Narrative:

During the shift I had felt tired from the quick turn I had done the night before; but felt that I was alert enough to work traffic. I didn't realize just how tired I was until after I was relieved and looked back on the operation. I was working north local control on plan B landing runway 22R. The previous 50 minutes was the normal routine: cleared to land and giving the aircraft a turn off the runway. A helicopter was flying VFR just outside the bravo; about 1;500 ft-1;600 ft MSL. My aircraft were checking on with me at about 5 miles from the airport over the (outer marker) at about 2;000 ft - 2;100 ft. The helicopter was under the final approach course for the runway at one point. I failed to call traffic with the helicopter and never reached out to the helicopter to see if he was on my frequency. The first time I exchanged traffic was when the helicopter called me initially 5.5 northeast requesting to go westbound about 2 miles and hold at 1; 600 ft. I gave the helicopter radar contact and cleared him into the class B airspace as requested and told him traffic was landing 22R and to remain clear of the runway 14L extended center line. I was not very specific with the traffic call to the helicopter nor did I issue cautionary advisories. I issued traffic to the next arrival on 22R as the helicopter was now clear of the final heading west. I feel that this lack of traffic calls and positive control was due to fatigue and inadvertent complacency due to the low complexity and rhythm of that particular position. I remember thinking that the helicopter was not in my airspace: at or below 1; 600 ft; VFR; moving north and that my arrivals are 500 ft above him heading southwest; thus the lack of traffic calls. I realize that this thinking was incorrect and should not have allowed myself to work like that. I think that my fatigue was the primary reason for this. In hindsight; I should have requested not to work because I was too tired and should have taken leave. I did try to stay engaged by standing and moving around my position. In the future I will do my best to assess myself realistically and take action to protect the safety of air traffic. I will also reach out to aircraft on my final and make sufficient traffic calls when my aircraft are in close proximity; even if legal separation was being maintained. If the aircraft get too close; I will send my arrival around. Recommendation; maybe we can find a way to help lessen the quick turn effects. I always feel more tired the day after my quick turn than other days of the week. Generally; I am able to use different techniques to lessen the effect of the quick turn; but I feel this week may have been different due to other variables. A bad storm came through the area in the middle of the night during my quick turn and flooded much of the area. Many people had to leave their houses earlier to have more time to get to work due the lack of available public transportation and the closure of streets. I know the hours between the night and day are now at 9; but I feel that many people; like myself; may come to work tired and not well rested due to circumstances outside of our control.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Tower Controller described a flawed traffic call event noting the quick turn around schedule may have contributed to the circumstances listed.

Narrative: During the shift I had felt tired from the quick turn I had done the night before; but felt that I was alert enough to work traffic. I didn't realize just how tired I was until after I was relieved and looked back on the operation. I was working North Local Control on Plan B landing Runway 22R. The previous 50 minutes was the normal routine: cleared to land and giving the aircraft a turn off the runway. A helicopter was flying VFR just outside the BRAVO; about 1;500 FT-1;600 FT MSL. My aircraft were checking on with me at about 5 miles from the airport over the (outer marker) at about 2;000 FT - 2;100 FT. The helicopter was under the final approach course for the runway at one point. I failed to call traffic with the helicopter and never reached out to the helicopter to see if he was on my frequency. The first time I exchanged traffic was when the helicopter called me initially 5.5 northeast requesting to go westbound about 2 miles and hold at 1; 600 FT. I gave the helicopter RADAR contact and cleared him into the Class B airspace as requested and told him traffic was landing 22R and to remain clear of the Runway 14L extended center line. I was not very specific with the traffic call to the helicopter nor did I issue cautionary advisories. I issued traffic to the next arrival on 22R as the helicopter was now clear of the final heading west. I feel that this lack of traffic calls and positive control was due to fatigue and inadvertent complacency due to the low complexity and rhythm of that particular position. I remember thinking that the helicopter was not in my airspace: at or below 1; 600 FT; VFR; moving north and that my arrivals are 500 FT above him heading southwest; thus the lack of traffic calls. I realize that this thinking was incorrect and should not have allowed myself to work like that. I think that my fatigue was the primary reason for this. In hindsight; I should have requested not to work because I was too tired and should have taken leave. I did try to stay engaged by standing and moving around my position. In the future I will do my best to assess myself realistically and take action to protect the safety of air traffic. I will also reach out to aircraft on my final and make sufficient traffic calls when my aircraft are in close proximity; even if legal separation was being maintained. If the aircraft get too close; I will send my arrival around. Recommendation; maybe we can find a way to help lessen the quick turn effects. I always feel more tired the day after my quick turn than other days of the week. Generally; I am able to use different techniques to lessen the effect of the quick turn; but I feel this week may have been different due to other variables. A bad storm came through the area in the middle of the night during my quick turn and flooded much of the area. Many people had to leave their houses earlier to have more time to get to work due the lack of available public transportation and the closure of streets. I know the hours between the night and day are now at 9; but I feel that many people; like myself; may come to work tired and not well rested due to circumstances outside of our control.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.