Narrative:

During the originating checklist; while attempting to test the stall warning system; I mistakenly lifted the plastic guard for the lh engine fire push switch and pressed it. Very shortly after; the green engine fire bottle push to discharge light illuminated. Not realizing I had pressed the engine fire switch instead of the stall warning switch and thinking the green switch was the green roll control switch that might have been accidental hit; I pressed the engine fire bottle switch thinking I was resetting the roll control. Immediately upon seeing the engine and bottle cas messages I realized my mistake. I told the gate agent to hold boarding and I called maintenance. It was agreed to ferry the aircraft to a maintenance base. In my effort to expeditiously complete the checklists during the first flight of the day and due to a very short cod I may have became complacent while checking that item. On the glare shield there are two pairs of identical switches on the captain's side; which I believe was also a contributing factor. I have seen the green roll control before on line and knew that it was able to be reset. I have not seen the green discharge light except for in the simulator and I certainly was not expecting it at the gate. It was an incorrect reaction to press the switch without stopping to think what it was. Usually; I am very deliberate; but I may have been in a hurry enough to make the resulting mistake. Despite any perceived pressures or possible fatigue; each checklist and phase of flight can not be taken for granted. Each item needs to be checked and given the thought that is required to complete the desired result. No matter how many times an action has been completed during a flight; day; or even a career the same discipline each time is needed to operate safely and efficiently. During routine operations; we are constantly getting caution and warning lights on the glare shield panel. Usually; they are expected and immediately reset. That reaction to a light on the glare shield panel may result in improperly pushing or not realizing what the message really is.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A fatigued CRJ200 Captain attempted to test the stall warning; but accidentally armed the left engine fire bottle which is adjacent to it on the glare shield and then fired the squib thinking the green FIRE light was the roll control switch.

Narrative: During the originating checklist; while attempting to test the stall warning system; I mistakenly lifted the plastic guard for the LH ENG FIRE PUSH switch and pressed it. Very shortly after; the green engine fire bottle push to discharge light illuminated. Not realizing I had pressed the ENG FIRE switch instead of the stall warning switch and thinking the green switch was the green roll control switch that might have been accidental hit; I pressed the engine fire bottle switch thinking I was resetting the roll control. Immediately upon seeing the engine and bottle CAS messages I realized my mistake. I told the Gate Agent to hold boarding and I called Maintenance. It was agreed to ferry the aircraft to a Maintenance base. In my effort to expeditiously complete the checklists during the first flight of the day and due to a very short COD I may have became complacent while checking that item. On the glare shield there are two pairs of identical switches on the Captain's side; which I believe was also a contributing factor. I have seen the green roll control before on line and knew that it was able to be reset. I have not seen the green discharge light except for in the simulator and I certainly was not expecting it at the gate. It was an incorrect reaction to press the switch without stopping to think what it was. Usually; I am very deliberate; but I may have been in a hurry enough to make the resulting mistake. Despite any perceived pressures or possible fatigue; each checklist and phase of flight can not be taken for granted. Each item needs to be checked and given the thought that is required to complete the desired result. No matter how many times an action has been completed during a flight; day; or even a career the same discipline each time is needed to operate safely and efficiently. During routine operations; we are constantly getting caution and warning lights on the glare shield panel. Usually; they are expected and immediately reset. That reaction to a light on the glare shield panel may result in improperly pushing or not realizing what the message really is.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.