the new signals; just did not understand when to give these signals. I was in communication with the tug driver the entire time; so I was not confused about the status of the pushback. However; the Marshaller was giving me signals that would of involved injury or damage to equipment. The Marshaller never gave me a 'stop and hold position' wands crossed at night signal. When we stopped and set our brakes; the Marshaller gave me the 'hold position; standing by' arms down at 45 degree angle to side; while tug still hooked up. I was communicating this to the driver; he stated; the Marshaller said these are the correct signals; so; the driver was not in charge of the pushback on the ground. So; who is in charge of the ground crew when pushing back if they do not understand the communication they are giving each other and the flight deck? Also; I was discussing this with the driver; the Marshaller then gave me the ''all clear' signal; wands high in the air; while tug still connected to aircraft. We waited until everyone was clear; and reported this to operations. Once again; apparently too many changes and not enough time for everyone to be on the same page and absorb these changes. I have never had a botched pushback this bad before. If I and the first officer had not been paying close attention; we could have been cleared to taxi into the tug and driver.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.