An EMB500 captain reported failure of the flying first officer's airspeed indicator during the takeo...

Narrative:

During takeoff roll the pilot flying (PF) did not make the standard operating procedure (SOP) '70 knots cross-checked' call out. I; the non-flying pilot (nf) inquired about the missed call out and looked at the PF's airspeed tape noting that it read 36 knots instead of 70 knots. Immediately cross-checking my airspeed tape and seeing approximately 100 knots (V1 & vr on that day) commanded 'rotate'. As a note; we were well past the 70 knot point which our SOP dictates is the go no-go point regarding shorter runways and the aircraft not being on fire etc. For reference: we were using the longest runway available; 5500' with a takeoff distance required of 3;063' and a landing distance required after a 1;000 lb burn-off at destination would have been 3;585'. It was a weekend at the subject airport with a large amount of general aviation traffic and it was very busy on the afternoon of the event. There are also crossing runways relative to our runway. During the initial portion of the takeoff roll prior to the event; I checked my airspeed tape to make sure that is was alive and increasing normally after which I checked the engine gauges and then my eyes were outside checking the crossing runways for potential traffic conflicts. This action; I believe; distracted me from checking the PF's airspeed tape (although doing so is not part of our company's SOP). I believe that this would have allowed me time to call 'abort' prior to reaching the '70 knots; cross-checked' call out point of the takeoff roll; thus leaving us room enough to abort for a non-catastrophic event on the runway. Most importantly; however; is the fact that I believe that the PF should have called 'no airspeed; abort' when seeing the airspeed abnormality instead of fixating on the inaccurate airspeed tape. In summary; it was my decision and responsibility as PIC to continue the takeoff given the limited amount of extra runway available by the time the problem was realized and the philosophy that our SOP's are based upon for this scenario. My airspeed tape provided me with normal indications; the runway was only 5500'; the aircraft was not on fire nor were there any catastrophic aircraft issues that would prevent flight.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An EMB500 Captain reported failure of the flying First Officer's airspeed indicator during the takeoff roll. This was not detected in a timely manor and the takeoff was continued.

Narrative: During takeoff roll the pilot flying (PF) did not make the standard operating procedure (SOP) '70 knots cross-checked' call out. I; the non-flying pilot (NF) inquired about the missed call out and looked at the PF's airspeed tape noting that it read 36 knots instead of 70 knots. Immediately cross-checking my airspeed tape and seeing approximately 100 knots (V1 & Vr on that day) commanded 'Rotate'. As a note; we were well past the 70 knot point which our SOP dictates is the go no-go point regarding shorter runways and the aircraft not being on fire etc. For reference: we were using the longest runway available; 5500' with a takeoff distance required of 3;063' and a landing distance required after a 1;000 lb burn-off at destination would have been 3;585'. It was a weekend at the subject airport with a large amount of General Aviation traffic and it was very busy on the afternoon of the event. There are also crossing runways relative to our runway. During the initial portion of the takeoff roll prior to the event; I checked my airspeed tape to make sure that is was alive and increasing normally after which I checked the engine gauges and then my eyes were outside checking the crossing runways for potential traffic conflicts. This action; I believe; distracted me from checking the PF's airspeed tape (although doing so is not part of our company's SOP). I believe that this would have allowed me time to call 'abort' prior to reaching the '70 knots; cross-checked' call out point of the takeoff roll; thus leaving us room enough to abort for a non-catastrophic event on the runway. Most importantly; however; is the fact that I believe that the PF should have called 'no airspeed; abort' when seeing the airspeed abnormality instead of fixating on the inaccurate airspeed tape. In summary; it was my decision and responsibility as PIC to continue the takeoff given the limited amount of extra runway available by the time the problem was realized and the philosophy that our SOP's are based upon for this scenario. My airspeed tape provided me with normal indications; the runway was only 5500'; the aircraft was not on fire nor were there any catastrophic aircraft issues that would prevent flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	976828
Time
Date	201110
Local Time Of Day	1201-1800
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZ.Tower
State Reference	US
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	Embraer Legacy 450/500
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 135
Flight Phase	Takeoff
Route In Use	None
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Function	Captain Pilot Not Flying
Qualification	Flight Crew Flight Engineer Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Flight Instructor Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150 Flight Crew Total 10400 Flight Crew Type 960
Events
Anomaly	Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy

An EMB500 captain reported failure of the flying first officer's airspeed indicator during the takeoff roll. This was not detected in a timely manor and the takeoff was continued.