Narrative:

I was operating a be-58 under 14 crash fire rescue equipment part 91. The flight had just departed a CTAF airport and was in the climb phase of flight at approximately 3;000 ft MSL. I was in the process of completing a climb checklist and was about to contact approach control to open a filed IFR flight plan. I noticed the left engine fuel flow indication was reading 15 gph (normal is nearer to 27 gph). I cross checked the installed electronic fuel flow computer and the egt gauges; which confirmed that there was indeed a fuel flow problem rather than a malfunctioning gauge. I placed the left auxiliary fuel pump switch in the 'high' position and confirmed the fuel selectors and mixture control were in the 'on' and 'full rich' positions; respectively (by physically touching both); there was no improvement. Rather; the fuel flow had deteriorated to approximately 13 gph and the engine was beginning to shutdown from excessively lean fuel/air mixture. I then performed an intentional in-flight engine shutdown; securing and feathering procedures from memory and contacted approach. I informed them of the situation and requested vectors to an airport more suitable then my departure airport (which has a narrow; short runway and no arff or line service). The controller did their job well and offered my two choices of airports; I accepted vectors toward another airport. I then completed the in-flight engine failure checklist. I decided to delay attempting a restart until nearer the other airport in case a fire occurred. I did attempt restart; but fuel flow remained at 0 gph; so I re-feathered and secured the engine. After landing; I contacted a mechanic who found a loose fitting on a fuel line near the fuel 'spider' on top of the engine. After reconnecting and tightening the fitting; the aircraft ran properly. I believe I was able to keep the aircraft under control and continue the flight to a safe landing due to the training I have received while obtaining multi-engine ratings; both commercial and instructor; but especially the recurrent training from being employed by a 14 crash fire rescue equipment part 135 operator. The occurrence was obviously caused by a loose fitting; but I do not wish to blame a mechanic; designer or any other person. Those engines are subjected to many forces (a 550 cubic inch engine running at 2;300 RPM creates a lot of force); temperature and pressure changes; and other harsh conditions; something is going to fail eventually. I will use this experience in my position as a CFI to educate other pilots about the necessity to remain first and foremost proficient and aware of the possibility of emergencies.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE-58 engine fuel flow was low and the engine malfunctioning so the pilot feathered the engine; declared an emergency; and landed at a nearby airport where a loose fuel fitting was found.

Narrative: I was operating a BE-58 under 14 CFR Part 91. The flight had just departed a CTAF airport and was in the climb phase of flight at approximately 3;000 FT MSL. I was in the process of completing a climb checklist and was about to contact Approach Control to open a filed IFR flight plan. I noticed the left engine fuel flow indication was reading 15 GPH (normal is nearer to 27 GPH). I cross checked the installed electronic fuel flow computer and the EGT gauges; which confirmed that there was indeed a fuel flow problem rather than a malfunctioning gauge. I placed the left auxiliary fuel pump switch in the 'high' position and confirmed the fuel selectors and mixture control were in the 'on' and 'full rich' positions; respectively (by physically touching both); there was no improvement. Rather; the fuel flow had deteriorated to approximately 13 GPH and the engine was beginning to shutdown from excessively lean fuel/air mixture. I then performed an intentional in-flight engine shutdown; securing and feathering procedures from memory and contacted Approach. I informed them of the situation and requested vectors to an airport more suitable then my departure airport (which has a narrow; short runway and no ARFF or line service). The Controller did their job well and offered my two choices of airports; I accepted vectors toward another airport. I then completed the in-flight engine failure checklist. I decided to delay attempting a restart until nearer the other airport in case a fire occurred. I did attempt restart; but fuel flow remained at 0 GPH; so I re-feathered and secured the engine. After landing; I contacted a Mechanic who found a loose fitting on a fuel line near the fuel 'spider' on top of the engine. After reconnecting and tightening the fitting; the aircraft ran properly. I believe I was able to keep the aircraft under control and continue the flight to a safe landing due to the training I have received while obtaining multi-engine ratings; both Commercial and Instructor; but especially the recurrent training from being employed by a 14 CFR Part 135 operator. The occurrence was obviously caused by a loose fitting; but I do not wish to blame a Mechanic; Designer or any other person. Those engines are subjected to many forces (a 550 cubic inch engine running at 2;300 RPM creates a lot of force); temperature and pressure changes; and other harsh conditions; something is going to fail eventually. I will use this experience in my position as a CFI to educate other pilots about the necessity to remain first and foremost proficient and aware of the possibility of emergencies.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.