Narrative:

About 25-30 minutes after leveling off at fl 300 we received a call from the purser stating there was a strong odor of burning rubber in the main cabin and it was intensifying. I spoke with the relief pilot; who was on his crew break; and he confirmed the odor and the passengers and flight attendant's were extremely concerned. I had the relief pilot return as we declared 'pan; pan; pan' and began a turn to ZZZZ. I briefed the purser on the situation with and had her prep the a/c and crew for landing in 25 minutes. We dumped about 28;000 pounds of fuel. I had the relief pilot remain on the interphone with a flight attendant during the whole time to keep us apprised of the situation in the cabin. We ran QRH procedures for 'fire or smoke or fumes' checklist. During the descent we noticed the odor subsided after we turned off utility buses and selected 'standby' on the equipment cooling selector. We landed overweight in ZZZZ on runway xxl. After clearing runway we had aarf inspect exterior of aircraft and when given the ok we taxied to gate.after gate arrival we were met by a host of ground personnel. I was informed by the ZZZZ police that the passengers were not able to deplane for security reasons. We eventually got this rectified and the people were allowed to deplane to a secure gate area. The passengers were extremely thankful but visibly shaken. Maintenance began going through the east&east compartment troubleshooting that area. One of the mechanics returned to cockpit and told me that it was extremely hot in the east&east compartment. Another mechanic returned to the cockpit with a piece of ducting; elbow shaped; and said he found it near the right pack. Then another mechanic returned to cockpit and told me he found a loose cannon plug from right pack that controlled auto shut down of pack in event of compressor discharge. While the mechanics continued working on aircraft the flight crew went to operations. While there; crew scheduling called us and told us we would go illegal on duty time in a short time. Shortly after that; maintenance informed me they had found a part but it was off the airfield a few miles. They would have to retrieve the part; return to airport; clear security; install part and perform an engine run-up. I began to have serious doubts about them completing this task safely in the time available as it appeared everyone was rushing. I spoke with operations managers; neither a pilot or mechanic; and explained I felt we were being pushed to take this aircraft. In the meantime; I received a phone call from the purser and she explained that she and several of the other flight attendants were very apprehensive taking this aircraft back out because of the fumes and odors as well as another item already deferred concerning 'wheel well fire detection' requiring us; per MEL; to leave gear extended for 10 minutes after takeoff. This was day 4 on the placard. I returned to jet to find the general manager and the director of maintenance on board. I spoke with them about the issues and told him I was not comfortable with aircraft. The general manager told me I had to speak to mechanics because they had fixed the aircraft. I politely asked them to be present when I spoke to mechanics. I explained to general manager that if I took this aircraft and diverted again what the ramifications would be. I then asked him if he was prepared to take that responsibility and his answer to me was 'no'. I then asked the two mechanics if they could definitively say that the ducting elbow caused the smell of burning rubber and by replacing it would fix the problem and their answer was 'no'. We were now less than 30 minutes from going illegal on duty day. I declined the aircraft. We went to hotel for a short layover and returned the next morning to fly the flight with a different aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A long range air carrier flight declared an emergency and diverted to a nearby airport when passengers and flight attendants reported strong odors of burning rubber in the cabin. The Captain later refused the aircraft because of a long standing MEL regarding the landing gear fire warning system and the fact that maintenance was unable to determinatively declare the source of the odors to have been identified and resolved.

Narrative: About 25-30 minutes after leveling off at FL 300 we received a call from the Purser stating there was a strong odor of burning rubber in the main cabin and it was intensifying. I spoke with the Relief Pilot; who was on his crew break; and he confirmed the odor and the passengers and Flight Attendant's were extremely concerned. I had the Relief Pilot return as we declared 'pan; pan; pan' and began a turn to ZZZZ. I briefed the purser on the situation with and had her prep the a/c and crew for landing in 25 minutes. We dumped about 28;000 LBS of fuel. I had the Relief Pilot remain on the interphone with a flight attendant during the whole time to keep us apprised of the situation in the cabin. We ran QRH procedures for 'Fire or Smoke or Fumes' checklist. During the descent we noticed the odor subsided after we turned off utility buses and selected 'Standby' on the equipment cooling selector. We landed overweight in ZZZZ on Runway XXL. After clearing runway we had AARF inspect exterior of aircraft and when given the OK we taxied to gate.After gate arrival we were met by a host of ground personnel. I was informed by the ZZZZ Police that the passengers were not able to deplane for security reasons. We eventually got this rectified and the people were allowed to deplane to a secure gate area. The passengers were extremely thankful but visibly shaken. Maintenance began going through the E&E compartment troubleshooting that area. One of the mechanics returned to cockpit and told me that it was extremely hot in the E&E compartment. Another Mechanic returned to the cockpit with a piece of ducting; elbow shaped; and said he found it near the right pack. Then another Mechanic returned to cockpit and told me he found a loose cannon plug from right pack that controlled auto shut down of pack in event of compressor discharge. While the mechanics continued working on aircraft the flight crew went to operations. While there; Crew Scheduling called us and told us we would go illegal on duty time in a short time. Shortly after that; Maintenance informed me they had found a part but it was off the airfield a few miles. They would have to retrieve the part; return to airport; clear security; install part and perform an engine run-up. I began to have serious doubts about them completing this task safely in the time available as it appeared everyone was rushing. I spoke with Operations Managers; neither a pilot or mechanic; and explained I felt we were being pushed to take this aircraft. In the meantime; I received a phone call from the Purser and she explained that she and several of the other flight attendants were very apprehensive taking this aircraft back out because of the fumes and odors as well as another item already deferred concerning 'wheel well fire detection' requiring us; per MEL; to leave gear extended for 10 minutes after takeoff. This was day 4 on the placard. I returned to jet to find the General Manager and the Director of Maintenance on board. I spoke with them about the issues and told him I was not comfortable with aircraft. The General Manager told me I had to speak to mechanics because they had fixed the aircraft. I politely asked them to be present when I spoke to mechanics. I explained to General Manager that if I took this aircraft and diverted again what the ramifications would be. I then asked him if he was prepared to take that responsibility and his answer to me was 'No'. I then asked the two mechanics if they could definitively say that the ducting elbow caused the smell of burning rubber and by replacing it would fix the problem and their answer was 'No'. We were now less than 30 minutes from going illegal on duty day. I declined the aircraft. We went to hotel for a short layover and returned the next morning to fly the flight with a different aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.