Narrative:

The first officer (pilot flying) advanced the throttles for take-off. As the airplane started it's roll and before it reached 50 KIAS; we had a idg 2 caution message on the EICAS (it only appeared for a couple of seconds). Rejected takeoff was called; ATC informed and after exiting the runway; I brought the aircraft to a stop. The passengers were instructed to remain in their seats; and the rejected takeoff QRH was performed. We contacted maintenance control and informed them of the rejected takeoff and why. I talked to maintenance control and informed them that the message only came up on initial roll and then disappeared after a couple of seconds (as soon as the rejected takeoff was initiated). I also informed them that the QRH for idg 2 caution was not done because the message had disappeared and had not come back. They decided to go ahead with MEL 24-11-01-1 since it had happened once before; around 8 days prior to this event. We proceeded to write up the MEL and maintenance control walked me through the MEL process; during the process I once again made clear with maintenance control that the message only showed up for a second or two and that the idg 2 caution message QRH was not performed because the message had disappeared. I reviewed the MEL in the MEL book. Once done; we got new numbers updated our release and passed the information along to operations for update of new MEL and fuel numbers. More than 25 minutes had passed since the rejected takeoff; and we attempted to take-off again. The same situation occurred on the second attempt; as the airplane started it's roll and before it reached 50 KIAS; we had a idg 2 caution message on the EICAS (it only appeared for a couple of seconds). Rejected takeoff was called; ATC informed and after exiting the runway; I brought the aircraft to a stop. The passengers were instructed to remain in their seats; and the rejected takeoff QRH was performed. At that point I made the decision to return to the gate. After arriving at the gate; the passengers were deplaned while we waited for maintenance personnel to arrive. I reviewed the MEL again and noticed that I had missed the line where it says that the idg should be disconnected. During the initial MEL maintenance control did not mention the disconnect function; they did say to turn off the generator and make sure the APU was taking the load and all flow lines were green and verified working on the electrical page. Maintenance personnel inspected the idg; found the oil level on the idg to be almost dry. They serviced; ops checked it with an engine run and signed off the MEL and returned the aircraft to service. We got new paperwork from dispatch; re-boarded the aircraft and proceeded without any further incidents. First; be completely sure that communications between maintenance control and crew are understood by both sides. Second; if you have to read the MEL book more than once to make sure every single line was understood and covered; do so.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 Captain reports rejecting a takeoff for an IDG caution message at low speed. Maintenance elects to defer the generator via MEL 24-11-01 with the crew preforming the required actions. The second takeoff attempt results in a second reject due to the IDG not being disconnected as required by the MEL. After the IDG is serviced with oil at the gate the flight departs with both generators fully operational.

Narrative: The First Officer (pilot flying) advanced the throttles for Take-off. As the airplane started it's roll and before it reached 50 KIAS; we had a IDG 2 Caution Message on the EICAS (it only appeared for a couple of seconds). Rejected Takeoff was called; ATC informed and after exiting the runway; I brought the aircraft to a stop. The passengers were instructed to remain in their seats; and the rejected takeoff QRH was performed. We contacted Maintenance Control and informed them of the rejected takeoff and why. I talked to Maintenance Control and informed them that the message only came up on initial roll and then disappeared after a couple of seconds (as soon as the rejected takeoff was initiated). I also informed them that the QRH for IDG 2 caution was not done because the message had disappeared and had not come back. They decided to go ahead with MEL 24-11-01-1 since it had happened once before; around 8 days prior to this event. We proceeded to write up the MEL and Maintenance Control walked me through the MEL process; during the process I once again made clear with Maintenance Control that the message only showed up for a second or two and that the IDG 2 Caution Message QRH was not performed because the message had disappeared. I reviewed the MEL in the MEL book. Once done; we got new numbers updated our release and passed the information along to operations for update of new MEL and fuel numbers. More than 25 minutes had passed since the rejected takeoff; and we attempted to take-off again. The same situation occurred on the second attempt; as the airplane started it's roll and before it reached 50 KIAS; we had a IDG 2 Caution Message on the EICAS (it only appeared for a couple of seconds). Rejected Takeoff was called; ATC informed and after exiting the runway; I brought the aircraft to a stop. The passengers were instructed to remain in their seats; and the rejected takeoff QRH was performed. At that point I made the decision to return to the gate. After arriving at the gate; the passengers were deplaned while we waited for maintenance personnel to arrive. I reviewed the MEL again and noticed that I had missed the line where it says that the IDG should be disconnected. During the initial MEL Maintenance Control did not mention the disconnect function; they did say to turn off the generator and make sure the APU was taking the load and all flow lines were green and verified working on the electrical page. Maintenance personnel inspected the IDG; found the oil level on the IDG to be almost dry. They serviced; ops checked it with an engine run and signed off the MEL and returned the aircraft to service. We got new paperwork from dispatch; re-boarded the aircraft and proceeded without any further incidents. First; be completely sure that communications between Maintenance Control and crew are understood by both sides. Second; if you have to read the MEL book more than once to make sure every single line was understood and covered; do so.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.