Narrative:

While on a vector of 130 to ILS 09R we were given clearance to intercept localizer approximately one-half mile to intercept. This produced an overshoot to the right of course. At this time; approach was transmitting to another aircraft; and we had not been given clearance to intercept the glideslope. After going approximately one-half dot high; we received clearance. We were presently at 4;700. The captain disconnected the autopilot to rejoin the glideslope. As we began descent; we remained right of course; and I verbalized this to the crew. Approach soon commented we were right of course and gave us a climb to 6;000. The captain called visual and continued to descend. Not feeling an appropriate correction was being made to the runway; I stated that we were right of course and the runway was well left. At approximately 500 to 700; the captain initiated a go-around. I only estimate this altitude because I do not recall hearing a 500 ft call; but feel it was below 1;000. Go-around was uneventful and another approach and ILS were made to sbgr. In retrospect; the late turn on to final and late clearance for the ILS initiated this event. I have witnessed this late clearance two times in the last two months while arriving into sbgr. The decision to continue the approach and stabilize was late and inappropriate for this situation. As the relief pilot; I think I should have been more direct to state that we needed to go-around earlier; and at a minimum 1;000 ft per SOP.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Late and close-in clearances to intercept the localizer and glide slope at SGBR resulted in an unstabilized approach and a subsequent go-around for a widebody air carrier.

Narrative: While on a vector of 130 to ILS 09R we were given clearance to intercept localizer approximately one-half mile to intercept. This produced an overshoot to the right of course. At this time; approach was transmitting to another aircraft; and we had not been given clearance to intercept the glideslope. After going approximately one-half dot high; we received clearance. We were presently at 4;700. The Captain disconnected the autopilot to rejoin the glideslope. As we began descent; we remained right of course; and I verbalized this to the crew. Approach soon commented we were right of course and gave us a climb to 6;000. The Captain called visual and continued to descend. Not feeling an appropriate correction was being made to the runway; I stated that we were right of course and the runway was well left. At approximately 500 to 700; the Captain initiated a go-around. I only estimate this altitude because I do not recall hearing a 500 FT call; but feel it was below 1;000. Go-around was uneventful and another approach and ILS were made to SBGR. In retrospect; the late turn on to final and late clearance for the ILS initiated this event. I have witnessed this late clearance two times in the last two months while arriving into SBGR. The decision to continue the approach and stabilize was late and inappropriate for this situation. As the Relief Pilot; I think I should have been more direct to state that we needed to go-around earlier; and at a minimum 1;000 FT per SOP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.