Narrative:

I contacted dispatch for a briefing on my upcoming flights; a positioning ferry; a charter; another positioning ferry. My dispatcher advised me that both long runway pairs our destination were closed for construction. The only runways available were the 6;000 ft runway xx/yy; and there was a possibility that runway yy (in use) would be wet upon our arrival. I had landed on the available runway one time in my career; on runway xx and knew from that experience that the concrete/asphalt is short; patchy and rough. The dispatcher advised me of his planned fuel load for uplift out of the departure station. The amount was far more than needed for the leg; but he explained that it was being uploaded so little or no refueling would be necessary prior to the charter flight. This made no sense to me since doing so would bring the aircraft up to just under the charted max landing weight for runway xx/yy leaving few options should we encounter a problem. I advised the dispatcher that less fuel was more desirable for operational reasons on the short runway. As a result; he adjusted the numbers so that some of the extra fuel was eliminated and issued a revised release. When I boarded the aircraft prior to departure I noticed that the aircraft had been fueled to the original load which had been planned prior to my conversation with the dispatcher. I was not willing to take the extra fuel (approximately 3;000 pounds) due to the previously stated reasons. Regardless of the potential for a delay due to de-fueling; we departed the gate on time only to be strapped with an edct due to weather in the destination metro area as well as added security measures in place due to the 9/11 anniversary. Engines were restarted and we lifted off about an hour late. The flight was uneventful until shortly after we began communicating with destination approach. As things turned out; we ended up with 'issues' during our arrival. The fuel being carried affected the landing weight of the aircraft and turned out to be a big factor in our decision making process. On approach to; with runway yy in use (wet); the wind was being reported at different times from 110/11; progressively moving more northeasterly to 030/08 by the time we were turning final approach for runway yy. Performance pages referenced for landing indicated that an 8 knot direct tailwind put us too close to the landing length available for yy at 127K pounds. We elected to break off approach and advised the approach controller that we would need runway xx due to the tailwind on yy. We were instructed to climb to 5;000 ft and proceed direct to a nearby intersection to enter holding on the 244 radial; with left hand turns; 10 mile legs and an efct or until we could be sequenced for a landing on runway xx (which was within tolerance for landing with flaps full). While proceeding toward fix; a thunderstorm with lightning; heavy rain and hail moved over the field. As a result; we ended up remaining in the hold for approximately :20 minutes while the storm passed. Once the weather had moved away from the airport; ATC cleared us out of the hold; and issued a clearance to fly a 120?? Heading. I inquired if this was for vectors to runway xx. Controller responded 'no; it's for yy.' I advised him that we were 'unable yy' due to the previously reported tailwind. Controller responded that the wind was now 'calm.' at that point we discussed what would occur should a tailwind be reported prior to landing. We advised the dispatcher via ACARS data link that we had departed the hold and were headed to the airport for landing. We received an acknowledgment of our report. Shortly thereafter; the data link system failed. Although various means were utilized in an attempt to reestablish the data link; it locked up in voice mode and remained unavailable for data transmission for the duration of the flight. Pilot not flying/pilot flying further discussed the likelihood that the wind data was inaccurate; and that we would seek further wind updates as we approached runway yy. If the winds went out of tolerance as we approached the runway; we would break off the approach and land on runway xx. The weather was VFR within 10 miles of the airport; so a visual approach would be utilized if we had to break off the approach to yy and land on xx. As we were being vectored to runway yy; wind reports starting coming in which indicated that the wind was again from the east and increasing. As I recall; the first report was 110/09; then 090/6; followed by 060/8. We switched onto the tower frequency about 5 miles from touchdown but had not identified the fact that we were listening. A wind report of '030/08' was provided to a preceding aircraft. That report was identical to the wind reported which caused us to break off the first approach. I checked on with the tower controller and asked him to repeat the wind info. When the controller gave us the same wind info '030/08' pilot flying and pilot not flying concurred that the wind being reported was unacceptable for landing on yy. I advised the tower that we were discontinuing the approach and would need vectors to runway xx for landing. Tower issued clearance to climb and maintain 2;000 ft and assigned us to 'fly runway heading' for vectors to runway xx. As we began our final turn to the runway; the pilot flying call for 'gear down; flaps 3; landing check.' pilot not flying repeated 'gear down; flaps 3' and initiated the landing checklist. When we reached the 'ECAM verify; landing no blue; sts checked' portion of the checklist; we noticed that we had an ECAM present which stated brakes altn brake fault. We did not receive an ECAM 'chime' alerting us to the fault. Upon recognizing; pilot not flying & pilot flying quickly discussed the fault; and decided to break off the approach to sort out what was going on. The landing gear was not retracted as we aborted the approach as we wanted to evaluate the fault condition prior to raising the gear. ATC issued clearance to climb back up to 2;000 ft at which time we ran the ECAM. ECAM action was called for; however; there were no actions associated with the fault. Wheel page and status indicated altn brake inoperative. Pilot not flying referenced the QRH and looked at the ECAM non-normal supplemental manual which stated 'crew awareness - altn brake function is lost.' I then referenced the green pages of the QRH to acquire performance numbers and confirmed that a landing in ZZZ with the altn brake system inoperative was not within limits on a 6;000 ft runway in either direction. We then elected to cycle the gear. Upon doing so; the brakes altn brake fault ECAM disappeared; but on the wheel page an anti-skid 1 fault presented itself. No ECAM message or chime was ever presented in relation to the anti-skid fault. At that point I advised the pilot flying that I would be 'off' ATC; in order to talk to dispatch and maintenance control. Pilot flying assumed responsibility for ATC communications while I contacted ops to establish a voice relay communication with dispatch and maintenance control. After reporting the current condition of the aircraft as well as the initial fault; maintenance control advised us to cycle the a/skid and northwest/ strg switch. Once this was accomplished; the faults appeared to clear themselves. I advised operations to relay that the board appears to be clear indicating that the fault/failure appeared to be gone. However pilot flying/pilot not flying were suspicious that the system was still not functioning properly. We briefly discussed the situation and decided that we were not comfortable landing the aircraft on a wet 6;000 ft runway with gremlins potentially still lurking in the brake and anti-skid systems. This was a conservative; precautionary decision based on the faults that had occurred; and the possibility that there was a deeper fault within the system which could cause a recurrence of one or more problems as we touched down. I then advised operations to relay to dispatch that we were not going to land here; that we had slightly more than 10;000 pounds of fuel; and that we were going to proceed to one of two nearby airport and system control needed to make a decision as to which airport they wanted us to proceed as quickly as possible as our fuel situation was deteriorating. I added that we should probably head the furthest airport so we could switch aircraft and return as quickly as possible to continue the charter operation. After a short pause; operations advised that system control had instructed us to divert to that airport. I advised ATC that we would be diverting to phl. I elected to declare an emergency as a precaution; advised the controller that we would need zzl/zyr for landing; and that we would like the emergency equipment standing by; since we had and may again have; a problem related to our brake system. The first officer remained pilot flying throughout the entire event and handled ATC communications when I was off the frequency dealing with operations; dispatch and maintenance control. The two flight attendants and charter coordinator with us on the positioning flight were briefed and told to expect a normal landing and there would be emergency equipment standing by. We proceeded for an uneventful landing. We taxied to the hangar; whereby; upon shutdown; we received an additional (non-chimed) ECAM message for brakes - north/west strg minor fault; which confirmed our suspicion that there was a deeper problem within the system; and that our decision to divert to a longer runway was valid. Note-that the line under the word brakes in the ECAM we received extended underneath the 'north/west strg. This is important because the ECAM non-normal supplemental manual contains two separate brakes - north/west strg minor fault entries. One has the underline ending at the word brakes the other continues below the north/west strg portion of the message. The ECAM displayed to us included underlining which extended underneath the north/west strg portion of the header. This is important because the reference in the ECAM non-normal supplemental manual states that the message would appear on two specific aircraft. There is no reference to the message appearing on our aircraft which happens to be an enhanced cfm powered aircraft similar to the exceptions aircraft mentioned in the QRH. Throughout the event; multiple aspects of CRM were employed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A321 approaching an airport with a 6;000 FT runway was unable to land on the first approach because of wind and on the second approach had a brake fault which affected the landing distance capabilities and so they diverted to a nearby aircraft where an aircraft switch was made.

Narrative: I contacted Dispatch for a briefing on my upcoming flights; a positioning ferry; a Charter; another positioning ferry. My Dispatcher advised me that both long runway pairs our destination were closed for construction. The only runways available were the 6;000 FT Runway XX/YY; and there was a possibility that Runway YY (in use) would be WET upon our arrival. I had landed on the available runway one time in my career; on Runway XX and knew from that experience that the concrete/asphalt is short; patchy and rough. The Dispatcher advised me of his planned fuel load for uplift out of the departure station. The amount was far more than needed for the leg; but he explained that it was being uploaded so little or no refueling would be necessary prior to the charter flight. This made no sense to me since doing so would bring the aircraft up to just under the charted max landing weight for Runway XX/YY leaving few options should we encounter a problem. I advised the Dispatcher that less fuel was more desirable for operational reasons on the short runway. As a result; he adjusted the numbers so that some of the extra fuel was eliminated and issued a revised release. When I boarded the aircraft prior to departure I noticed that the aircraft had been fueled to the original load which had been planned prior to my conversation with the Dispatcher. I was not willing to take the extra fuel (approximately 3;000 LBS) due to the previously stated reasons. Regardless of the potential for a delay due to de-fueling; we departed the gate on time only to be strapped with an EDCT due to weather in the destination metro area as well as added security measures in place due to the 9/11 anniversary. Engines were restarted and we lifted off about an hour late. The flight was uneventful until shortly after we began communicating with destination Approach. As things turned out; we ended up with 'issues' during our arrival. The fuel being carried affected the landing weight of the aircraft and turned out to be a big factor in our decision making process. On approach to; with Runway YY in use (wet); the wind was being reported at different times from 110/11; progressively moving more northeasterly to 030/08 by the time we were turning final approach for Runway YY. Performance pages referenced for landing indicated that an 8 knot direct tailwind put us too close to the landing length available for YY at 127K LBS. We elected to break off approach and advised the Approach Controller that we would need Runway XX due to the tailwind on YY. We were instructed to climb to 5;000 FT and proceed direct to a nearby intersection to enter holding on the 244 Radial; with left hand turns; 10 mile legs and an EFCT or until we could be sequenced for a landing on Runway XX (which was within tolerance for landing with flaps full). While proceeding toward fix; a thunderstorm with lightning; heavy rain and hail moved over the field. As a result; we ended up remaining in the hold for approximately :20 minutes while the storm passed. Once the weather had moved away from the airport; ATC cleared us out of the hold; and issued a clearance to fly a 120?? heading. I inquired if this was for vectors to Runway XX. Controller responded 'no; it's for YY.' I advised him that we were 'unable YY' due to the previously reported tailwind. Controller responded that the wind was now 'CALM.' At that point we discussed what would occur should a tailwind be reported prior to landing. We advised the Dispatcher via ACARS data link that we had departed the hold and were headed to the airport for landing. We received an acknowledgment of our report. Shortly thereafter; the data link system failed. Although various means were utilized in an attempt to reestablish the data link; it locked up in VOICE mode and remained unavailable for DATA transmission for the duration of the flight. Pilot not flying/Pilot flying further discussed the likelihood that the wind data was inaccurate; and that we would seek further wind updates as we approached Runway YY. If the winds went out of tolerance as we approached the Runway; we would break off the approach and land on Runway XX. The weather was VFR within 10 miles of the airport; so a visual approach would be utilized if we had to break off the approach to YY and land on XX. As we were being vectored to Runway YY; wind reports starting coming in which indicated that the wind was again from the east and increasing. As I recall; the first report was 110/09; then 090/6; followed by 060/8. We switched onto the Tower frequency about 5 miles from touchdown but had not identified the fact that we were listening. A wind report of '030/08' was provided to a preceding aircraft. That report was identical to the wind reported which caused us to break off the first approach. I checked on with the Tower Controller and asked him to repeat the wind info. When the Controller gave us the same wind info '030/08' pilot flying and pilot not flying concurred that the wind being reported was unacceptable for landing on YY. I advised the Tower that we were discontinuing the approach and would need vectors to Runway XX for landing. Tower issued clearance to climb and maintain 2;000 FT and assigned us to 'fly runway heading' for vectors to Runway XX. As we began our final turn to the runway; the pilot flying call for 'GEAR DOWN; FLAPS 3; LANDING CHECK.' Pilot not flying repeated 'gear down; flaps 3' and initiated the landing checklist. When we reached the 'ECAM VERIFY; LANDING NO BLUE; STS CHECKED' portion of the checklist; we noticed that we had an ECAM present which stated BRAKES ALTN BRAKE FAULT. We did not receive an ECAM 'chime' alerting us to the fault. Upon recognizing; pilot not flying & pilot flying quickly discussed the fault; and decided to break off the approach to sort out what was going on. The landing gear was not retracted as we aborted the approach as we wanted to evaluate the fault condition prior to raising the gear. ATC issued clearance to climb back up to 2;000 FT at which time we ran the ECAM. ECAM action was called for; however; there were no actions associated with the FAULT. Wheel page and status indicated ALTN BRAKE inoperative. Pilot not flying referenced the QRH and looked at the ECAM Non-Normal Supplemental Manual which stated 'CREW AWARENESS - ALTN Brake function is lost.' I then referenced the GREEN pages of the QRH to acquire performance numbers and confirmed that a landing in ZZZ with the ALTN BRAKE SYS INOP was not within limits on a 6;000 FT runway in either direction. We then elected to cycle the gear. Upon doing so; the BRAKES ALTN BRAKE FAULT ECAM disappeared; but on the Wheel page an ANTI-SKID 1 fault presented itself. No ECAM message or chime was ever presented in relation to the Anti-Skid Fault. At that point I advised the pilot flying that I would be 'off' ATC; in order to talk to Dispatch and Maintenance Control. Pilot flying assumed responsibility for ATC communications while I contacted Ops to establish a voice relay communication with Dispatch and Maintenance Control. After reporting the current condition of the aircraft as well as the initial fault; Maintenance Control advised us to cycle the A/SKID and NW/ STRG Switch. Once this was accomplished; the faults appeared to clear themselves. I advised Operations to relay that the board appears to be clear indicating that the fault/failure appeared to be gone. However pilot flying/pilot not flying were suspicious that the system was still not functioning properly. We briefly discussed the situation and decided that we were not comfortable landing the aircraft on a WET 6;000 FT runway with gremlins potentially still lurking in the brake and anti-skid systems. This was a conservative; precautionary decision based on the faults that had occurred; and the possibility that there was a deeper fault within the system which could cause a recurrence of one or more problems as we touched down. I then advised Operations to relay to Dispatch that we were not going to land here; that we had slightly more than 10;000 LBS of fuel; and that we were going to proceed to one of two nearby airport and System Control needed to make a decision as to which airport they wanted us to proceed as quickly as possible as our fuel situation was deteriorating. I added that we should probably head the furthest airport so we could switch aircraft and return as quickly as possible to continue the CHARTER operation. After a short pause; Operations advised that System Control had instructed us to divert to that airport. I advised ATC that we would be diverting to PHL. I elected to declare an emergency as a precaution; advised the Controller that we would need ZZL/ZYR for landing; and that we would like the Emergency Equipment standing by; since we had and may again have; a problem related to our brake system. The First Officer remained pilot flying throughout the entire event and handled ATC communications when I was off the frequency dealing with Operations; Dispatch and Maintenance Control. The two flight attendants and Charter coordinator with us on the positioning flight were briefed and told to expect a NORMAL landing and there would be emergency equipment standing by. We proceeded for an uneventful landing. We taxied to the hangar; whereby; upon shutdown; we received an additional (non-chimed) ECAM message for BRAKES - N/W STRG MINOR FAULT; which confirmed our suspicion that there was a deeper problem within the system; and that our decision to divert to a longer runway was valid. NOTE-that the line under the word BRAKES in the ECAM we received extended underneath the 'N/W STRG. This is important because the ECAM Non-Normal Supplemental Manual contains two separate BRAKES - N/W STRG MINOR FAULT entries. One has the underline ending at the word BRAKES the other continues below the N/W STRG portion of the message. The ECAM displayed to us included underlining which extended underneath the N/W STRG portion of the header. This is important because the reference in the ECAM Non-Normal Supplemental Manual states that the message would appear on two specific aircraft. There is no reference to the message appearing on our aircraft which happens to be an ENHANCED CFM powered aircraft similar to the exceptions aircraft mentioned in the QRH. Throughout the event; multiple aspects of CRM were employed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.