Narrative:

While descending out of FL240 on the arrival; the 'stabilizer mis comp' annunciator and 'hydraulic press' annunciator illuminated at the same time. My first officer and also the pilot flying (PF) called for the checklist while he initiated a speed reduction to 200 KIAS. We assigned PF and non-flying pilot duties; I ran the checklist and he ran the radios and flew the airplane. He notified ATC of our change in airspeed due to the horizontal stabilizer moving. I accomplished the cessna ce-CE560XL emergency/abnormal checklist. This basically directed us to slow to 200 KIAS or below and ensure the flap handle was in the full forward (zero degree) position; which it was. Both annunciators extinguished after approximately one and one half to two minutes. After slowing to 200 KIAS (and while I was running the checklist); the other captain (acting first officer and PF) turned off the autopilot and hand flew the aircraft for the remainder of the flight (we felt this would allow a quicker notification of a change in the stabilizer position in the event it started to move again). After the checklist was completed and the lights were out; the first officer hand flew the airplane to our intended destination (about another fifteen minutes to finish the arrival; approach; and landing). The rest of the flight continued normally and with no other abnormal indications. At no time did we experience any pitch upsets. After arriving; we contacted maintenance and deferred the horizontal stabilizer per the MEL. I think this occurred due to a mechanical malfunction. I think that hand flying the airplane was a sound decision that would have allowed us to nearly instantly diagnose any more un-commanded movements in the horizontal stabilizer. I think that we handled CRM by working together to make sound judgment calls and that we followed company and manufacturer procedures in a proper and logical manner. I think we notified ATC of our intentions and necessary corrective actions in a timely and appropriate manner. I think the malfunction was well handled and at no time did I think the safe outcome of the flight was in doubt.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CE560XL STAB MISCOMP and HYD PRESS lights illuminated during descent and then both extinguished after the aircraft slowed to 200 KTS and the checklist was completed.

Narrative: While descending out of FL240 on the Arrival; the 'STAB MIS COMP' annunciator and 'HYD PRESS' annunciator illuminated at the same time. My First Officer and also the pilot flying (PF) called for the checklist while he initiated a speed reduction to 200 KIAS. We assigned PF and non-flying pilot duties; I ran the checklist and he ran the radios and flew the airplane. He notified ATC of our change in airspeed due to the horizontal stabilizer moving. I accomplished the Cessna CE-CE560XL EMER/ABNORMAL checklist. This basically directed us to slow to 200 KIAS or below and ensure the flap handle was in the full forward (zero degree) position; which it was. Both annunciators extinguished after approximately one and one half to two minutes. After slowing to 200 KIAS (and while I was running the checklist); the other Captain (acting First Officer and PF) turned off the autopilot and hand flew the aircraft for the remainder of the flight (we felt this would allow a quicker notification of a change in the stabilizer position in the event it started to move again). After the checklist was completed and the lights were out; the First Officer hand flew the airplane to our intended destination (about another fifteen minutes to finish the arrival; approach; and landing). The rest of the flight continued normally and with no other abnormal indications. At no time did we experience any pitch upsets. After arriving; we contacted Maintenance and deferred the horizontal stabilizer per the MEL. I think this occurred due to a mechanical malfunction. I think that hand flying the airplane was a sound decision that would have allowed us to nearly instantly diagnose any more un-commanded movements in the horizontal stabilizer. I think that we handled CRM by working together to make sound judgment calls and that we followed company and manufacturer procedures in a proper and logical manner. I think we notified ATC of our intentions and necessary corrective actions in a timely and appropriate manner. I think the malfunction was well handled and at no time did I think the safe outcome of the flight was in doubt.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.