Narrative:

After entering foreign airspace; we were briefed and ready for descent. ATC instructed us to descend from FL360 to FL280. Followed by instructions to continue the descent to FL150. Passing fl 280 (and just a minute from entering the weather) we received a lvl 2 alert 'sel elev feel man' and a lvl 2 'flap lim ovrd.' at the same time the autopilot kicked off and the autothrottles kicked off; and were unrecoverable. Additionally; we lost our flight directors and the captain's airspeed indicator was extremely inaccurate. While in the process of attempting to follow ATC's instructions I had the first officer in the jumpseat running the checklists while the first officer in the right seat was constantly calling out standby airspeed values; selecting headings and altitudes to avoid weather and comply with ATC. Passing FL180; the jumpseat first officer was unable to locate the 'airspeed lost; suspect or erratic' checklist; which was where our checklist for 'sel elev feel man' and 'flap lim ovrd' leads us to. At this time we all agreed his time would be better spent assisting to get the aircraft on the ground. I requested a 30 mile final vector for the ILS. After slat extension and flap 15 extension I called for flaps 28. The flaps only extended to a split of 20/22 with a 'flap disag' alert. Gear down; flaps 35; still split 20/22. Captain's airspeed indicator was unusable. Landing was [normal]. During the debrief we all tried to locate the 'airspeed lost; suspect or erratic' checklist and could not find it. After arriving at the hotel around dawn we all got together with the company clearance delivery to try to find it. After 15 minutes we located it; not under the 'emergency non-alerts' where our checklist leads us; but under 'emergency procedures.' I would like to commend both first officers for their professional and controlled performance under extremely stressful conditions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An MD11 CADC failed and the panel switch would not latch to the alternate CADC so the Captain had no airspeed; autothrottle or flight director in severe weather conditions. The AIRSPEED LOST Checklist was in the Emergency Procedures; not the Emergency Non Alerts as indicated.

Narrative: After entering foreign airspace; we were briefed and ready for descent. ATC instructed us to descend from FL360 to FL280. Followed by instructions to continue the descent to FL150. Passing FL 280 (and just a minute from entering the weather) we received a LVL 2 alert 'SEL ELEV FEEL MAN' and a LVL 2 'FLAP LIM OVRD.' At the same time the autopilot kicked off and the autothrottles kicked off; and were unrecoverable. Additionally; we lost our Flight Directors and the Captain's airspeed indicator was extremely inaccurate. While in the process of attempting to follow ATC's instructions I had the First Officer in the jumpseat running the checklists while the First Officer in the right seat was constantly calling out standby airspeed values; selecting headings and altitudes to avoid weather and comply with ATC. Passing FL180; the jumpseat First Officer was unable to locate the 'AIRSPEED LOST; SUSPECT or ERRATIC' Checklist; which was where our checklist for 'SEL ELEV FEEL MAN' and 'FLAP LIM OVRD' leads us to. At this time we all agreed his time would be better spent assisting to get the aircraft on the ground. I requested a 30 mile final vector for the ILS. After slat extension and flap 15 extension I called for Flaps 28. The flaps only extended to a split of 20/22 with a 'FLAP DISAG' alert. Gear down; Flaps 35; still split 20/22. Captain's airspeed indicator was unusable. Landing was [normal]. During the debrief we all tried to locate the 'AIRSPEED LOST; SUSPECT or ERRATIC' checklist and could not find it. After arriving at the hotel around dawn we all got together with the company CD to try to find it. After 15 minutes we located it; not under the 'Emergency Non-Alerts' where our checklist leads us; but under 'Emergency Procedures.' I would like to commend both First Officers for their professional and controlled performance under extremely stressful conditions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.