Narrative:

Company B737 was due to depart ZZZ when the pilot reported to maintenance control that the nose landing gear (nlg) door bonding wire (1 of 2 per [nlg] door); illustrated parts catalog (ipc) reference 32-22-11; item # 20; was broken-off and written in the logbook. It's hard to recall the exact time of the occurrence; but I believe it was right at; or after shift change and as always; the phone lines were lit up and calls were backed up.there were two technicians on shift at the time. I deferred the item for time with a recurrent check per maintenance procedures manual (mpm) chapter 53-03-15 using the standard wiring procedures manual (swpm) 20-20-00 as a deferral source. The captain clearly objected to this action and stated I was wrong; including a statement that on a previous aircraft with the same issue; maintenance replaced the bonding wire. I disagreed with the captain and faxed him the reference and the aircraft departed for ZZZ1 with no further objection. At this point the whole situation was professional and I don't remember either party becoming or acting confrontational.after things settled down; my peer asked me how I handled the bonding wire and when I told him; he also stated I was wrong. Within minutes of this conversation a maintenance control quality assurance person; who reviews all new deferrals with recurrent maintenance inspections; approached me with the same concern. I immediately re-read the swpm reference and realized that I had mis-read the deferral statement. I had thought it stated the remaining bonding wires had to meet the minimum deferral limits and as there are two wires per door; then one could be broken as long as the other met the limitations. As I stated the aircraft had departed ZZZ for ZZZ1 at which point I felt the individual bonding wire was not a safety of flight issue and allowed the flight to continue to ZZZ1. I immediately contacted ZZZ1 maintenance and requested maintenance replace the bonding wire before further flight. I then called the operations dispatcher and requested he have the captain call me when he arrived in ZZZ1.I did not hear from the captain for a couple days; but when he called I explained my actions and apologized for the situation I placed him and his crew in. I was adamant this would not happen again and that I made a series of mistakes; first I went from memory; second when challenged by the captain; I read the reference and mis-interpreted what was written. I could make excuses but in all honesty I was wrong; I made a mistake and I thought my immediate actions to not only correct the mistake; but yet contact the captain and apologize for the action were adequate enough for a corrective action (C/a). I am very active in everything I interact with in my job. I don't take anything lightly; but in this case I dropped the ball and made a mistake. No one feels worse than I do; however I felt my corrective action was professional and adequate to rectify the mistake. The captain informed me he filed a report and I accepted his reasoning behind his filing of the report.the event occurred because I worked initially from memory because we were very busy with multiple problems going on. When the captain challenged my deferral; I mis-read the deferral reference and faxed the paperwork to the captain. I know better than to the let the workload affect my decisions especially going from memory. I should have taken the time to carefully read the deferral reference or query my peers for assistance. This was a big lesson learned; which has changed my whole approach to job accomplishment. I now make sure I review all materials for deferrals carefully and I do not quote from memory in deferring issues with flight crews or maintenance. I have taken this mistake seriously and now take everything I do one call at a time. I strive daily to ensure this mistake does not happen again. I have apologized to the pilot and I apologize to the company and any individuals who feel my actions were mis-leading; inappropriate or careless; that was not my intention.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Maintenance Controller describes his efforts to correct an improper deferral he had made for a broken bonding wire on a B737 Nose Landing Gear (NLG) door that was challenged by an outbound Captain. After the aircraft had departed; another Maintenance Controller informed him the deferral was wrong.

Narrative: Company B737 was due to depart ZZZ when the pilot reported to Maintenance Control that the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) door bonding wire (1 of 2 per [NLG] door); Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) Reference 32-22-11; Item # 20; was broken-off and written in the Logbook. It's hard to recall the exact time of the occurrence; but I believe it was right at; or after shift change and as always; the phone lines were lit up and calls were backed up.There were two Technicians on shift at the time. I deferred the item for time with a recurrent check per Maintenance Procedures Manual (MPM) Chapter 53-03-15 using the Standard Wiring Procedures Manual (SWPM) 20-20-00 as a deferral source. The Captain clearly objected to this action and stated I was wrong; including a statement that on a previous aircraft with the same issue; Maintenance replaced the bonding wire. I disagreed with the Captain and faxed him the reference and the aircraft departed for ZZZ1 with no further objection. At this point the whole situation was professional and I don't remember either party becoming or acting confrontational.After things settled down; my peer asked me how I handled the bonding wire and when I told him; he also stated I was wrong. Within minutes of this conversation a Maintenance Control Quality Assurance person; who reviews all new deferrals with recurrent maintenance inspections; approached me with the same concern. I immediately re-read the SWPM reference and realized that I had mis-read the deferral statement. I had thought it stated the remaining bonding wires had to meet the minimum deferral limits and as there are two wires per door; then one could be broken as long as the other met the limitations. As I stated the aircraft had departed ZZZ for ZZZ1 at which point I felt the individual bonding wire was not a safety of flight issue and allowed the flight to continue to ZZZ1. I immediately contacted ZZZ1 Maintenance and requested Maintenance replace the bonding wire before further flight. I then called the Operations Dispatcher and requested he have the Captain call me when he arrived in ZZZ1.I did not hear from the Captain for a couple days; but when he called I explained my actions and apologized for the situation I placed him and his crew in. I was adamant this would not happen again and that I made a series of mistakes; first I went from memory; second when challenged by the Captain; I read the reference and mis-interpreted what was written. I could make excuses but in all honesty I was wrong; I made a mistake and I thought my immediate actions to not only correct the mistake; but yet contact the Captain and apologize for the action were adequate enough for a Corrective Action (C/A). I am very active in everything I interact with in my job. I don't take anything lightly; but in this case I dropped the ball and made a mistake. No one feels worse than I do; however I felt my Corrective Action was professional and adequate to rectify the mistake. The Captain informed me he filed a report and I accepted his reasoning behind his filing of the report.The event occurred because I worked initially from memory because we were very busy with multiple problems going on. When the Captain challenged my deferral; I mis-read the deferral reference and faxed the paperwork to the Captain. I know better than to the let the workload affect my decisions especially going from memory. I should have taken the time to carefully read the deferral reference or query my peers for assistance. This was a big lesson learned; which has changed my whole approach to job accomplishment. I now make sure I review all materials for deferrals carefully and I do not quote from memory in deferring issues with flight crews or Maintenance. I have taken this mistake seriously and now take everything I do one call at a time. I strive daily to ensure this mistake does not happen again. I have apologized to the pilot and I apologize to the company and any individuals who feel my actions were mis-leading; inappropriate or careless; that was not my intention.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.