Narrative:

An aircraft had arrived at den with a big chunk of tire missing. This was apparently not discovered for some time after the aircraft had landed. Airport operations wanted to inspect the runways for FOD. I was not overly concerned as the flm had advised me that we had been landing on the subject runway for an hour with no complaints of FOD. As airport operations approached runway 16R; he asked to get onto the runway 'after the aircraft on final.' I instructed him to hold short of runway 16R and got a correct read back. I then commented to the flm; who was watching the whole thing; that I did not like airport operations' radio technique. He should be requesting to get onto the runway; I pick the hole. His transmission could lead to confusion. As air carrier X crossed the landing threshold; I cleared the vehicle to drive on runway 16R 'from the approach end.' he stated that there would be two other vehicles on the runway. I acknowledged; but did not alter the entry point. Ground control then pointed out that one of the vehicles had entered the runway from the departure end. Air carrier X was still rolling out and exited the runway without incident; and in fact may never have seen the vehicle which was more than a mile down the runway.this whole event started as an overreaction by airport operations to the damaged aircraft. Had there been FOD on any of our runways; we would have known by now. And since we didn't know which runway the damaged aircraft had landed on; if they were that concerned; they should have closed the whole airport for inspection. It is not very logical to do it one runway at a time if you think that there is a potential hazard and you don't know which runway. The airport vehicle should not be trying to pick his hole to get on the runway. If he wanted to get on now; close the runway and I would send traffic around. Otherwise; I'll get him on when I can. He also needed to state from the very beginning that there were 3 vehicles on the runway and not wait for the clearance to tell me. He also needed to state that there would be multiple entry points.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DEN Controller described a potential ground conflict event when airport vehicles wanting to check the runway for FOD used poor phraseology techniques as well as unclear communications regarding intent.

Narrative: An aircraft had arrived at DEN with a big chunk of tire missing. This was apparently not discovered for some time after the aircraft had landed. Airport Operations wanted to inspect the runways for FOD. I was not overly concerned as the FLM had advised me that we had been landing on the subject runway for an hour with no complaints of FOD. As Airport Operations approached Runway 16R; he asked to get onto the runway 'after the aircraft on final.' I instructed him to hold short of Runway 16R and got a correct read back. I then commented to the FLM; who was watching the whole thing; that I did not like Airport Operations' radio technique. He should be requesting to get onto the runway; I pick the hole. His transmission could lead to confusion. As Air Carrier X crossed the landing threshold; I cleared the vehicle to drive on Runway 16R 'from the approach end.' He stated that there would be two other vehicles on the runway. I acknowledged; but did not alter the entry point. Ground Control then pointed out that one of the vehicles had entered the runway from the departure end. Air Carrier X was still rolling out and exited the runway without incident; and in fact may never have seen the vehicle which was more than a mile down the runway.This whole event started as an overreaction by Airport Operations to the damaged aircraft. Had there been FOD on any of our runways; we would have known by now. And since we didn't know which runway the damaged aircraft had landed on; if they were that concerned; they should have closed the whole airport for inspection. It is not very logical to do it one runway at a time if you think that there is a potential hazard and you don't know which runway. The airport vehicle should not be trying to pick his hole to get on the runway. If he wanted to get on now; close the runway and I would send traffic around. Otherwise; I'll get him on when I can. He also needed to state from the very beginning that there were 3 vehicles on the runway and not wait for the clearance to tell me. He also needed to state that there would be multiple entry points.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.