Narrative:

This crew flew duty period 1 of our 4 day trip uneventfully from the us to the caribbean which was then scheduled to receive a 'reduced rest' period (R3) in the caribbean due to being scheduled for 9:37 flight time in a 24 hour period. The next morning; duty period 2; when arriving at the aircraft in the caribbean; preflight inspection revealed the first officers 'nav display unit' (ndu 2) was blank; and would not display any information....it was just blank. I called maintenance control to discuss the item and we both agreed this item could be covered as an MEL item; allowing the aircraft to continue to our destination (a company maintenance station.) after 20 minutes of discussion on a cell phone with maintenance control about the correct write up procedure; pilot corrective action remarks; placarding procedures and logbook sign offs; we realized that our onboard aircraft MEL book had been revised and that I did not have the current MEL description for this particular discrepancy. Our MEL issue date was from 2009; and maintenance control had an updated 2010 version which I needed a copy of; since some of the restrictions had changed. We had completed the entire logbook entry process with 15-20 still remaining to departure time; however our departure was delayed almost 40 minutes while we waited for our operations in the caribbean to receive a fax with the current MEL revision covering the discrepancy. We departed the caribbean approximately 40 minutes late in good VMC conditions; and remained in marginal VFR to VFR-on-top conditions for the entire flight to the company maintenance station.we were scheduled to continue with this same aircraft on from the company maintenance station on; and then another leg. Knowing this; when approaching the company maintenance station from the caribbean and within ACARS range; we reminded the company maintenance station that we would be looking to have the ndu 2 replaced there. Ten minutes prior to landing; we again radioed the station to remind them we had an item we wanted fixed there. After landing; the crew cleared customs; and returned to our aircraft (which the agent was anxious to board for the next flight) only to find out that maintenance had visited the aircraft; performed a brief and required 'daily check' on the aircraft; and had converted the pilot-MEL for the ndu 2 into a regular maintenance MEL for the ndu 2. Clearly; the intention was to minimize delay; and have the crew continue to fly with an inoperative ndu 2; in the interest of 'keeping on schedule.'my original first officer was replaced due to illness; and I met the replacement first officer; who informed me he was still 'new' on the aircraft. Although he did have over 100 hours in type he said he was still 'getting used' to the aircraft. With this knowledge and after noting a severe weather advisory for thunderstorms had been issued for the destination area and along the route to there; I determined it was not in the interest of safety to continue there and then on with a 'new' first officer and an inoperative ndu 2 screen; effectively cutting in half our ability to see and navigate around any severe weather; and safely navigate our route. After some discussion with maintenance I explained I would not take the aircraft in its degraded state; and expressed frustration in that they had nearly 5 hours notice of the aircraft's condition upon arrival; and that they knew the crew had to clear customs before continuing on allowing additional time for maintenance to be performed; and that the scheduled turnaround time for these flights was 1:37 to begin with; plenty of time to replace a display unit screen. The mechanic who performed the daily check was somewhat perplexed as well; since he stated to me that the replacement display unit had been sent to the aircraft; was available and waiting for replacement; yet maintenance control had said it would now take 'too long' to replace the screen; and was just goingto keep the item on MEL and send us on our way. Realizing I would not accept the aircraft with that MEL for the next two legs due to the proximity and severity of weather along the route; maintenance then put an estimated time of departure delay of approximately and hour and a half. Shortly afterward; dispatch and maintenance decided to swap aircraft and issue us another aircraft for our next flight. As we were preflighting the new aircraft; we were advised that destination traffic now had a ground stop due to severe weather; and we were issued a next update time of approximately 1:30. After checking again about 40 minutes later; we heard clearance issuing re-routes for two other flights to our destination; so we inquired about a re-route for us; and were ultimately issued a different routing due to weather. Once airborne and while enroute; we were issue no less than 4 additional re-routes; still due to severe weather. Thankfully; with the high task loading for both pilots of accurately inputting new routes into the FMGC while still navigating around multiple thunderstorm systems; we did not accept an aircraft with only one operable nav display unit. Both pilots were kept very busy inputting and verifying new route segments while safely avoiding dangerous weather. The flight landed uneventfully. The following flight was again task saturated; due to airborne re-routes and deviations around the same massive storm systems; and successfully landed in our final destination.our company has gone too far in their attempts to stay 'on time.' the corporate philosophy has shifted much too far in favor of keeping schedule at minimum cost; and much too far away from maintaining adequate staff; parts; and qualified mechanics; pilots; and customer service agents on staff to properly run the airline. The agents are far too heavily task saturated when everything is running 'smoothly;' and they become woefully inadequate for our customer's needs when there is even the slightest disruption to a perfect operation. One agent to check in passengers; board an aircraft; answer questions and accommodate seat change requests; process frequent flier mileage updates and wheelchair requests; etc. Is sadly inadequate. In addition; every agent is intimidated about having any flight leave the gate even a minute late; is constantly answering to their supervisors as to why they were not 'on time' (which does not necessarily mean departing the gate on schedule; but rather 5-10 minutes early!) the maintenance department has been outsourced at all but a handful of stations which we serve. This outsourcing has allowed the company to maintain virtually no spare parts at an overwhelming majority of our stations served; other then a steady stream of MEL stickers for use to keep the airplanes flying. Even at our largest of maintenance stations there are so few mechanics on staff that they are unable to complete most line repairs due to the (company perceived) delay it will cause the outgoing flight. In other words; we would rather put a 'band-aid' and an MEL sticker and send the aircraft out than fix it properly and promptly. The problem with this philosophy is it is contradictory to the preamble governing our MEL authority. As with my case in point as stated above; the intent of the MEL system is to (according to the preamble) 'allow the aircraft to be safely flown to a station where repairs may be made.' this does not mean carrying an item on MEL through maintenance hubs for 3; 4; or 5 days in order to 'trouble shoot' or keep the airline on schedule. The preamble also states that it is important to note the 'importance of accomplishing repairs at the earliest opportunity.'the company has sadly warped the intent by creating a deliberate shortage of parts supplies; and then claiming the required repairs are unable to be made due to 'parts availability.' I believe this is not a valid interpretation of the MEL preamble intent....the intent is to allow the safe continuation of the aircraft to the first available maintenance station capable of performing the repair; whether that be at a company maintenance station or a contract maintenance station; but one which has a qualified mechanic and the required expertise and equipment capable of conducting the repair. Parts availability is a company issue; and the company's obligation is to get the part to the aircraft at a station where 'repairs may be made.' additionally; the pilot force has been subjected to increasing pressure by phone calls from chief pilots 'urging' them to 'use good judgment;' or to 'help' them make their decision about taking an aircraft which the pilot may feel is not in proper condition for continued operation. This is all very indicative of an extremely poor safety culture; a major distrust between the pilot force and the 'management pilots;' and increased hostility between the maintenance; operations; in-flight; and customer service departments all due to managements increased pressure to provide more service with fewer people; parts; and time. Every employee (short of middle to upper management) is feeling intimidated; pressured; coerced; and harassed by the pressures exerted from above; while each and every employee group has taken repeated pay cuts; reduced vacation and sick time; while shouldering mandatory additional overtime; extra duties and responsibilities.this company simply requires more employees to provide the level of service our costumes deserve; and to allow our employees to recover and recuperate from the increased demands placed on them through several bankruptcies and ever more tyrannical management personalities.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 Captain provided a lengthy and detailed report on what he feels are the many areas in which flight safety is being compromised by his airline with respect to flight crew fatigue; aircraft maintenance and pressure to operate on schedule (often times; early) even if critical issues need to be ignored to do so.

Narrative: This crew flew duty period 1 of our 4 day trip uneventfully from the U.S. to the Caribbean which was then scheduled to receive a 'reduced rest' period (R3) in the Caribbean due to being scheduled for 9:37 flight time in a 24 hour period. The next morning; duty period 2; when arriving at the aircraft in the Caribbean; preflight inspection revealed the First Officers 'Nav Display Unit' (NDU 2) was blank; and would not display any information....it was just blank. I called Maintenance Control to discuss the item and we both agreed this item could be covered as an MEL item; allowing the aircraft to continue to our destination (a Company Maintenance Station.) After 20 minutes of discussion on a cell phone with Maintenance Control about the correct write up procedure; pilot corrective action remarks; placarding procedures and logbook sign offs; we realized that our onboard aircraft MEL book had been revised and that I did not have the current MEL description for this particular discrepancy. Our MEL issue date was from 2009; and Maintenance Control had an updated 2010 version which I needed a copy of; since some of the restrictions had changed. We had completed the entire logbook entry process with 15-20 still remaining to departure time; however our departure was delayed almost 40 minutes while we waited for our operations in the Caribbean to receive a fax with the current MEL revision covering the discrepancy. We departed the Caribbean approximately 40 minutes late in good VMC conditions; and remained in marginal VFR to VFR-on-top conditions for the entire flight to the Company Maintenance Station.We were scheduled to continue with this same aircraft on from the Company Maintenance Station on; and then another leg. Knowing this; when approaching the Company Maintenance Station from the Caribbean and within ACARS range; we reminded the Company Maintenance Station that we would be looking to have the NDU 2 replaced there. Ten minutes prior to landing; we again radioed the station to remind them we had an item we wanted fixed there. After landing; the crew cleared customs; and returned to our aircraft (which the agent was anxious to board for the next flight) only to find out that Maintenance had visited the aircraft; performed a brief and required 'daily check' on the aircraft; and had converted the pilot-MEL for the NDU 2 into a regular maintenance MEL for the NDU 2. Clearly; the intention was to minimize delay; and have the crew continue to fly with an inoperative NDU 2; in the interest of 'keeping on schedule.'My original First Officer was replaced due to illness; and I met the replacement First Officer; who informed me he was still 'new' on the aircraft. Although he did have over 100 hours in type he said he was still 'getting used' to the aircraft. With this knowledge and after noting a severe weather advisory for thunderstorms had been issued for the destination area and along the route to there; I determined it was not in the interest of safety to continue there and then on with a 'new' First Officer and an inoperative NDU 2 screen; effectively cutting in half our ability to see and navigate around any severe weather; and safely navigate our route. After some discussion with Maintenance I explained I would not take the aircraft in its degraded state; and expressed frustration in that they had nearly 5 hours notice of the aircraft's condition upon arrival; and that they knew the crew had to clear customs before continuing on allowing additional time for maintenance to be performed; and that the scheduled turnaround time for these flights was 1:37 to begin with; plenty of time to replace a display unit screen. The mechanic who performed the daily check was somewhat perplexed as well; since he stated to me that the replacement display unit had been sent to the aircraft; was available and waiting for replacement; yet Maintenance Control had said it would now take 'too long' to replace the screen; and was just goingto keep the item on MEL and send us on our way. Realizing I would not accept the aircraft with that MEL for the next two legs due to the proximity and severity of weather along the route; Maintenance then put an estimated time of departure delay of approximately and hour and a half. Shortly afterward; Dispatch and Maintenance decided to swap aircraft and issue us another aircraft for our next flight. As we were preflighting the new aircraft; we were advised that destination traffic now had a ground stop due to severe weather; and we were issued a next update time of approximately 1:30. After checking again about 40 minutes later; we heard clearance issuing re-routes for two other flights to our destination; so we inquired about a re-route for us; and were ultimately issued a different routing due to weather. Once airborne and while enroute; we were issue no less than 4 additional re-routes; still due to severe weather. Thankfully; with the high task loading for both pilots of accurately inputting new routes into the FMGC while still navigating around multiple thunderstorm systems; we did NOT accept an aircraft with only one operable Nav Display Unit. Both pilots were kept very busy inputting and verifying new route segments while safely avoiding dangerous weather. The flight landed uneventfully. The following flight was again task saturated; due to airborne re-routes and deviations around the same massive storm systems; and successfully landed in our final destination.Our company has gone too far in their attempts to stay 'on time.' The corporate philosophy has shifted much too far in favor of keeping schedule at minimum cost; and much too far away from maintaining adequate staff; parts; and qualified mechanics; pilots; and customer service agents on staff to properly run the airline. The agents are far too heavily task saturated when everything is running 'smoothly;' and they become woefully inadequate for our customer's needs when there is even the slightest disruption to a perfect operation. One agent to check in passengers; board an aircraft; answer questions and accommodate seat change requests; process frequent flier mileage updates and wheelchair requests; etc. is sadly inadequate. In addition; every agent is intimidated about having any flight leave the gate even a minute late; is constantly answering to their supervisors as to why they were not 'on time' (which does not necessarily mean departing the gate on schedule; but rather 5-10 minutes early!) The Maintenance Department has been outsourced at all but a handful of stations which we serve. This outsourcing has allowed the company to maintain virtually NO spare parts at an overwhelming majority of our stations served; other then a steady stream of MEL stickers for use to keep the airplanes flying. Even at our largest of Maintenance Stations there are so few mechanics on staff that they are unable to complete most line repairs due to the (company perceived) delay it will cause the outgoing flight. In other words; we would rather put a 'band-aid' and an MEL sticker and send the aircraft out than fix it properly and promptly. The problem with this philosophy is it is contradictory to the preamble governing our MEL authority. As with my case in point as stated above; the INTENT of the MEL system is to (according to the preamble) 'allow the aircraft to be safely flown to a station where repairs may be made.' This does NOT mean carrying an item on MEL through maintenance hubs for 3; 4; or 5 days in order to 'trouble shoot' or keep the airline on schedule. The Preamble also states that it is important to note the 'importance of accomplishing repairs at the earliest opportunity.'The company has sadly warped the intent by creating a deliberate shortage of parts supplies; and then claiming the required repairs are unable to be made due to 'parts availability.' I believe this is NOT a valid interpretation of the MEL preamble intent....the intent is to allow the safe continuation of the aircraft to the first available maintenance station CAPABLE of performing the repair; whether that be at a Company Maintenance Station or a Contract Maintenance Station; but one which has a qualified mechanic and the required expertise and equipment capable of conducting the repair. Parts availability is a company issue; and the company's obligation is to get the part to the aircraft at a station where 'repairs MAY be made.' Additionally; the pilot force has been subjected to increasing pressure by phone calls from Chief Pilots 'urging' them to 'use good judgment;' or to 'help' them make their decision about taking an aircraft which the pilot may feel is not in proper condition for continued operation. This is all very indicative of an extremely poor safety culture; a major distrust between the pilot force and the 'management pilots;' and increased hostility between the maintenance; operations; in-flight; and customer service departments ALL due to managements increased pressure to provide more service with fewer people; parts; and time. EVERY employee (short of middle to upper management) is feeling intimidated; pressured; coerced; and harassed by the pressures exerted from above; while each and every employee group has taken repeated pay cuts; reduced vacation and sick time; while shouldering mandatory additional overtime; extra duties and responsibilities.This company simply requires more employees to provide the level of service our costumes deserve; and to allow our employees to recover and recuperate from the increased demands placed on them through several bankruptcies and ever more tyrannical management personalities.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.