Narrative:

During pre-flight preparation of aircraft; the first officer mentioned that he had flown this aircraft earlier in june and encountered a dual engine egt over limit shortly after rotation. Upon examination of the previous logbook; it was discovered that aircraft had three previous dual engine egt over limits in june. Each was noted with takeoff and go-around (toga) power set for takeoff and each returned to normal limits when climb power was established during normal climb profile. Due to anticipating a toga; near maximum gross weight takeoff with an OAT of 34 degrees celsius; the captain called dispatch and maintenance control to discuss the previous egt over limit incidents. Maintenance control confirmed three such incidents had occurred. Maintenance control further explained that each exceedance was in 'area a' for which 20 are permitted per engine before maintenance action is required. The log booked also noted area a with no further maintenance action required. Maintenance control also explained to the captain 'area B' and 'area C' for egt over limits and discussed when an egt over limit requires an engine change. Based on the fact that all three over limits were area a; the captain elected to accept the aircraft for flight. The captain and first officer completed pre-flight preparations and discussed the potential for a dual egt over limit during the departure review. The crew pushed off the gate and taxied to the runway. The initial takeoff weight and balance indicated an improved performance; 'APU bleed on' takeoff. The captain noticed that the longer runway was still being used for departures and requested it as a precaution for a duel egt over limit. This runway is 1;100 ft longer than the assigned runway. Takeoff weight and balance for this runway did not require an improved performance; 'APU bleed on' takeoff; however; the captain elected to takeoff with the 'APU bleed on' as an added precaution in the event on a dual egt over limit. During the initial takeoff roll; both egts were in the mid 880's degrees C. Just prior to V1; both engines were below 950 degrees C (937 C and below.) during rotation; both engines exceeded 950 degrees C with the right (no 2) engine exceeding first flowed by the left (no 1) engine approximately 10 seconds later. The right engine exceedance was followed by an engine 2 egt over limit ECAM along with an engine 1 egt over limit ECAM when the left engine exceedance occurred. Maximum egt's noted were left (no 1) 958 C and right (no 1) 965 C. As this was a dual engine non-normal during takeoff with no loss of thrust; a normal climb profile was maintained with a lateral track of runway heading in case loss of thrust occurred. Climb power was set at thrust reduction altitude. When climb thrust was set; both engine egt's returned to normal range and both egt over limit ecams cleared without any input from the flight crew. Maintenance control and dispatch were notified via ACARS of dual engine egt over limit and an entry made in the logbook. The flight continued without incident as the egt over limits where once again in 'area a'. The safety concern when operating an aircraft with a known egt over limit condition; is the possible lack of knowledge by the flight crew - with no opportunity to brief and plan for the over limit and ECAM that might occur during rotation through initial climb segment. This flight crew would not have been aware of the issue had it not been for the first officer. The previous egt over limit incidents where contained in a previous logbook which was buried in the bottom of the cockpit coat closet. In accordance with threat error management; during the departure review; special consideration should be given to possible egt over limit during takeoff and a contingency plan established. This flight crew was aware of the potential issue during a night departure at a high density altitude airport (during hot weather); at maximum gross weight in mountainous terrain. This crew also had a company pilot on the jump seat as an extra pair of eyes to specifically monitor and note any egt over limit. A dual egt over limit at very low altitude to an uninformed crew would almost certainly narrow their situational awareness. It could be considered analogous to inducing a low altitude non-normal for each hot weather toga takeoff. The MEL system contains a host [of] non-normals that will exist during takeoff; flight or landing. If engines with documented recurring egt over limits are considered safe for normal flight operations; then this crew recommends an MEL or notification process/phb bulletin be established to warn flight crews of potential (and/or routine) engine egt over limit (during hot weather) along with the precautions and procedures to follow should the over limit occur; particularly with dual engine egt over limit.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 Captain is dismayed to learn that although his aircraft has a history of EGT exceedances during TOGA power takeoffs in hot conditions; no maintenance action is required until 20 such 'AREA A' over temperatures occur.

Narrative: During pre-flight preparation of aircraft; the First Officer mentioned that he had flown this aircraft earlier in June and encountered a dual engine EGT over limit shortly after rotation. Upon examination of the previous logbook; it was discovered that aircraft had three previous dual engine EGT over limits in June. Each was noted with takeoff and go-around (TOGA) power set for takeoff and each returned to normal limits when climb power was established during normal climb profile. Due to anticipating a TOGA; near maximum gross weight takeoff with an OAT of 34 Degrees Celsius; the Captain called Dispatch and Maintenance Control to discuss the previous EGT over limit incidents. Maintenance Control confirmed three such incidents had occurred. Maintenance Control further explained that each exceedance was in 'AREA A' for which 20 are permitted per engine before maintenance action is required. The log booked also noted Area A with no further maintenance action required. Maintenance Control also explained to the Captain 'Area B' and 'Area C' for EGT over limits and discussed when an EGT over limit requires an engine change. Based on the fact that all three over limits were Area A; the Captain elected to accept the aircraft for flight. The Captain and First Officer completed pre-flight preparations and discussed the potential for a Dual EGT over limit during the Departure Review. The crew pushed off the gate and taxied to the runway. The initial takeoff weight and balance indicated an Improved Performance; 'APU Bleed ON' takeoff. The Captain noticed that the longer runway was still being used for departures and requested it as a precaution for a duel EGT over limit. This runway is 1;100 FT longer than the assigned runway. Takeoff weight and balance for this runway did not require an Improved Performance; 'APU Bleed On' takeoff; however; the Captain elected to takeoff with the 'APU Bleed On' as an added precaution in the event on a dual EGT over limit. During the initial takeoff roll; both EGTs were in the mid 880's degrees C. Just prior to V1; both engines were below 950 degrees C (937 C and below.) During rotation; both engines exceeded 950 degrees C with the right (No 2) engine exceeding first flowed by the left (No 1) engine approximately 10 seconds later. The right engine exceedance was followed by an ENG 2 EGT OVER LIMIT ECAM along with an ENG 1 EGT OVER LIMIT ECAM when the left engine exceedance occurred. Maximum EGT's noted were Left (No 1) 958 C and Right (No 1) 965 C. As this was a dual engine non-normal during takeoff with no loss of thrust; a normal climb profile was maintained with a lateral track of runway heading in case loss of thrust occurred. Climb power was set at thrust reduction altitude. When climb thrust was set; both engine EGT's returned to normal range and both EGT over limit ECAMs cleared without any input from the flight crew. Maintenance Control and Dispatch were notified via ACARS of dual engine EGT over limit and an entry made in the logbook. The flight continued without incident as the EGT over limits where once again in 'Area A'. The safety concern when operating an aircraft with a known EGT over limit condition; is the possible lack of knowledge by the flight crew - with no opportunity to brief and plan for the over limit and ECAM that might occur during rotation through initial climb segment. This flight crew would not have been aware of the issue had it not been for the First Officer. The previous EGT over limit incidents where contained in a previous logbook which was buried in the bottom of the cockpit coat closet. In accordance with Threat Error Management; during the departure review; special consideration should be given to possible EGT over limit during takeoff and a contingency plan established. This flight crew was aware of the potential issue during a night departure at a high density altitude airport (during hot weather); at maximum gross weight in mountainous terrain. This crew also had a company pilot on the jump seat as an extra pair of eyes to specifically monitor and note any EGT over limit. A dual EGT over limit at very low altitude to an uninformed crew would almost certainly narrow their situational awareness. It could be considered analogous to inducing a low altitude non-normal for each hot weather TOGA takeoff. The MEL System contains a host [of] non-normals that will exist during takeoff; flight or landing. If engines with documented recurring EGT over limits are considered safe for normal flight operations; then this crew recommends an MEL or notification process/PHB Bulletin be established to warn flight crews of potential (and/or routine) engine EGT over limit (during hot weather) along with the precautions and procedures to follow should the over limit occur; particularly with dual engine EGT over limit.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.