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37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
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| Attributes | |
| ACN | 953136 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201106 |
| Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
| State Reference | US |
| Environment | |
| Light | Night |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Descent |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Aircraft 2 | |
| Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Climb |
| Route In Use | Vectors |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Approach |
| Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types |
Narrative:
My aircraft was on downwind and I waited until I had course divergence from the air carrier X departure prior to descent clearance. The person working the departure position was working at the scope directly next to me. The departure was obviously issued a climb clearance because the next thing I hear is the conflict alert and air carrier X was climbing through 5;300 ft and headed northeast bound. My downwind air carrier Y was descending through 5;600 ft and the aircraft were about a mile apart. I issued traffic; but air carrier Y did not see air carrier X until appropriate separation was achieved. I then said to the controller; 'he didn't get him in sight until he was at 6;000 ft.' the controller's reply; 'it doesn't matter anyway.' I do not agree or like this reporting system. I have witnessed more operational errors since it's inception than ever before. Many of the errors I have seen were similar in nature to the one described above; preventable. Let me be clear; this program is creating and breeding a group of controllers who have no conscience. When there is no accountability; the rules no longer apply. Recommendation; cancel this program immediately.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Approach Controller described a loss of separation event noting his fellow Controller's lack of professionalism and listing the current reporting program as problematic.
Narrative: My aircraft was on downwind and I waited until I had course divergence from the Air Carrier X departure prior to descent clearance. The person working the Departure position was working at the scope directly next to me. The departure was obviously issued a climb clearance because the next thing I hear is the conflict alert and Air Carrier X was climbing through 5;300 FT and headed northeast bound. My downwind Air Carrier Y was descending through 5;600 FT and the aircraft were about a mile apart. I issued traffic; but Air Carrier Y did not see Air Carrier X until appropriate separation was achieved. I then said to the Controller; 'He didn't get him in sight until he was at 6;000 FT.' The Controller's reply; 'It doesn't matter anyway.' I do not agree or like this reporting system. I have witnessed more operational errors since it's inception than ever before. Many of the errors I have seen were similar in nature to the one described above; preventable. Let me be clear; this program is creating and breeding a group of controllers who have no conscience. When there is no accountability; the rules no longer apply. Recommendation; cancel this program immediately.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.